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Adoption by United States Hog Producers
Production contracts play an important role in U.S. livestock production. As their use has
grown, so has the need to understand their influence on production practices. Understanding
the link between production contracts and health management practices, for example, is cru-
cial to policies and analysis of the preparation for, and potential consequences of larger scale
animal disease outbreaks in the United States. The benefits and costs, as well as tolerance
for disease risks, are likely different among independent producers and operations utilizing
some form of production contracts. Using results from a 2017 survey of U.S. hog producers,
we estimate the effects of production contract use on adoption of enhanced biosecurity prac-
tices. The main result of this chapter is that contracting producers are more likely to adopt
biosecurity. We find evidence that the effect of production contracts is heterogeneous across
enterprise types.
Chapter 2: The Market for Traceability with Applications to U.S.
Feeder Cattle
For voluntary traceability programs, a key interest for program designers and policymakers
is how to encourage participation. We contend that participating in voluntary traceability
can be viewed as a product characteristic, and thus serves as a source of product differ-
entiation. We study the implicit market for traceability systems for the first known time.
In our empirical example, we use stated choice experiments to link feeder cattle sellers and
buyers through premiums and discounts for cattle traceability systems. Using results from
discrete choice models, we simulate changes in traceability supply and demand in response
to prices and policies. We find that cost-share policies might be an effective way of encour-
aging participation for feeder cattle sellers and could serve as an alternative to mandating
traceability.
Chapter 3: Cow-Calf Producer Willingness to Report Disease: A
Test of Adverse Selection
Animal health agencies’ efforts to prevent and control foreign animal disease outbreaks de-
pend on, among other factors, timely livestock producer self-reporting of disease suspicions.
Adverse selection applies to disease reporting because livestock producers have private in-
formation about their disease status. Policymakers want to know how to set policy variables
such that producers reveal private information about disease status, early, before the disease
spreads. In this chapter, we study the effects of disease prevalence and indemnity payments
on cow-calf producer willingness to report foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) suspicions. A
novel test of adverse selection arises because we can determine how the rate of disease re-
porting adjusts to policy variables evaluated at different disease prevalence rates. Producers
that report FMD suspicions do so early such that the effects of policy variables diminish at
high prevalence rates.
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grown, so has the need to understand their influence on production practices. Understanding
the link between production contracts and health management practices, for example, is cru-
cial to policies and analysis of the preparation for, and potential consequences of larger scale
animal disease outbreaks in the United States. The benefits and costs, as well as tolerance
for disease risks, are likely different among independent producers and operations utilizing
some form of production contracts. Using results from a 2017 survey of U.S. hog producers,
we estimate the effects of production contract use on adoption of enhanced biosecurity prac-
tices. The main result of this chapter is that contracting producers are more likely to adopt
biosecurity. We find evidence that the effect of production contracts is heterogeneous across
enterprise types.
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can be viewed as a product characteristic, and thus serves as a source of product differ-
entiation. We study the implicit market for traceability systems for the first known time.
In our empirical example, we use stated choice experiments to link feeder cattle sellers and
buyers through premiums and discounts for cattle traceability systems. Using results from
discrete choice models, we simulate changes in traceability supply and demand in response
to prices and policies. We find that cost-share policies might be an effective way of encour-
aging participation for feeder cattle sellers and could serve as an alternative to mandating
traceability.
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Test of Adverse Selection
Animal health agencies’ efforts to prevent and control foreign animal disease outbreaks de-
pend on, among other factors, timely livestock producer self-reporting of disease suspicions.
Adverse selection applies to disease reporting because livestock producers have private in-
formation about their disease status. Policymakers want to know how to set policy variables
such that producers reveal private information about disease status, early, before the disease
spreads. In this chapter, we study the effects of disease prevalence and indemnity payments
on cow-calf producer willingness to report foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) suspicions. A
novel test of adverse selection arises because we can determine how the rate of disease re-
porting adjusts to policy variables evaluated at different disease prevalence rates. Producers
that report FMD suspicions do so early such that the effects of policy variables diminish at
high prevalence rates.
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The Effects of Production Contracts
on Biosecurity Adoption by United
States Hog Producers
1.1 Introduction
Livestock biosecurity is a set of on-farm practices designed for infectious disease prevention
and control. Biosecurity also includes disease surveillance, risk assessments, and practices
used to limit production losses following exposure. Together, these practices form an oper-
ation’s biosecurity plan. Isolating and determining the effectiveness of a single biosecurity
practice or a combination of practices is challenging. Biosecurity practices range in com-
plexity and efficacy, and adoption occurs at the intersection of several factors.
Today, biosecurity is at the forefront of larger animal health and food safety concerns.
The coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak is an example where a disease was transferred from
animals (bats) to humans (zoonotic disease) (World Health Organization-China Joint Mis-
sion, 2020).1 The U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that 3
1It is still not known which intermediate hosts were associated with the transmission of the disease to
humans (World Health Organization-China Joint Mission, 2020).
1
out of every 5 diseases in humans are zoonotic (Center for Disease Control and Prevention,
2019). Beyond human health, contageous diseases also have important agricultural produc-
tivity and economic implications. The 2013 U.S. porcine epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDV)
outbreak resulted in average annual economic losses ranging from $900 million to $1.8 billion
for the 2013-2018 period (Paarlberg, 2014). The 2014 U.S. highly pathogenic avian influenza
(HPAI) outbreak resulted in the death of more than 50 million chickens and turkeys (Ramos
et al., 2017). The 165 detected cases of African swine fever (ASF) in China have resulted
in the culling of 1.19 million pigs (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2020). While these
examples have widely different implications and consequences, they highlight the importance
of biosecurity in animal agriculture.
Central to broader biosecurity discussion is determining what role economic incentives
play in biosecurity adoption. In recent years, the literature on the incentives to adopt biose-
curity has grown substantially. Research has focused on policy (Gramig et al., 2009; Mitchell
et al., 2020; Reeling and Horan, 2015), strategic interaction (Hennessy et al., 2005; Reeling
and Horan, 2015), market prices (Tonsor and Schulz, 2020), and disease risk reductions
(Gramig et al., 2010) as the main instruments to incentivize biosecurity adoption. An in-
centive that is ignored is the business arrangements characterizing the livestock operation
under consideration.2 The benefits and costs from biosecurity are likely different among
independent producers and operations utilizing some form of production contracts.
The objective of this chapter is to determine the effects of production contracts on biose-
curity adoption. We consider three components of a operations’s biosecurity plan, 1) conduct-
ing biosecurity risk assessments, 2) providing written biosecurity procedures to employees,
and 3) adopting specific biosecurity practices. Using data from a 2017 survey of U.S. hog pro-
ducers, we estimate differences in biosecurity adoption between contracting and independent
producers. An empirical problem that potentially hinders our ability to draw conclusions
about the effects of production contracts is selection bias. We overcome possible selection
bias by jointly estimating biosecurity adoption and production contract participation with
2Dong et al. (2010) show that contracting results in higher levels of a business protection input and
Hennessy et al. (2019) note that contracting is an important consideration that is omitted from their model.
2
a bivariate probit model.
For the three components of biosecurity that we consider, results show a significant
increase in the probability of adoption when the producer is a contract grower (contractee).
Estimates for the effects of contracting on biosecurity adoption are also heterogenous. The
key source of heterogeneity that we consider is the type of operation (e.g., wean-to-finish
versus finishing operation). Among the operations we consider, we find a heterogenous effect
for finishing operations.
1.2 Production Contracts and Biosecurity
A hog production contract is an agreement where a contractee or grower raises or grows
pigs that are owned by a contactor or integrator.34 The use and structure of production
contracts in U.S. livestock production have evolved. From 1992 to 2009, the percent of U.S.
hog operations using production contracts grew from 3% to 48%, and the percent of hogs
grown under contract grew from 5% to 71% (Mcbride and Key, 2013). More recently, 11.5%
of U.S. hog operations are contract growers, and hogs grown under contract represent 43.0%
of total production (National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2019).5
The structure of livestock production contracts changes the types of price, production,
financial, and disease risks that producers face. Broadly, a standard production contract
involves a base payment with bonuses or premiums built into the contract. The design of
production contracts allow for solutions to the classic economic problems of moral hazard
and adverse selection. Moral hazard might arise if producers take less care at raising or
growing animals that they do not own. Adverse selection might arise if a producer has
private information about which type of operation they are (e.g., efficient versus inefficient).
Contract designs to solve adverse selection and moral hazard can take many forms which
might include a tournament contract or premiums based on predetermined performance
3Langemeier (1993) provides a more detailed description of livestock production contracts.
4Throughout the chapter we will use the terms contractor, integrator, firm, and principal interchange-
ability. Likewise, we will use contracting producer, contracting operation, and agent interchangeability.
5The calculation is a percent of total U.S. hog operations with inventory, which include contract growers,
contractor or integrator, and independent grower.
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measures. Performance measures typically include feed efficiency and/or death loss which
are easily measured and verifiable by the producer and the contractor firm.
Contract terms list the duties of the grower and the firm. Duties include general man-
agement responsibilities, animal handling, and environmental practices, among many others.
Grower duties also include health management and biosecurity, which are part of the firm’s
best management practices. Best management practices are private actions taken by the
producer. These private actions might be difficult for a firm to observe and verify. The ques-
tion then arises, what mechanisms act through production contracts to result in different
biosecurity actions than what a producer would take otherwise?
We argue that there are two potential mechanisms that act through production contracts
to result in different levels of biosecurity practice adoption. First, to verify that producers are
compliant with biosecurity, contractors subject all operations to internal audits. In practice,
auditing takes the form of firm production managers performing routine standard site visits
and verifying that all processes are being completed correctly following the guidelines that
have been established through the contract. The prospect of on-farm assessments increases
the likelihood of biosecurity adoption by contracting operations. Failure to comply with
biosecurity standards could result in penalties or contract termination. Second, contractors
or integrators provide pigs for growing (inputs) and serve as sellers, and in many cases
packers, for finished hogs (outputs). Firms also provide feed, veterinary services, supplies
and when a mortgage exists on the contracting producer’s facilities provide a long-term
contract that will match the length of the loan. Thus, losing a production contract would
result in a loss of market access for inputs, outputs, and sources of credit. Another benefit
to raising hogs on contract is access to manure which is often a big driver, especially in the
Midwest. Hog manure offers a opportunity to offset fertilizer costs. Third, while biosecurity
adoption is not observable by the firm, outcomes that biosecurity adoption are associated
with are observable. Namely, performance which could vary depending upon feed efficiency,
morbidity, and mortality. A firm could simply make compensation conditional on or a
function of herd health and productivity.
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1.3 Conceptual Framework
This section provides a simple model of biosecurity adoption to illustrate key differences
that arise between contracting and independent growers. To do this, we bring together the
literature on biosecurity and damage control inputs (Chi et al., 2002; Gramig et al., 2010)
and the literature on livestock production contracts (Dong et al., 2010; Dubois and Vukina,
2004; Muth et al., 2007). In the livestock production contract literature, researchers model
grower effort as a broad collection of production actions. Grower effort is related to output
through the effects of effort on feed conversion (Dubois and Vukina, 2004). However, the
biosecurity literature makes a distinction between productive and biosecurity inputs, which
have different effects on output, and thus grower incentives. We model this distinction for
independent and contract growers.
There are three types of producers i ∈ {I, C,A} where I denotes an independent grower,
C denotes a contract grower that does not face auditing, and A denotes a contract grower
facing auditing. We assume that there is a representative grower for each type. Throughout,
let us assume that growers operate in isolation so that there are no strategic interactions
or livestock disease externalities. At the beginning of a feeding period, growers decide on




K) to adopt and grower effort e





Gramig et al. (2010) we will focus on discrete biosecurity practices so that biK ∈ {0, 1} and
regard them as practices functioning to prevent disease during the feeding period. Likewise,
we consider the discrete case of producer effort so that eik ∈ {0, 1}. Biosecurity adoption
and effort are costly and have price vectors cb = (cb1, cb2, ..., cbK) and ce = (ce1, ce2, ..., ceN),
respectively, which implies that all pay the same price.6
During the feeding period some level of disease D = D(bi) ∈ [0, 1] is realized after bi is
adopted. Here D(bi) = 1 implies that bi has no effect on the prevalence of the disease and
D(bi) = 0 implies that bi completely prevents that disease. We maintain the assumption of
Gramig et al. (2010) that D(0) ≥ D(bi) when bi includes at least one nonzero element. By
not indexing disease by producer type, we are assuming that biosecurity efficacy is the same
6Relaxing this assumption is not crucial to the main result.
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for all producers.7
Disease has a destructive effect on output. Specifically, the share of output destroyed
by disease is G(D) ∈ [0, 1] where G(·) is the damage function (Lichtenberg and Zilberman,
1986). Alternatively, G(D) can be thought of as the mortality rate. Output is defined as total
pounds of live weight produced N iW iL where N
i is the number of pigs and W iL is live weight.
8
Feeder pigs weigh W iF . Thus, the total amount of output that survives the production process
is N iW iL[1 − G(D(bI))]. Disease and effort have production efficiency effects. We write the
grower-specific feed conversion rate F i(ei, D(bi)) ∈ [0,∞] and assume ∂F (·)/∂D(·) > 0.
The feed conversion rate is the pounds of feed per pound of gain. D(0) ≥ D(bi) implies
F i(D(0)) ≥ F i(D(bi)) when bi includes at least one nonzero element.
1.3.1 Adoption for an Independent Producer
At the beginning of the feeding period, the independent grower purchases feeder pigs N I at
weight W IF and pays market price PF in dollars per pound. The independent grower owns
and can sell the output at price PL in dollars per pound. Finally, feed costs are cF in dollars





















− cb · bI − ce · eI
The usual decision rule applies for the adoption of discrete practices. An independent pro-
ducer will adopt biosecurity practice bIk if π
I
k=1−πIk=0 > 0 where πIk=1 is profit from adoption
and πIk=0 is profit from non-adoption.
7There are several specific examples where this is not true. However, we have no way of definitively
arguing how efficacy from collective biosecurity adoption varies between independent and contract growers.
That is, differences in efficacy will be practice-specific.
8Alternatively, N i can be viewed as the amount of pig space measured in number of pigs or size of
production facilities.
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1.3.2 Adoption for a Contracting Producer
In this section, we model producer decisions for a given set of contract terms. We are not
interested in the contractor-contractee relationship or the design of contracts.
The first difference between independent and contract growers is recognizing that a con-
tract grower does not own the output produced, and thus compensation is not equal to the
market price. Likewise, contract growers do not pay for variable inputs and feeder pigs.
Payment can take many forms. We will use a variant of the payment scheme developed in
Dubois and Vukina (2004). The second difference is that contracting producers might be
required to use a certain combination or amount of inputs to produce outputs, as described
in the contract terms. For example, a contractee might have to adopt specific animal welfare
practices or manage water and waste according to a contractor’s guidelines. In our context,
a contracting producer might be required to adopt certain biosecurity practices. In what
follows, we will consider these two key differences.
Without Auditing. Suppose that a contractor would like to encourage adoption of biose-
curity bC . However, during a feeding period, a contractor cannot perfectly observe a con-
tractee’s biosecurity adoption. The contractor knows there is a relationship between biosecu-
rity and disease. Moreover, the contractor knows that disease influences mortality and feed
efficiency. As such, the contractor structures bonuses around feed efficiency and mortality.
For the contractee, compensation takes the form PC = base + bonus. The contract grower
receives a base payment that is determined by pig space, base = β1N
C . bonus is determined






































cb · bC − ce · eC
and adoption occurs if RCk=1 −RCk=0 > 0, for practice bCk .
With Auditing. In this scenario, a contractor would like to incentivize a grower to adopt a
specific set of biosecurity practices, defined by b̄ = (b̄1, b̄2, ..., b̄K). However, during a feeding
period, a contractor cannot observe a contractree’s choice of bA. Instead, a contractor can
audit growers with auditing probability α ∈ [0, 1]. A penalty is applied β3 ·max(0, b̄ − bA)
when the producer is audited where β3 is an exogenously determined parameter measuring
the severity of the penalty.



















cb · bA − ce · eA − αβ3 ·max(0, b̄− bA)
and adoption occurs if RAk=1 −RAk=0 > 0, for practice bAk .
1.3.3 Comparisons
Recall, we care about determining which producer is more likely to adopt biosecurity. We
can do this by comparing adoption decision rules across producers. The idea is to compare
πIk=1−πIk=0, RCk=1−RCk=0, and RAk=1−RAk=0 which will determine which grower is more likely
to comply with bk. Comparisons are made easier through normalization of several terms.










F = 0. Thus, we
are evaluating growers of similar size with similar live hog and feeder pig weights. Further,
assume that we are evaluating growers at constant effort so that eI = eC = eA = e. Given
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respectively. For each grower, equations 1.5-1.7 show that three main effects are driving the
adoption decision. The first term in each equation is the difference in returns from adoption.
The second term in each equation is the unit cost of adoption. Finally, the third term in
each equation is the cost differential that arises from changes in feed conversion and death
loss. Equation 1.7 includes an additional term for the effects of auditing.
A type C contract grower is more likely to adopt bk relative to an independent grower
if RCk=1 − RCk=1 > πIk=1 − πik=1 ∀ bCk = bIk = 1. A visual inspection of equations 1.5 and
1.6 reveal that the likelihood that contract growers will have a higher rate of adoption will
depend on how the benchmark feed conversion rate and bonus parameter are set relative to
costs and market prices for the independent grower. A higher rate of adoption by contract
growers also depends on the relative functional relationship between feed conversion, effort,
and disease, i.e., grower production efficiency. To see this, assume that we are comparing
growers with similar production efficiency, F I(·) = FC(·). Combining equations 1.5 and 1.6
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shows that a contract grower is more likely to adopt biosecurity practice bK if:
β2F̄ > PL. (1.8)
β2F̄ can be viewed as the maximum bonus payment, i.e., a feed conversion rate of zero.
Equation 1.8 says that a contract grower will be more likely to adopt bk if contract terms are
set such that the maximum bonus is greater than market prices received by the independent
grower.
A type A contract grower is more likely to adopt bk relative to an independent grower if
RAk=1 − RAk=1 > πIk=1 − πik=1 ∀ bCk = bIk = 1. From equations 1.5 and 1.7, relative adoption
between type grower types A and I depends on how the benchmark feed conversion rate,
bonus parameters, auditing probability, and auditing penalty are set for the contract grower
relative to costs and market prices for the type I grower. Again, the functional relationship
between feed conversion, effort, and disease will play an important role. Assuming that
F I(·) = FA(·) and combining equations 1.5 and 1.7 shows that a contract grower facing
auditing is more likely to adopt biosecurity practice bK if:
β2F̄ + αβ3 ·max(0, b̄k − 0) > PL. (1.9)
Equation 1.9 says that a contract grower will be more likely to adopt bk if contract terms are
set such that the maximum bonus is greater than market prices received by the independent
grower, adjusted by the prospect of auditing.
Equations 1.8 and 1.9 provide evidence that contract grower compensation and auditing
might result in a contracting producer being more likely to adopt a biosecurity practice rel-
ative to an independent producer. This finding depends on how the contractor sets contract
parameters. An assumption that might not be appropriate is that biosecurity adoption costs
are the same across producer types. A likely alternative is that contractors cover or supply
all the inputs associated with complying with biosecurity protocols so that cI > cA = cC .
Another simplifying assumption that abstracts from the nuances of hog production is that
10
independent producers face output and input price risk whereas contracting producers do
not in most cases. Finally, we have only considered one payment scheme for one type of
hog producer. There are several different types of business arrangements that vary among
enterprise types.
To conclude, the main prediction that we seek to test is that contracting producers are
more likely to comply with biosecurity. This section also provides insights on which variables
should be controlled for empirically to isolate the effects of production contracts. We have
no way of knowing which contracting producers are subject to audits or face compensation
based on mortality and feed efficiency. Thus, a significant finding for the effects of contracting
does not mean that audits or compensation based on the disease are the reason for higher
adoption. However, the lack of such a finding would suggest that audits or conditional
compensation based on disease have no effect on a contracting producer’s decision to adopt
biosecurity practices.
1.4 Data
This chapter uses data from a 2017 survey of U.S. hog producers. The survey instrument
was developed and tested in collaboration with university faculty, extension specialists, and
other professionals with knowledge of U.S. hog production. The final survey instrument
was granted exemption status by the Iowa State University Institutional Review Board
and administered by the Iowa State University Center for Survey Statistics and Methodol-
ogy (CSSM). CSSM developed survey cover letters and questions for web application using
Qualtrics software.
Hog producers from Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ne-
braska, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wisconsin received surveys
electronically from March to April 2017. These 13 states were selected as they represent
60% of inventory and 90% of sales in the United States (National Agricultural Statistics Ser-
vice, 2019). Producers were sampled from membership lists, and invitations to complete the
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survey were sent from respective state pork producers’ associations.9 Final data collection
resulted in 371 complete or partially complete surveys.
The survey instrument collected information on producer demographics, current man-
agement questions, biosecurity investment and adoption, feasibility of implementation of
specific biosecurity practices, and experiences with and perceptions of swine disease. The
survey asked producers, “Which business arrangement best describes the agreement under
which you are presently producing hogs?” and options included independent producer, con-
tractor or integrator, contract grower (contractee), or other. For comparison, we limit the
sample to producers that either identifies their business arrangements as an independent
producer or contractee.
Determining how best to measure biosecurity has proven difficult in the literature, and
there is no clear consensus. A farm’s biosecurity plan is comprised of several protocols,
procedures, and investments that range in complexity, efficacy, and cost. In the literature,
biosecurity has been measured as a share of total investment (Mitchell et al., 2020), hypo-
thetical annualized costs in stated choice questions (Tonsor and Schulz, 2020), biosecurity
protocol adoption with adoption costs in experimental games (Merrill et al., 2019), and
discrete adoption (Gramig et al., 2010; Pudenz et al., 2019). We consider a subset of the
discrete biosecurity practices in Pudenz et al. (2019).
Collectively, the Center for Food Security and Public Health, Iowa State University,
University of Minnesota, swine industry expert, and state and national government officials
developed the Secure Pork Supply (SPS). SPS provides educational material, checklists,
templates, and training for producers to enhance their preparedness for disease outbreaks.
Central to SPS is enhanced biosecurity. The SPS provides enhanced biosecurity checklists
and plans for each sector of the U.S. swine industry.
Here, we consider the adoption of three separate and distinct biosecurity practices from
SPS that were included in the survey: biosecurity risk assessment (BioRisk), always pro-
viding a written site-specific biosecurity plan to employees (BioP lan), and clearly defining
a perimeter buffer area (PBA). A site-specific biosecurity plan is a collection of protocols
9Similar producer sampling procedures were used by Roe et al. (2004).
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that range from entry/exit guidance from the site to feed and manure management. Biose-
curity risk assessments evaluate a farm’s biosecurity and identify risk factors for disease and
herd health that can be mitigated through changes to an operation’s biosecurity. Providing
site-specific biosecurity procedures to employees helps ensure that everyone entering and on
the production site is compliant with biosecurity procedures.10 A PBA functions to keep
potentially pathogen contaminated personnel, vehicles, and equipment from contaminating
swine production areas. The PBA is the first line of defense to protect the pigs housed
within its perimeter.Together, these three practices serve as key components to protecting
from endemic and foreign animal diseases (Secure Pork Supply, 2017).
The final sample includes 223 observations after omitting incomplete survey responses.
Table 1.1 provides variable abbreviations and definitions of all variables used in the analysis.
In Table 1.2, we provide a summary of the data, difference in mean tests, and a comparison
with data from the 2017 Census of Agriculture (Ag Census) when available. To make better
comparisons, we only use Ag Census data for the 13 states surveyed. In our sample, 40%
of producers are contracting produces, and 22.5% of producers (operations with inventory)
from the Ag Census sample are contract growers. Producers are similar in operation type and
PRRSV infection. PRRSV statistics are from the 2012 National Animal Health Monitoring
System swine study. Differences between the data used in this chapter and Ag census data
are expected. Producers in our sample have larger inventories relative to Ag Census data.
Contract producers have a higher adoption rate of all biosecurity practices considered
(Table 1.2). The largest difference in adoption is for providing biosecurity procedures to
employees (BioP lan). While this finding could be a function of production contracts, it
is also likely that inventory is a determinant of differences in BioP lan adoption. Larger
operations require more employees, and thus providing biosecurity procedures becomes an
important step in ensuring biosecurity compliance. Similarly, inventory could be a confound-
ing factor in determining the effects of contracts on PBA adoption. Table 1.2 shows that
48% of contracting producers and 28% of independent producers adopt PBA. PBA helps
10The SPS provides an example of a site-specific biosecurity plan that can be accessed at: https://www.
securepork.org/Resources/SPS-Biosecurity-Plan-Example-W-F-Indoor-Production.pdf.
13
prevent pathogens from entering production sites. As the number of of production sites
(unique premise ID, unique address) in an operation increases, to house larger hog and pig
inventories, PBA becomes important in preventing pathogen spread between sites where
animals are raised.
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Table 1.1: Variables and Definitions
Variables Definition
Dependent Variables:
BioRisk (0,1) 1 if the operation has conducted a self-administered biose-
curity risk assessment
BioP lan (0,1) 1 if written site-specific biosecurity procedures are provided
to employees
PBA (0,1) 1 if a perimeter buffer area is clearly defined for the oper-
ation
Independent Variables:
Contract (0,1) 1 if currently a contract grower/contractee
Age (years) Producer age
Exp30 (0,1) 1 if experience in hog production is greater than or equal
to 30 years
College (0,1) 1 if college education or more
IA (0,1) 1 if operation is in Iowa
PRRSV (0,1) 1 if PRRSV outbreak on operation in the last 3 years
PEDV (0,1) 1 if PEDV outbreak on operation in the last 3 years
Operation (0,1) 1 if operation is farrow to finish (FarrowFinish); 2 if op-
eration is wean to finish (WeanFinish); 3 if operation is
finishing only (Finishing); 4 if operation is other.
MgmtPigs (0,1) 1 if growing pigs are managed other (other); 2 if growing
pigs are managed continual flow (ContFlow); 3 if growing
pigs are managed all-in/all-out by room (AllByRoom); 4 if
growing pigs are managed all-in/all-out by building (All-
ByBuilding); 5 if growing pigs are managed all-in/all-out
by site (AllBySite)
Inventory (0,1) 1 if hog and pig inventory is 1-999 head; 2 if hog and pig
inventory is 1000-4999 head; 3 if hog and pig inventory is
5000-9999 head; 5 if hog and pig inventory is >10000 head
FacilityAge Number of buildings in which hogs are raised are 10 years
old or greater
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Table 1.2: Survey means for dependent and independent variables
All Operations Contract Independent 2017a
N=223 N=89 N=134 Difference Ag Census
Dependent Variables:
BioRisk (0,1) 0.52 0.60 0.46 -0.13*
BioP lan (0,1) 0.57 0.76 0.45 -0.32***
PBA (0,1) 0.36 0.48 0.28 -0.21***
Independent Variables:
Age 53.04 54.28 52.21 -2.072 49.20
FacilityAge 7.04 3.49 9.40 5.90**
Exp30 (0,1) 0.63 0.57 0.67 0.10
College (0,1) 0.57 0.55 0.59 0.04
IA (0,1) 0.71 0.63 0.76 0.13** 0.09
PRRSV (0,1) 0.53 0.43 0.60 0.18*** 0.46b
PEDV (0,1) 0.40 0.43 0.39 -0.039
Operation (0,1)
FarrowFinish 0.32 0.02 0.51 0.49*** 0.29
WeanFinish 0.43 0.53 0.36 -0.17**
Finishing 0.13 0.26 0.04 -0.21*** 0.40c
Other 0.13 0.19 0.08 -0.11** 0.17
MgmtPigs (0,1)
Other 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.04
ContFlow 0.07 0.02 0.10 0.08**
AllByRoom 0.19 0.12 0.24 0.12**
AllByBuilding 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.00
AllBySite 0.35 0.49 0.25 -0.24***
Inventory (0,1)
1-999 0.09 0.00 0.14 0.14*** 0.69
1000-4999 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.04 0.20
5000-9999 0.22 0.29 0.17 -0.12** 0.11d
>10000 0.48 0.49 0.48 -0.02
aOnly for operations in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ne-
braska, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
bFrom the 2012 National Animal Health Monitoring System swine study USDA–APHIS–
VS–NAHMS (2012).
cThe USDA’s definition of a finishing hog operation is such that it does separate wean to
finish from finishing operations.
d5,000 or more in hog and pig inventory.
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1.5 Empirical Framework
The theoretical model predicts that contracting producers are more likely to adopt biosecu-
rity. We test this prediction by exploiting cross-sectional variation in biosecurity adoption in
survey data among contracting and independent producers. To start, we assume that binary
biosecurity adoption Bioi is determined by
Bioi = 1[xi
′β + γContracti + εi > 0] (1.10)
where 1[·] is the indicator function equal to one if xi′β+ γContracti + εi > 0, xi is a vector
of controls, β is a parameter vector, Contracti is the business arrangement for producer i
that equals one if the producer operates under production contracts and zero if the producer
operates independently, γ is the effect of interest, and εi is the error term. With normally
distributed errors, we would like to know the effects of production contracts on the response
probability:
P (Bioi|Contracti,xi) = Φ(xi′β + γContracti) (1.11)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
One problem with the model in equation 1.10 is that Contracti is not randomly assigned.
As a result, MLE for the probit model will be inconsistent for β and γ. Non-random assign-
ment is a result of producers’ self-selecting into different business arrangements. Selection
bias becomes less of a problem if one can provide a convincing argument for selection on
observables and control for all observable differences between contracting and independent
producers. However, in our context, there are several reasons why unobservables potentially
play an important role in determining contract participation and biosecurity adoption. A
specific example in the hog production contract literature is management ability (Key and
McBride, 2003). Like Key and McBride (2003), it is easy to see how management ability
might be positively correlated with production contracts and biosecurity adoption.
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One way to account for selection on unobservables is the bivariate probit model:
Bioi = 1[xi
′β + γContracti + εi > 0]
Contracti = 1[zi
′α+ υi > 0] (1.12)






In equation 1.12, ρ 6= 0 implies that a single probit estimation would produce biased estimates
because of correlation between Contracti and εi.
There are two ways through which the bivariate probit model in equation 1.12 is iden-
tified. The first is the case where xi = zi and identification is driven by functional form
assumptions. In particular, the model is identified from parametric assumptions made about
the joint distribution of the error terms. While this approach might be appealing, many in
the literature are critical and argue that results can be fragile (Altonji et al., 2005; Maddala,
1983; Mourifié and Méango, 2014).
The second approach is well known and uses exclusion restrictions to identify the parame-
ters in the model. In our model, we use the exclusion restriction that the number of facilities
that are greater than 10-years-old (FacilityAge) enters the contracting equation but has no
direct channel through which it determines the adoption of the types of biosecurity that we
consider. Integrators and contractors can offer contract growers loans for buildings, facility
improvements, and equipment, as well as help build facilities (Langemeier, 1993). Thus, it
is hypothesized that contracting producers will have fewer old buildings. Recent estimates
support the hypothesis. According to Eric Haveman, an ag lending vice president for the
Sioux Center American Savings Bank, “more than 80 percent of hog buildings constructed
in the last few years have come attached to a contract from a large producer.” (DeYoung,
2019)
The types of biosecurity practices that we consider are low investment practices that
require a high level of adoption to be effective. We cannot think of a plausible reason why
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FacilityAge would directly determine adoption of the three practices that we consider. As
an example, there is no reason why producers with fewer old buildings would be more/less
compliant with providing employees with biosecurity procedures relative to producers with
more older buildings. This exclusion restriction would be hard to justify for practices that
require a high investment. For example, producers with more older buildings would be
reluctant to invest in new air filtration systems that improve air quality and prevent the
introduction and spread of disease.
The next obvious problem with our exclusion restriction is determining whether FacilityAge
is correlated with management ability and ε. FacilityAge captures the age of the produc-
tion technology used in hog production (McBride, 2003). In general, managerial skill is a
broad term related to several production decisions that go beyond biosecurity. To purge
any correlation that FacilityAge has with ε, we include as many observables in x that are
likely predictors of management skill and biosecurity adoption. For example, experience,
age, education are likely highly correlated with overall management skills. We also include
past outbreaks of PEDV and PRRSV as controls in x. PEDV and PRRSV outbreaks are
likely correlated with the portion variation in management ability that is correlated with
production contracts and biosecurity adoption.
1.6 Results
This section focuses on the empirical results of the chapter. We begin the section by present-
ing baseline results from probit models that ignore selection bias and consider the importance
of different sets of confounding factors. As a robustness check, we estimate the effects of pro-
duction contracts for a more homogeneous subsample of the data. Next, we provide results
from bivariate probit models to control for selection bias. Finally, we consider heterogeneity
and use model predictions to determine the number of operations adopting biosecurity under
different business arrangement scenarios.
Results in Table 1.3 are from probit estimations that consider different sets of control vari-
ables. Results in Column (1) are from the regression of biosecurity on production contracts
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without controls. Without controls, the average marginal effect ranges from 0.13 for biose-
curity risk assessment (BioRisk) to 0.32 for providing biosecurity procedures to employees
(BioP lan) and is equivalent to a raw difference in means. Column (2) controls for oper-
ation type. Different operation types have different contractual obligations and tolerances
for disease risks. For example, the implications for a disease outbreak in a gilt developer
unit, which supplies genetics (breeding stock), are drastically different from those for an
operation growing hogs for marketing. A feature of the swine industry is the development
of production pyrmids (Ramirez and Zaabel, 2012). As part of production pyramids, the
health pyramid concept, which seeks to minimize the downstream effects of disease by con-
trollingfor disease toward the top of the pyramid and thus prioritizes the health of animals
in the genetic nucleus and multiplication population, followed by farrowing and gestation,
nursery, and lastly finishing animals (Ramirez and Zaabel, 2012). When we control for oper-
ation type, we see a slight change in marginal effect estimates, relative to Column (1). The
average marginal effect for Contract ranges from 0.198 for BioRisk to 0.30 for BioP lan,
and all are statistically significant (Table 1.3 Column 2).
Together, controlling for operation type and inventory in Column (3) have an impact
on estimated marginal effects and appear to be important predictors of biosecurity adop-
tion. Relative to Column (1), controlling for operation type and inventory decreases the
marginal effect 9.8 percentage points for BioP lan and increases the marginal effect 4.2 and
2.6 percentage points for BioRisk and PBA, respectively. Column (4) includes the full set
of controls. Relative to Column (3), including additional controls has a small impact on es-
timated average partial effects. However, relative to Column (1), the direction of change in
the average marginal effects from including all controls reduces the range across biosecurity
practices. In Column (4), the average marginal effect ranges from 0.19 to 0.23, whereas the
range of the effect is 0.13 to 0.32 in Column (1).
As a robustness check, we conduct a similar assessment for a subsample of the data.
The last four Columns in Table 1.3 are from data that only include wean to finish, farrow
to finish, and finishing sample, which allows for comparisons among a more homogenous
group of producers. The full sample includes additional (Other) operations such as gilt
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Table 1.3: Maximum likelihood estimates and average partial effects (APE) from probit
models for the effects of production contracts on biosecurity adoption
Full Sample N=223 Sub Sample N=195
BioRisk (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Estimate 0.34* 0.52** 0.47** 0.51** 0.273 0.55** 0.53** 0.53**
(0.17) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.19) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25)
APE 0.13** 0.20*** 0.18** 0.19** 0.11 0.21** 0.20** 0.20**
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
R-squared 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06
BioPlan
Estimate 0.85*** 0.80*** 0.64*** 0.69*** 0.90*** 0.84*** 0.72*** 0.70***
(0.18) (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) (0.20) (0.24) (0.25) (0.26)
APE 0.32*** 0.30*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.25*** 0.23***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
R-squared 0.07 0.09 0.16 0.18 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.18
PBA
Estimate 0.55*** 0.72*** 0.66*** 0.69*** 0.48** 0.72*** 0.70*** 0.70**
(0.18) (0.15) (0.23) (0.25) (0.19) (0.25) (0.25) (0.28)
APE 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.18** 0.26*** 0.24*** 0.22***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
R-squared 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.14
Notes: The full sample includes operation types and the sub sample only includes farrow
to finish, wean to finish, and finishing operations. Columns (1) and (5) do not controls.
Columns (2) and (6) includes Operation (four categories with weanfinish as the base) as
control variables. Columns (3) and (7) are Columns (2) and (6) plus Inventory (four cat-
egories with ¿10,000 as the base) as controls. Columns (4) and (8) are Columns (3) and
(7) plus Age, College, Exp30, IA, PRRSV , PEDV , and MgmtPigs (five categories with
AllByRoom is the base). Standard errors in parentheses. APE standard errors are calculated
using the delta method. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
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developer units and breeding operations, which likely results in greater differences in overall
production and biosecurity. With no controls, the average marginal effect of Contract is
0.11, 0.33, and 0.18 for BioRisk, BioP lan, and PBA, respectively (Table 1.3 Column 5).
The estimate and average marginal effect in Column (5) are not statistically significant for
BioRisk. Interestingly, relative to the full sample, including additional controls has a similar
effect on the direction of change and magnitude of the average marginal effects. The average
marginal effect in Column (8) ranges from 0.20 to 0.23 for the subsample and from 0.19 to
0.23 in Column (4) for the full sample.
1.6.1 Selection Bias
Here, we control for selection bias by estimating bivariate probit models that utilize an ex-
clusion restriction. The exclusion restriction that we use is that FacilityAge is an important
determinant of contract participation but has no direct effect on biosecurity adoption for the
types of practices that we consider. As another example, the fourth component of the SPS
enhanced biosecurity plan is a line of separation (LOS). Clearly defining a LOS for each
building provides a physical barrier to prevent pathogen contact between the outside and
pigs being housed on-site. Since a LOS is directly related to hog buildings, the type and
how a LOS is defined will likely depend on the age of the building and is an example where
our exclusion restriction would not work.
As a crude test to determine if FacilityAge is a good predictor of contract participa-
tion, we estimate probit models for contract participation and use a likelihood ratio test
to determine if FacilityAge should be included in the model (Table 1.4). Likelihood ratio
test results reject the restricted model in favor of including FacilityAge as a predictor of
contract participation. Among the variables included, Exp30, PRRSV , and FacilityAge
are associated with a lower probability of being a contract producer. Relative to farrow to
finish operations, wean to finish, finishing, and other operations are associated with a higher
probability of being a contracting producer.
For brevity, the full set of results for bivariate probit models are suppressed, and attention
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is given to marginal effects for contract and the correlation parameter estimate (Table 1.5).11
Correlation between unobservables ranges from 0.15 for the bivariate probit model with
BioRisk and contract to -0.50 for the model with PBA and contract. For each of the
bivariate probit models, we fail to reject the null H0 : ρ = 0, which can be used as a test
of exogeneity for contract if we assume the exclusion restriction holds (Wooldridge, 2010).
Despite this finding, we observe noticeable differences in the average partial effect relative
to probit models that ignore selection bias. The most significant difference is for the effects
of contract on PBA. The average partial effects for contract are 0.11, 0.37, and 0.43 for
BioRisk, BioP lan, and PBA, respectively, and standard errors are generally larger for the
bivariate probit relative to probit models that treat contract as exogenous.
1.6.2 Heterogeneous Effects
An important consideration is determining whether the effects of production contracts are
heterogeneous across producers. A potential source of heterogeneity is operation type. Dif-
ferent operations will have different tolerance for diseases risks and contract obligations vary
significantly from one operation type to another which could lead to a heterogenous effect for
production contracts. For example, a production contract for a finishing operation will have
detailed animal health and biosecurity protocols for feeder pig through finishing management
while farrow to finish operations would have a more complex biosecurity plan which would
include breeding, gestating, farrowing, lactating, weaning through finishing management.
In Table 1.6, we report marginal effects from models that interact contract with binary
variables for operation type. We find a statistically significant heterogenous effect for fin-
ishing operations for BioP lan and PBA adoption. The effect of contracting is larger for
BioP lan and smaller for PBA adoption relative to operations that are not finishing op-
erations. When there is not a statistically significant interaction term, marginal effects are
similar to those in Column (4) of Table 1.3. The effect of contracting for BioRisk ranges from
0.15 to 0.20 in Table 1.6 and is 0.19 in Column (4) of Table 1.3. Not finding heterogenous
11Because of issues with convergence, we do not estimate bivariate probit models for the subsample of the
data that only includes wean to finish, farrow to finish, and finishing operations.
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Exp30 (0,1) -0.71** -0.66**
(0.303) (0.308)
College (0,1) -0.09 -0.12
(0.232) (0.235)
IA (0,1) -0.30 -0.31
(0.257) (0.262)





























Psuedo R-Squared 0.36 0.38
Log-likelihood -96.32 -93.00
H0 : FacilityAge = 0 6.65***
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
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Table 1.5: Maximum likelihood estimates and average partial effects (APE) from probit and
bivariate probit models for the effects of production contracts on biosecurity adoption, N=223




















H0 : ρ = 0 2.53
Note: SThis table reports results for the full sample that includes all operation types. In the bivariate probit
model the exclusion restriction is that log(FacilityAge) is included in the production contract equation but
not the biosecurity adoption equation. Controls include Age, College, Exp30, IA, PRRSV , PEDV , and
MgmtPigs (five categories with AllByRoom is the base), Inventory (four categories with ¿10000 as the
base), and Operation (four categories with weanfinish as the base). Standard errors in parentheses. APE
standard errors are calculated using the delta method. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
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effect for WeanFinish and Other might be due to a lack of variation in operation type among































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This chapter determines the effects of contracting on biosecurity adoption. The focus is on
three components of biosecurity in the Secure Pork Supply. Namely, conducting biosecurity
risk assessments, providing biosecurity procedures to employees, and defining a perimeter
buffer area. We find strong evidence that contracting producers are more likely to adopt
biosecurity. Throughout the chapter, we argue that compensation based on disease status
and quality assurance audits act through production contracts to result in higher biosecurity
adoption. As a test of one particular hypothesis with implications for preparation for, and
potential consequences of larger scale animal disease outbreaks in the United States, our
analysis provides fodder for the discussion of the benefits of production contracts that extend
beyond reducing producer input expenditures, accessing credit, and reducing risk that is
typically examined in the literature. We find production contracts facilitate the adoption of
enhanced biosecurity practices that might help provide business continuity in the event of a
foreign animal disease outbreak as well as help protect operations from endemic diseases.
The results of this chapter are not without limitations. Throughout the chapter, we
maintain that our target population is producers in the 13 states that represent the bulk of
U.S. hog production. Still, our sample is heavily skewed towards Iowa producers. Future
research should substitute the use of membership lists of state pork producer associations
with alternative associations. Equally important, our identification relies on an exclusion
restriction for the age of buildings used in hog production. A more detailed record of produc-
tion practices, financial background, and production contract details might allow for future
research to use a selection on observables identification strategy.
Several have documented structural change at the farm level (Key and McBride, 2007;
O’Donoghue et al., 2012; Parcell et al., 2016; Taylor, 2007). Although the process of re-
structuring is ongoing, and the merits of industry structure are continually being debated,
the net result is that the U.S. pork industry has held its ground domestically and has made
major inroads in export markets. The United States has one of the most competitive pork
industries in the world but still faces challenges. The economic impact of livestock disease
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has heightened and the importance of ensuring a continuous, safe, and wholesome supply of
pork for consumers is at the forefront of many producer and industry-wide decisions. Pro-
duction contracting should be regarded as one effective step, amongst many, in achieving
enhanced biosecurity for the pork industry.
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Chapter 2
The Market for Traceability with
Applications to U.S. Feeder Cattle
2.1 Introduction
Throughout agriculture, there have been increasing calls for knowing additional informa-
tion about food production. Food and livestock traceability programs that facilitate the
sharing of information are product, industry, and country-specific. For example, the Euro-
pean Union’s 2002 General Food Law mandates traceability for all food, food animals, and
feed and includes sector-specific requirements (European Commission, Health and Consumer
Protection Directorate-General, 2007). For several countries, traceability systems are estab-
lished following food safety and animal disease events. For example, disease has been the
driving force behind the development of several livestock traceability programs worldwide
(World Perspectives Inc, 2018). In addition to food safety and animal disease, motives to
develop traceability systems include supply chain management and product differentiation
(Golan et al., 2004).
Varying motives among participants and the specificity of traceability makes answering
policy questions challenging. Today, most policy debates have focused on whether voluntary
participation is sufficient to meet the stated goals of a country’s traceability goal. Mandatory
30
traceability policies are best suited to address market failures from information asymmetries
and the supply of a public good (Hobbs, 2003). Proponents of mandatory traceability have
been met with varying levels of resistance at the farm-level (Smyth et al., 2006). In the United
States, government subsidies for traceability costs have been used as an alternative policy tool
to increase participation in livestock traceability (USDA–APHIS, 2018, 2020a). Developing
traceability systems and answering traceability policy questions requires an understanding
of economic incentives for participating individuals, firms, and industries.
The literature on the economics of food and livestock traceability has focused on consumer
preference (Dickinson and Bailey, 2002; Hobbs et al., 2005), liability costs (Pouliot and
Sumner, 2008), food recall costs (Resende-Filho and Buhr, 2007), contracting and the value
of traceability (Resende-Filho and Hurley, 2012), contracting and information asymmetries
(Hobbs, 2004; Resende-Filho and Buhr, 2008), transaction costs (Banterle and Stranieri,
2008), traceability perceptions and preferences (Schulz and Tonsor, 2010a,b), and aggregate
economic impacts (Pendell et al., 2010, 2013). An area omitted from the literature is an
investigation of the implicit market for voluntary traceability.
Golan et al. (2004) state that one motive for establishing traceability systems is to verify
a product’s credence attributes. Motivated by the seminal work of Rosen (1974), we go
further by arguing that participating in voluntary traceability can be viewed as a product
characteristic, and thus serves as a source of product differentiation. Souza-Monteiro and
Caswell (2010) model an exogenously determined premium for traceability but do not directly
consider traceability as a product characteristic in a market setting. Likewise, Dickinson and
Bailey (2002) implicitly make this argument in their analysis of meat characteristics. The
obvious question that follows is whether there is a market where premiums and discounts
exist for traceability. Likewise, how do premiums and discounts available for traceability
participation determine the aggregate provision of traceability?
This chapter studies the implicit market for traceability for the first known time. To do
this, we adapt conceptual and empirical methods in order to link individual decision making
to aggregate traceability supply and demand. Producers of an agricultural input supply
traceability and downstream firms demand traceability. We use voluntary participation in
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U.S. cattle traceability as an empirical application. The empirical application links feeder
cattle sellers and feeder cattle buyers in a hypothetical feeder cattle market using stated
choice experiments.1 In the empirical application, we determine traceability premiums and
discounts that clear the implicit market and study how participation adjusts to policies.
Determining how to encourage participation in a voluntary traceability system requires
an understanding of the incentives (e.g., prices and policies) to adopt traceability and the
value participants place on traceability system attributes. Results from this paper provide
program designers with a framework that can be used to develop traceability programs.
Of course, program designers are presented with a balancing act when deciding on how to
develop a traceability system—namely balancing the attributes that make traceability useful
and the incentives that might encourage adoption.
This chapter makes three main contributions to the literature. First, we recognize that
there is an implicit market for voluntary traceability. The framework that we develop can
be applied to other technology adoption problems where the technology leads to a price
differential. In this context, agents interact in commodity markets, and prices determine the
aggregate provision of traceability. Ignoring, supply, demand, and traceability price effects
might lead to poorly designed policies.
Second, we contribute to the existing literature that uses stated choice experiments to
assess farmer decision making. Despite the extensive use of stated choice experiments, none
have considered both sides of an economic transaction through the simulation of hypothetical
markets. Motivated by our first contribution, we show how stated choice experiments can
be designed to determine both supply and demand for a commodity in a market setting.
Building on Schulz and Tonsor (2010b), the stated choice experiment design can be used
to study other traceability programs and attributes. For feeder cattle, by considering both
traceability supply and demand, we can directly observe differences in the incentives that
sellers need to adopt traceability and the incentives that buyers are willing to offer.
1Feeder cattle sellers or sellers are used to denote producers that supply feeder cattle and reflect the
producer group that makes the initial traceability adoption decision. Feeder cattle buyers or buyers are used
to denote producers that procure feeder cattle and traceability from sellers. Feeder cattle sellers include
seedstock, cow-calf, and operations retaining ownership of weaned calves. Feeder cattle buyers include
backgrounding/stocker operations and feedlots.
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Finally, we focus on policies that aim to improve participation in voluntary traceability
programs. We are first to directly consider policies that target increases in participation
at the individual level. Pendell et al. (2010) examine the changes in domestic and export
demand that would need to occur to offset the aggregate costs of a national animal iden-
tification program. Pendell et al. (2013) consider economic impacts from losing access to
beef export markets from failing to meet age and source verification requirements. Here, we
directly consider how policies that decrease adoption costs would improve adoption. We also
examine how participation rates change in response to changes in the entity managing the
traceability program, which have important implications for confidentiality and liability of
producer information.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
This section, as well as the entirety of the chapter, is motivated by the observation that
voluntary traceability is a product characteristic. As such, there is an implicit market for
traceability where prices govern the provision of traceability for an agricultural commodity or
food product. The section begins by defining the attributes that characterize a traceability
program. With a well-defined definition of traceability, we focus on adoption by sellers,
procurement by buyers, and equilibrium. The section concludes by considering a cost subsidy,
which we also consider in the empirical application.
2.2.1 Defining Traceability
There are several working definitions for food and animal identification and traceability.
A popular definition is that breadth (number of attributes and quantity of information
recorded), depth (number of supply chain segments included in the system), and precision
(the degree of accuracy or assurance of the system) describe a traceability system (Golan
et al., 2004). Pouliot and Sumner (2008) define traceability as the probability that a firm
or producer is identified as the source of contamination. Resende-Filho and Buhr (2008)
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consider the relationship between the rate that a traceability system works and the ability
to successfully traceback meat products. In their analysis, precision is conditional on the
system working and is either 0% or 100% accurate. Souza-Monteiro and Caswell (2010)
model a multi-ingredient (breadth), multi-firm (depth) supply chain and define traceability
as the precision of information provided by firms. In our context, we will describe the three
components of a traceability system following (Golan et al., 2004).
We will consider a competitive agricultural input market, where s = 1, ...., S upstream
farmers (sellers) produce the input and b = 1, ..., B downstream firms (buyers) purchase
the input. A single attribute, traceability characterize the agricultural input. We are ef-
fectively asserting that traceability is separate from other production decisions and product
characteristics Souza-Monteiro and Caswell (2010). That is, sellers will choose the amount
of traceability to supply independent of other production decisions. Likewise, buyers will
choose the type of traceability to procure from sellers independent of other purchasing deci-
sions. We have just defined the depth of the traceability system, a single supply chain link
between buyers and sellers of the agricultural input.2
In the literature studying the economics of traceability, researchers will often model one
component of Golan et al. (2004)’s traceability definition as a continuous choice variable.3
This treatment of traceability contrasts the empirical literature. Empirically, researchers
recognize that individuals face traceability alternatives, and the choice is discrete (Schulz
and Tonsor, 2010b; Souza-Monteiro and Caswell, 2010). Each traceability alternative is
characterized by differences in depth, breadth, and precision. We provide a direct link be-
tween the theoretical and empirical traceability literature by considering discrete traceability
adoption. Specifically, each seller will choose among J (indexed by j) discrete traceability
alternatives to adopt. Likewise, each buyer will choose among J (indexed by j) traceabil-
ity alternatives to procure from sellers. For completeness, let j = 0 denote the alternative
2A specific example for livestock is cow-calf producers selling feeder cattle to feedlots. For grains, depth
might be farmers supplying grain to an elevator. A system with more depth might trace grain between
farmers, elevators, and mills.
3Hobbs (2004) models voluntary firm participation in an industry-wide traceability program as discrete
but does not consider traceability alternatives.
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of not participating in traceability.4 For sellers, each traceability alternative is character-
ized by the information recorded and cataloged in the system, liability, adoption costs, and
traceability premiums/discounts received from buyers. For buyers, traceability alternatives
are characterized by the information recorded and cataloged in the system, liability, trace-
ability premiums/discounts paid to sellers (costs), and premiums/discounts received from
consumers.5 Subsequent paragraphs provide a discussion of each traceability attribute.
Information units. Each traceability system is used to record, catalog, and trace units of
information about the agricultural input (Golan et al., 2004). We denote units of information
by tj. We assume that tj is finite, captures the breadth of the system, and is observed by
all. For example, tj could be the source of origin information for the agricultural input.
A traceability system with more breadth might record the source of origin and production
practice information.
Liability. Liability is an important part of traceability adoption. In their analysis of cat-
tle traceability, Schulz and Tonsor (2010a) find that 45.2% of cow-calf producers are very
concerned with producer liability. Souza-Monteiro and Caswell (2010) model the mitigat-
ing effects of traceability on liability costs. While traceability might be able to mitigate
loss, Pouliot and Sumner (2008) acknowledge that traceability effectively allows downstream
firms to transfer some of the liability costs to upstream suppliers. In their model, Pouliot
and Sumner (2008) consider exogenously determined traceback probabilities and model the
probability of a food safety event as a function of agent effort.
In our analysis, we assume that there is an exogenously determined risk that a seller or
buyer will be identified and liable for damages. Denote liability `j and assume that it is a
continuous variable that adequately measures both risks of being identified and damages.
Sellers know `j when they participate in the traceability program. Similarly, buyers know
`j when they procure an input with traceability alternative j. We assume `j is such that
it allows buyers to transfer liability to sellers (Pouliot and Sumner, 2008). That is, `j is a
disincentive for sellers to adopt traceability alternative j.
4Choosing not to participate in traceability is not an opt-out option in the conventional sense. Some
attributes and outcomes arise from non-participation in traceability.
5We omit consumers from the analysis.
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Prices and costs. Adopting traceability is costly to the seller. Traceability costs for
alternative j are denoted by cj ∈ [0,∞]. A slight abstraction from practice, for convenience,
we will assume that costs are independent of the units of information recorded. In addition
to costs, the seller receives a premium/discount for supplying traceability alternative j by
p1j ∈ [−∞,∞]. Likewise, to procure alternative j buyers pay p1j . We assume that p1j is the
only traceability cost that buyers face.6 Competition implies that each seller and buyer take
p1j as given. Finally, buyers receive premium/discount p
2
j ∈ [−∞,∞] from consumers by
supplying output with alternative j. Buyers take p2j as given.
2.2.2 Adoption, Procurement, and Equilibrium
We use a random utility framework to characterize traceability adoption and procurement
by sellers and buyers, respectively.
Seller adoption. Sellers receive utility Usj = U(tj, `j, cj, p
1
j ; βs, εsj) by supplying alternative
j. Sellers are heterogeneous. βs captures preference heterogeneity across sellers and εsj
captures random taste variation across sellers and traceability alternatives. βs and εsj have
density functions fβ and fε, respectively.
The adoption decision rule for seller s is to supply traceability alternative j if Usj >
Usk ∀ j 6= k. The supply of traceability alternative j is the share of sellers that adopt the
alternative. The share of sellers adopting alternative j is expressed as:
Qsj =
∫∫
{βs,εsj |Usj>Usk, ∀ j 6=k}
fε(ε)fβ(β)dεdβ. (2.1)
In words, equation 2.1 aggregates over sellers choosing alternative j to provide an expression
for the share of adopters. For a set of prices, costs, liabilities, and units of information,
equation 2.1 shows that seller heterogeneity drives the supply of a traceability alternative.
6In practice, there are several scenarios where this assumption might not be true. An additional trace-
ability cost for buyers might be the reapplication of the identification technology or application of new
identification technology. As a specific example, results from the 2011 National Animal Health Monitoring
System (NAHMS) study by USDA–APHIS–VS–NAHMS (2013) reported that 48% of feedlots applied new
individual-animal identification at animal receiving time.
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Thus, Qsj = Qsj(t, `, c, p
1; β, ε).




j ;αb, εbj) by procuring
traceability alternative j. Buyers are heterogeneous. αb captures preference heterogeneity
across sellers and εbj captures random taste variation across sellers and traceability alterna-
tives. αb and εbj have distribution functions fα and fε, respectively.
The procurement decision rule for buyer b is to purchase traceability alternative j if
Ubj > Ubk ∀ j 6= k. The share of buyers purchasing alternative j is expressed as:
Qbj =
∫∫
{αb,εbj |Ubj>Ubk, ∀ j 6=k}
fε(ε)fα(α)dεdα. (2.2)
Equation 2.2 is interpreted analogously to equation 2.1 and Qbj = Qbj(t, `, p
1, p2;α, ε).
Equilibrium. Equations 2.1 and 2.2 allow us to link traceability participation by both seg-
ments of an input market to individual decision making. Let the set of prices for traceability
alternative j be P 1j . Holding constant all other traceability attributes, we hypothesize that
there exists a premium/discount for alternative j, p1∗j ∈ P 1j , such that:
Q∗sj = Q
∗
bj ∀ j ∈ J. (2.3)
There exists a set of traceability premiums/discounts such that the implicit market clears
for all j traceability alternatives. In a similar analysis, given fixed supply, Bayer et al.
(2004) provide the assumptions that are needed to prove the sufficient conditions for the
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a housing market. Specifically, for fixed supply,
the equilibrium price vector is unique if utility is linear and decreasing in price, and α and
ε are drawn from continuous distributions. In our analysis, it is reasonable to expect that
we would need to exploit similar assumptions for seller utility and heterogeneity, to prove
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
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2.2.3 Policy Implications
The previous section has important policy implications. The main focus of traceability
policy is whether voluntary participation is sufficient for Qj to meet the stated goals of the
traceability program for the commodity under consideration (Golan et al., 2004). A recent
policy alternative for livestock traceability in the United States is to subsidize traceability
costs (USDA–APHIS, 2018, 2020a). What is the effect of a traceability cost subsidy on
participation by sellers and buyers of the agricultural input?
Suppose there is a traceability policy that will subsidize participation costs for the sup-
plier of the agricultural input. Denote the subsidy for traceability by δj ∈ [0, 1]. Assume
preferences for sellers are such that for cj ≥ (1−δj)cj we find U(tj, `j, (1−δj)cj, p1j ; βs, εsj) ≥
U(tj, `j, cj, p
1
j ; βs, εsj). From equation (2.1), policymakers would like to know the effect of
the subsidy on traceability supply,
∂Qsj
∂δj
. An advantage of our conceptual framework is that
we can examine the effects of δj in (Qj, p
1
j) space. This is only made possible by considering
traceability in a market setting.

















j) will depend on the relative slopes of the supply and demand
curves in equations 2.1 and 2.2. A cost subsidy will shift traceability supply, and prices in a
decentralized input market will adjust to clear implicit traceability markets under the policy.
In what follows, we provide empirical context for a traceability cost subsidy.
2.3 Empirical Application
Empirically, we consider voluntary participation in U.S. cattle traceability systems. The
ability to trace individual animals to the source of origin has many potential benefits that
span the beef value chain. These benefits may include animal health monitoring, improved
response times to disease events, enhancing consumer demand, and accessing and main-
taining foreign markets (Schulz and Tonsor, 2010a). There have been several efforts in the
United States to increase participation in animal traceability programs and policies have
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evolved (USDA–APHIS, 2018). The National Animal Identification System (NAIS) was a
program developed in 2004 in part as response to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (USDA–
APHIS, 2006). More recently, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced a
new framework for approaching animal traceability, the federal animal disease traceability
(ADT) program (USDA–APHIS, 2014). Unlike the NAIS program, which initially proposed
a mandatory full traceability program, the current focus of the ADT program in the beef in-
dustry is breeding cattle over 18 months of age and dairy cattle (USDA–APHIS, 2018). U.S.
traceability programs for feeder cattle are currently voluntary and administered privately
within the industry.
Many studies have highlighted that the United States has been slow to adopt livestock and
meat identification and traceability systems relative to other countries which have mandatory
systems in place (Brester et al., 2011; Pendell et al., 2013). Several countries with mandated
traceability are important foreign markets for U.S. meat and others are competitors for key
export markets. The U.S. beef cattle industry is divided into distinct, but often overlapping
sectors, including seedstock production, cow-calf production, stocker/backgrounding, and
feedlot. For an animal to be traced to its origin of birth, traceability adoption has to occur
at the seedstock and cow-calf levels. The lack of U.S. beef industry participation in voluntary
traceability systems has been attributed to the demographics that characterize the cow-calf
sector (Brester et al., 2011; Schulz and Tonsor, 2010a,b). The cow-calf sector is comprised
of a large number of smaller operations where participation costs might be prohibitive. A
key objective in the literature studying U.S. livestock traceability is determining aggregate
economic impacts from adopting traceability or the lack thereof (Pendell et al., 2010, 2013).
Market interactions among industry participants in U.S. cattle traceability have been ignored
in the literature.
2.3.1 Data
In many situations, on-farm decisions are not directly observable, and thus to study these
decisions, researchers rely on primary data collection. A mail survey was developed for U.S.
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feeder cattle sellers and buyers and administered from October to November 2018. This
period was selected as it coincides with a time when producers make significant marketing
and procurement decisions. Questionnaire development followed Schulz and Tonsor (2010b)
to make direct comparisons with the literature that assess cow-calf producer preferences for
cattle traceability attributes.
The objective of the survey was to collect data on producer and operation characteristics,
animal health practices, livestock marketing methods, current cattle traceability implemen-
tation, perceptions of ongoing traceability efforts in the United States, and risk preferences.
The survey was administered and collected in collaboration with BEEF Magazine. For sell-
ers, a random sample was generated based on the requirement that a producer has at least
20 beef cows in inventory. For buyers, a random sample was created based on the condition
that a producer has sold at least 50 head of fed cattle in the last 12 months. The surveys were
sent to 1,500 feeder cattle sellers and 1,500 buyers. A $1 bill, cover letter, and postage-paid
return envelope were included in each invitation packet (Tonsor, 2018). The response rate
for the seller survey was 318 (21%) and 195 (13%) for buyers. Summary statistics for select
variables are presented in Table 2.1.
2.3.2 Stated Choice Methods
Stated choice methods have become a popular tool to assess a respondent’s preferences for
product attributes. Most applications have been in consumer and market research. Re-
cently, these methods have been used to study farmer decision making (e.g., McKendree,
2017; Roe et al., 2004; Schulz and Tonsor, 2010b; Tonsor, 2018; Vestal et al., 2013, among
others). Stated choice methods allow researchers to create hypothetical decisions and market
scenarios.
Specific to livestock markets, studies that use choice experiment methods can determine
what incentives—which might include prices or policies that encourage adoption—most im-
pact producer decisions to adopt a technology or supply a livestock characteristic. For
example, Roe et al. (2004) use stated choice methods to elicit hog producer preferences for
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Table 2.1: Select summary statistics for selected variables for feeder cattle seller and buyer
respondents
Seller Buyer
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Age (years) 63.80 12.97 59.70 13.59
Auction (0,1) 0.59 0.49 0.52 0.50
Region (0,1)
CB 0.19 0.39 0.31 0.46
NC 0.09 0.29 0.17 0.37
NP 0.29 0.45 0.27 0.45
NW 0.19 0.39 0.10 0.30
SE 0.10 0.31 0.08 0.27
SP 0.14 0.34 0.07 0.26
Cows (head) 180.74 190.25 − −
Head > 1, 000 (0,1) − − 0.14 0.34
Note: Seller is feeder cattle sellers. Buyer is feeder cattle buyers. Age is the age of the
respondent in years. Auction is a dummy variable that equals 1 (0 otherwise) if auction
markets are the most common the most common method of marketing and procuring cattle
by sellers and buyers, respectively. Region is coded following Schulz and Tonsor (2010a,b).
CB is corn belt states, NC is northern crescent states, NP is northern plains states, NW
is northwest states, SE is southeast states, and SP is southern plains stats. Cows is beef
cow inventory as of January 1, 2018. Head > 1000 is a dummy variable that equals 1 (0
otherwise) if the feedlot operator sold more than 1,000 head in the last 12 months.
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production contract attributes. Alternatively, stated choice methods might be used to de-
termine what incentives producers are willing to offer to procure specific characteristics or
technologies. For example, McKendree (2017) uses stated choice methods to determine how
feedlots manage different forms of risk.
While these studies provide useful context for on-farm decision making, they only focus
on one side of an economic transaction and are not able to assess the viability of incentive
structures. Roe et al. (2004) focus on the supply of hogs. McKendree (2017) studies feeder
cattle procurement. Specific to cattle traceability, research has determined cow-calf producer
preferences for traceability attributes (Schulz and Tonsor, 2010b) but ignores the demand
for feeder cattle with traceability attributes. In this study, we contribute to the literature
by considering both sides of the private market transaction for feeder cattle. By doing so,
we can better inform policymakers and further guide targeted policy adjustments. That is,
we can directly observe what incentives sellers need and what incentives buyers are willing
to offer.
Guided by our conceptual framework, we develop two separate stated choice experiments
for sellers and buyers to simulate feeder cattle transactions.7 The stated choice experiments
were designed to capture current traceability systems while also limiting complexity (Nor-
wood et al., 2006). In the stated choice scenarios, sellers were asked to choose among three
alternative traceability systems. The first traceability alternative is an electronic system that
involves applying radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, and the second alternative is
a visual system that involves using traditional plastic ear tags. The third alternative, no
traceability, is not an opt-out option in the conventional sense as it also has attributes and
reflects an actual alternative available to producers. In the stated choice scenarios, buyers
were asked to procure feeder cattle that were currently participating in electronic, visual, or
no traceability. In both surveys of sellers and buyers, the no traceability option was included
to reflect an exhaustive list of alternatives (Adamowicz et al., 1998). Different identification
technologies imply different levels of precision according to Golan et al. (2004)’s definition.
7Instructions and descriptions provided to the stated choice experiment respondents are provided in
Appendix A (sellers) and B (buyers).
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For sellers, the electronic traceability option included varying levels of implementation
cost, the managing entity, information shared with buyers, and feeder cattle price premiums
and discounts. A premium is paid for electronic traceability, and a discount is received for
choosing no traceability. The buyer stated choice experiment included varying levels of fed
cattle premiums and discounts, feeder cattle premiums and discounts, managing entity, and
information shared back with sellers. The fed cattle premium is the premium for electronic
traceability, and the discount is the discount for fed cattle with no traceability. All feeder and
fed cattle premiums and discounts are relative to the visual traceability alternative. Visual
traceability serves as the base scenario because most operations already use some form of
visual ID (e.g., tags, brands, tatoos, etc.) which would result in no additional implementation
costs and does not reflect a change from what operations are already doing. For example,
results from 2011 NAHMS show that 22.5% and 45% of large feedlots applied individual tags
and hide brands to cattle after arrival, respectively (USDA–APHIS–VS–NAHMS, 2013).
Including feeder cattle premiums and discounts in the stated choice experiments allows
us to link buyers and sellers in a hypothetical market scenario. Feeder cattle premiums and
discounts are assumed to be the only cost to buyers. This reflects how most traceability costs
are borne at the seller level, where implementation costs occur (Pendell et al., 2010). Most
studies assume that any additional costs at the buyer level are small and include the cost
of retagging animals upon arrival (Brester et al., 2011). For sellers, feeder cattle premiums
and discounts reflect the adjustment to the sale price for supplying a traceability alternative.
Figure 2.1 presents an example of the stated choice experiment.
Both stated choice experiments are designed using main-effects and two-way interaction
effects to create choice tasks. PROC OPTEX and PLAN in SAS were used to develop an
orthogonal fractional factorial design. The D-efficiency criterion was used to identify the
optimal design. The stated choice designs included 17 choice scenarios for producers. To
reduce survey respondent burden, choice scenarios were randomly assigned to two blocks of
6 scenarios and one block of 5 scenarios.
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Figure 2.1: Stated choice question examples.
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2.3.3 Empirical Model
Empirically, we would like to learn about equations 2.1 and 2.2, which requires further
assumptions about the utility function. First, we assume that random taste variation is
additively separable so that we can write utility Usj = V (tj, `j, cj, p
1
j ; βs) + εsj and Ubj =
V (tj, `j, cj, p
1
j ;αb) + εbj for sellers and buyers, respectively.
Next, assume that εsj and εbj are distributed type 1 extreme value. Seller and buyer logit


























Finally, we need to specify Vsj and Vbj for feeder cattle sellers and buyers, respectively.
From the stated experiments, we consider three traceability alternative j ∈{Electronic,
Visual, None}. For sellers, systematic utility is a function of costs, feeder cattle premi-
ums/discounts, liability, and information units. Denote feeder cattle premiums/discounts
pFj . An important component of liability risks is the entity managing the traceability. Em-
pirically, we use the managing entity as a proxy for liability risks and denote `j ∈{Private-
Industry, Gov, Gov and Private-Industry}. We use information shared in the choice exper-
iments to proxy information units so that tj ∈{Origin, Health Records, Origin and Health
Records}.





j + β2cj + βs3`j + βs4tj, ∀ j = Electronic, (2.8)
Vsj = β2cj + βs3`j + βs4tj, ∀ j = Visual, and (2.9)
Vsj = βs0 + β1p
F
j , ∀ j = None (2.10)
where visual traceability is the reference for feeder cattle premiums and discounts, and
βs = (βs0, βs3, βs4) are normally distributed random parameters whose structure follows
βs = β̄ +Rυs (Greene and Hensher, 2005; Train, 2009). In this specification, β̄ is a fixed
mean, R is a lower triangular Cholesky matrix, and υs is a standard normal random variable
capturing taste variation.
Systematic utility is a function of fed cattle premiums/discounts, feeder cattle premi-
ums/discounts, liability, and information units for buyers. Similarly for buyers, we approxi-





j + αb3`j + αb4tj, ∀ j = Electronic, (2.11)
Vbj = αb3`j + αb4tj, ∀ j = Visual, and (2.12)




j , ∀ j = None (2.13)
where pLCj are the fed cattle premiums and discounts, visual is the reference for premiums
and discounts, and αb = (αb0, αb3, αb4) are normally distributed random parameters. The
random parameters are specified as αb = ᾱ + Lυb where ᾱ is a fixed mean, L is a lower




Model specification is determined using a series of likelihood ratio tests. Tests reject con-
ditional logit models in favor of mixed logit models. Next, we use likelihood ratio tests to
test for correlated random parameters in the mixed logit model and reject the mixed logit
without random parameters. The final model specification is mixed logits with correlated
random parameters where all non-monetary variables are assumed to be normally distributed
(Table 2.2).8
A potential problem with the models in Table 2.2 is that there might be systematic
differences in preferences for price and cost variables among producers. For example, Brester
et al. (2011) find significant economies of size for cow-calf producer participation in age and
source verification programs. In their study, participation costs ranged from $14.51/head
sold for small operations currently tagging animals to $5.39/head sold for large operations
not currently tagging animals (Brester et al., 2011). While our choice experiments only
consider tag costs, perceptions about economies of size and scope might lead to a differential
in preference estimates.
To determine the effects of operation size on preferences, we estimate separate models
based on inventory. These estimations allow us to account for heterogeneity in the distribu-
tions characterizing the random parameters and in the fixed parameters. Ignoring this source
of heterogeneity would produce bias estimates. For sellers, separate models were estimated
based on whether the producer has 50 beef cows in inventory. For buyers, separate models
were estimated based on whether the producer sold more than 1,000 head in the last 12
months. In each case, likelihood ratio tests fail to reject pooled models in Table 2.2.
Results in Table 2.2 show that most coefficients are statistically significant and have the
expected sign. Of interest are the effects of premiums, discounts, and costs on the probability
of participating in each traceability system. Implementation costs have a negative effect on
the likelihood of adopting visual and electronic traceability. Feeder cattle premiums and
8See Revelt and Train (1998) for a detailed discussion of mixed logit models with correlated random
parameters. Hensher et al. (2005) provide a detailed discussion of how to derive the Cholesky matrix from
the model’s estimated variance-covariance matrix.
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Table 2.2: Feeder cattle seller and buyer correlated random parameter mixed logit results
for traceability attributes
Seller Buyer
Variable Estimate Std. error Estimate Std. error
Nonrandom parameter:
FedP − − 0.006 (0.011)
FeederP 0.058∗∗∗ (0.010) −0.038∗∗∗ (0.012)
Cost −0.172∗∗∗ (0.025) − −
Random parameter means:
Manage:
Private-Industry 1.194∗∗∗ (0.186) 0.422∗∗∗ (0.126)
Government and Private-Industry −0.211 (0.131) 0.420∗∗∗ (0.125)
Info:
Health Records −0.245∗ (0.140) 0.102 (0.118)
Origin and Health Records 0.274∗∗ (0.122) 0.166 (0.130)
None −3.941∗∗∗ (0.624) −3.324∗∗∗ (0.521)
Random parameter std. devs.:
Manage:
Private-Industry 1.784∗∗∗ (0.220) 0.751∗∗∗ (0.165)
Government and Private-Industry 1.190∗∗∗ (0.151) 0.335∗∗ (0.155)
Info:
Health Records 1.272∗∗∗ (0.182) 0.125 (0.146)
Origin and Health Records 0.801∗∗∗ (0.195) 0.565∗∗∗ (0.172)




Pseudo R-squared 0.297 0.236
Note: Seller is feeder cattle sellers. Buyer is feeder cattle buyers. For sellers the feeder pre-
mium/discount is the $/head amount that a producer would receive based on the traceability
system. For buyers the feeder premium/discount reflects a cost. These price adjustments to the
market price range from discounts of up to $15 per head for selecting No Traceability and premiums
of up to $15 per head for selecting Electronic Traceability. The fed cattle price premium/discount
has a similar interpretation for buyers as the feeder premium/discount does for sellers. Number of
observations is the product of 3 choices per task, number of choice tasks, and respondents. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
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discounts have a positive (negative) effect on the probability of adopting electronic (no)
traceability for sellers. Feeder cattle price premiums and discounts reflect costs to buyers and
have the expected sign. Fed cattle price premiums and discounts do not have a statistically
significant effect on the buyer’s choice of traceability. This result might be due to how
fed cattle are typically sold in the United States. Many fed cattle pricing methods include
standard $/hundredweight adjustments based on quality, cutability yield grade, and weight
standards,9 and it is currently unclear how packers and feeder cattle buyers would currently
directly differentiate the price based on the presence or absence of a traceability system.
Estimating mixed logit models with correlated random parameters capture another source
of heterogeneity. Namely, correlation in preferences for traceability attributes across alter-
natives. Like Tonsor et al. (2009), we provide correlation statistics and estimated Cholesky
matrices in Tables 2.3 for sellers and buyers. The decomposition of the Cholesky ma-
trix isolates two sources of heterogeneity that contribute to standard deviation parameters,
attribute-specificity and cross-correlations. Attribute-specificity contributes to standard de-
viation estimates through the heterogeneity around the mean of each random parameter,
and cross-correlations are sources of heterogeneity that are due to correlation with other
random parameters (Hensher et al., 2005).
While model estimates and Cholesky matrices provide useful insights for changes in choice
probabilities, our focus is on aggregate traceability supply and demand. In particular, we
are interested in how participation adjusts to prices and policy. To understand these effects,
we use elasticity estimates and simulated supply and demand, which use equations 2.6 and
2.7.
2.4.1 Elasticities
Based on the policy implications in Section 2.2.3, a useful first step towards understanding
how subsidies impact traceability supply and demand is an investigation of elasticities. Elas-
ticities from discrete choice models do not have the same interpretation as those obtained
9For example, see USDA Market News Service National Weekly Direct Slaughter Cattle–Premiums and
Discounts report, https://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/lm_ct155.txt.
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Table 2.3: Feeder cattle seller and buyer cholesky and correlation matrices for mixed logit
models
Gov and Origin and
Private- private- Health health
Seller: industry industry records records None
Private-industry 1.784∗∗∗ 0.680 −0.597 0.189 −0.159
Gov and private-industry 0.809∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗∗ 0.128 −0.478 −0.008
Health records −0.760∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.425∗ −0.632 0.026
Origin and health records 0.152 −0.663∗∗∗ 0.201 0.373∗∗ 0.065
None −0.860 0.739∗ −2.737∗∗∗ 3.891∗∗∗ 2.282∗∗∗
Buyer:
Private-industry 0.751∗∗∗ 0.893 −0.495 0.298 0.258
Gov and private-industry 0.299∗ 0.151 −0.051 0.692 −0.185
Health records −0.062 0.109 0.000 0.675 −0.931
Origin and health records 0.168 0.535∗∗∗ 0.000 0.070 −0.824
None 0.746 −2.67∗∗∗ −0.076 −0.600 0.546
Note: Main diagonal elements are the main diagonal for the Cholesky matrix, elements below
main diagonal are elements of Cholesky matrix, and elements above main diagonal are correlation
statistics.
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in traditional supply and demand analysis but still convey important information. For dis-
crete choice models, elasticities are interpreted as the percentage change in the probability of
choosing a traceability system for a percentage change in a traceability system attribute. We
estimate direct and cross-elasticities using the point elasticity method described in Hensher
et al. (2005). For the mixed logit model, individual-specific estimates are used to estimate
elasticities and aggregated using probability-weighted sample enumeration.
Direct- and cross-elasticities for sellers and buyers are in Table 2.4. Sellers are more
price-sensitive to changes in the electronic feeder cattle price premium than to changes in
the discount for no traceability (Table 2.4). Specifically, the probability of choosing elec-
tronic traceability increases by 0.130% and 0.024% in response to a 1% increase in the feeder
cattle price premium for electronic traceability and discount for no traceability, respectively.
Both estimates are inelastic. Estimates show a larger substitution from visual traceability to
electronic traceability relative to substituting from no traceability (Table 2.4, Row 1). Sim-
ilarly, elasticity estimates from changes in costs show more substitution between electronic
and visual traceability relative to no traceability (Table 2.4, Rows 3 and 5). A 1% increase
in costs results in a decrease of 0.250% and 0.292% in the choice probabilities for electronic,
respectively.
Feeder cattle price premiums and discounts for traceability represent changes in upfront
costs for buyers. In line with previous research, we assume that this is the only cost for
feedlot producers participating in a traceability system as implementation costs have already
occurred at the seller level (Brester et al., 2011). For a 1% increase in the discount for feeder
cattle with no traceability, the choice probability for procuring cattle with no traceability
increases by 0.150%, and substitution among visual and electronic traceability is similar
to decreases in the choice probabilities of 0.023% and 0.022%, respectively. There is a
greater substitution to visual traceability relative to no traceability for increases in the
cost of procuring feeder cattle with electronic traceability. When making decisions about
traceability, buyers are likely weighing alternatives between procuring cattle with traceability
and implementing traceability themselves once cattle are received.
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Table 2.4: Feeder cattle seller and buyer direct and cross-elasticities for correlated random
parameters logit models
Traceability system
Variable Electronic None Visual
Seller:
Electronic Traceability Feeder Premiuma 0.130∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
No Traceability Feeder Discountb 0.024∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Electronic Traceability Costa −0.250∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.002) (0.005)
Visual Traceability Costc 0.199∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ −0.292∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.007)
Buyer:
Electronic Traceability Fed Premiuma 0.025∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
No Traceability Fed Discountb 0.003∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Electronic Traceability Feeder Premiuma −0.130∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
No Traceability Feeder Discountb −0.022∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Note: Elasticities are calculated using the point elasticity method and calculated for each individ-
ual in the sample and aggregated using probability-weighted sample enumeration. Delta method
standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
a Direct-elasticities for electronic traceability and cross-elasticities for visual and no traceability.
b Direct-elasticities for no traceability and cross-elasticities for electronic and visual traceability.
c Direct-elasticities for visual traceability and cross-elasticities for electronic and no traceability.
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2.4.2 Price effects and model predictions
Given preferences, we are interested in finding the prices that equate equations 2.6 and 2.7.
For fixed prices, costs, and attributes, we predict choice probabilities and aggregate them
to calculate participation. Iterating over a set of prices for a specific traceability system
produces supply and demand curves. For predictions, we hold all other variables at the
data means. Since premiums and discounts are relative to visual traceability, we study
electronic and no traceability markets and determine own-price effects. As a benchmark,
we predict participation at the data means (Figure 2.2). The largest participation rate for
sellers is electronic traceability (44.4%), and the largest participation rate for buyers is visual
traceability (47.6%), which generally aligns with results from the 2011 NAHMS study.
Figure 2.2: Predicted mean participation rates for feeder cattle sellers and buyers.
Figure 2.3 shows electronic and no traceability participation changes in response to
changes in premiums and discounts, respectively.10 We find a more elastic effect for elec-
10Note that discounts are on the y-axis for the bottom graph, which explains why the seller curve is
downward sloping, and the buyer curve is upward sloping. The top graph is more easily interpreted as a
standard supply and demand graph.
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tronic traceability relative to no traceability. Figure 2.3, paired with elasticities in Table
2.4, provides a complete understanding of own-price effects and substitution patterns. The
bottom graph and elasticity results suggest a more elastic own-price effect for buyers relative
to sellers. The own-price effect for electronic traceability is the same for buyers and sellers.11
Figure 2.3: Effects of $/head premiums and discounts on electronic and no traceability
participation rates for feeder cattle sellers and buyers.
Together, these results have important policy implications. At a premium of $4.08/head,
11We did not formally test this.
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41.6% of buyers and sellers choose electronic traceability. A discount of $20.94/head results
in 16.3% of buyers and sellers choosing not to adopt traceability. Policies that aim to
incentivize electronic traceability adoption at the farm-level directly will result in shifts in
the seller supply curve, and prices will adjust to determine a new level of participation.
The inelastic supply curve in the bottom panel of Figure 2.3 suggests that any policy that
provides a direct disincentive for non-adoption will be less effective.
2.4.3 Policy effects and model predictions
Here, we consider the traceability subsidy proposed in Section 2.2.3. Specifically, we consider
policies that subsidize 50% and 100% of adoption costs for sellers that adopt electronic
traceability.
In our policy scenarios, we also consider the trade-offs between a government traceability
system and a system that partners with private industry. In developing a national trace-
ability system, confidentiality and security of data have always been a top concern among
producers (Schulz and Tonsor, 2010a). The management of a traceability system and data
has important implications for how the government can respond to disease events. A recent
proposal in response to producer feedback is a partnership between industry and APHIS
(USDA–APHIS, 2018). Specifically, the plan outlines a partnership where data is privately
managed, and animal health officials can only access data for tracing during disease events.
A corollary example exists in Australia where the Australian government contracts with a
private entity to maintain the database and thus exempts the data from their freedom of
information laws (World Perspectives Inc, 2018). Participation in a system like this in the
United States that includes government partnership will depend on producer preferences for
the managing entity.
Figure 2.4 shows a strong preference for an electronic traceability program that partners
with private industry. Ignoring a cost-share policy, premiums of $9.52/head and $2.06/head
result in 43.9% and 30.5% producer participation in government and jointly managed trace-
ability systems, respectively. A visual inspection of Figure 2.4 shows higher participation
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by both producer groups in a jointly managed program with $0/head premiums relative to
a program managed by the government. By allowing industry management, there are large
increases in producer participation. However, deciding who manages the traceability system
and the associated data has important implications for how traceability data is used during
disease events.
Figure 2.4: Effects of prices, cost-share policies, and managing entity on producer partici-
pation in electronic traceability.
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Feeder cattle premiums of $5.69/head and $1.92/head result in 46.7% and 49.6% of pro-
ducers participating in a jointly managed electronic traceability program with 50% and 100%
cost-shares, respectively (Figure 2.4). Cost-share policies also increase seller participation
in a program managed by the government, but preferences for the managing entity are such
that buyer participation is low, and there is no intersection with sellers. Recognize that al-
lowing prices to vary within a policy scenario is only realistic when traceability is voluntary.
A mandatory traceability system would likely result in there not being any premiums for
traceability. Thus, program design will become more important for producer participation.
To calculate the government cost of a cost-share policy, we use the 2019 U.S. calf crop
(USDA-NASS, 2020), average RFID tag costs from the stated choice experiments, and the
changes in traceability participation from Figure 2.4. The 2019 calf-crop was 36.1 million
head, and average RFID costs are $5.00/head. We assume that changes in producer par-
ticipation are equivalent to changes in the number of cattle participating as a percent of
the total calf crop. For cost calculations, we use participation estimates for sellers when the
feeder cattle premium is $0.00/head. Finally, we calculate policy costs when the policy is
applied at the margin (targeted) and when the policy is applied to all producers adopting
under the policy (all).
Government cost estimates for each scenario are in Table 2.5. As an example calculation,
costs from a targeted 50% cost-share policy for a program managed by the government are
36.1 million head× (34.2%− 29.2%)× $2.50/head = $4.51 million per year. For each policy
scenario in Table 2.5, “Targeted” and “All” estimates are likely a very conservative lower and
upper bound, respectively, on realized government costs. In each case, costs from a program
managed through a private industry partnership are higher because of higher participation.
Thus, the government would need to weigh benefits of higher participation against higher
costs in future discussions about how a national traceability system should be managed.
Sumner et al. (2005) find that the cost involved with ex-post control or eradication of a
disease is higher than ex-ante prevention, where the difference in cost depends on the number
of farms and production quantity. If one of the main functions of live animal traceability
is to allow animal health officials to quickly identify agricultural premises that are exposed
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50% cost-share 4.51 40.87
100% cost-share 18.77 71.48
Government-private program:
50% cost-share 5.05 34.52
100% cost-share 20.22 86.82
Note: Estimates are calculated using a tagging cost of $5.00/head and a 2019 calf-crop of 36.1
million head. Seller participation rates in a government program when the feeder cattle premium
is $0.00/head are 29.2%, 34.2%, and 39.6% for 0%, 50% and 100% cost-shares, respectively. Seller
participation rates in a government-private program when the feeder cattle premium is $0.00/head
are 36.9%, 42.5%, and 48.1% for 0%, 50% and 100% cost-shares, respectively.
to diseases so that diseases can be isolated and eradicated (Schulz and Tonsor, 2010a), then
ex-post government costs could be minimized under a cost-share policy between feeder cattle
sellers and the government.
2.5 Conclusion
Little work exists to explain traceability adoption at the individual level. In this chapter,
we argue that voluntary traceability is a product characteristic, and there exists an implicit
market for this characteristic. We show that traceability suppliers and intermediate trace-
ability consumers can be linked using a random utility framework and the economics of
food traceability. Importantly, we show that any policy that targets increases in voluntary
participation should consider the equilibrium effects. A key feature that has been ignored
in the literature for voluntary traceability programs is the potential for traceability to add
value to products. Guided by conceptual arguments, we show how stated choice experi-
ments and discrete choice models can be used to empirically study traceability markets and,
more broadly, commodity markets. The empirical application that we choose to focus on
is voluntary participation in U.S. cattle traceability, and empirical results have important
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implications for the U.S. beef industry.
The Beef Industry Long Range Plan 2016-2020 set forth by the National Cattlemen’s
Beef Association (NCBA) includes the strategic initiative to “Secure the broad adoption
of individual animal I.D. traceability system(s) across the beef community to equip the
industry to effectively manage a disease outbreak while enhancing both domestic and global
trust in U.S. beef and ensuring greater access to export markets” (National Cattlemen’s Beef
Association, 2018). This shows traceability remains a high priority for a large segment of
the industry, however, there are many challenges which lead to major barriers to the success
of industry-wide traceability implementation.
Both mandatory and voluntary approaches raise questions of viability. NAIS was origi-
nally designed as a mandatory program, but due to strong opposition, became a voluntary
program at the federal level (Murphy et al., 2009). A survey of U.S. cow-calf producers
found 50.3% of producers believed NAIS should not be mandatory, while 21.2% believed it
should be mandatory and 28.5% were undecided (Schulz, 2008). Golan et al. (2004) noted
that voluntary traceability systems must increase adopting firm’s net revenues or they will
not be adopted. Traceability adoption is an example of a private behavior that generates
positive spillovers affecting the supply of a public good, that is, the ability to better manage,
and potentially cushion the shock of, animal disease incursions. This makes it less clear
who will benefit and who will pay for it in the supply chain. Cow-calf producers believe
most of the traceability benefits are distributed to retailers and processors, whereas most
costs are largely born by the cow-calf sector (Schulz, 2008). The significant gap between
benefits and costs for cow-calf producers likely influences willingness to invest in traceability
implementation.
Our results are extremely important for policy makers. Traceability has long been dis-
cussed and debated in the beef cattle industry, and many differing views continue today. The
ability of traceability systems to either add value to industry sectors along the supply chain,
increase demand, and/or offer other tangible benefits to market participants is often nebu-
lously defined. The need to effectively prevent and control animal disease outbreaks, and the
role of traceability from a generally defined standpoint, is a greater point of consensus within
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the industry. Our economic model demonstrates that there is a theoretical foundation for
accomplishing both of these objectives. Our empirical findings show that government poli-
cies aimed at increasing traceability adoption would be most effective when reducing costs
at the supplier level. Jettisoning current private and public traceability programs because of
their lack of participation may set the industry further back of global customers and com-
petitors. U.S. government traceability program designers should consider a joint partnership




Cow-Calf Producer Willingness to
Report Disease: A Test of Adverse
Selection
3.1 Introduction
Livestock disease has played an important role in shaping U.S. food and agricultural policy.
In 1884, the Animal Industry Act established the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI) to
combat contagious livestock disease in the United States. Soon after, meat inspection laws
were strengthened by an 1891 meat inspection act (Food and Nutrition Board, 1990), and
the Federal Meat Inspection Act became law in 1906. When the BAI was formed, the U.S.
food system was plagued by livestock disease, and human health was severely impacted.
The role of the BAI was to “conduct scientific investigations and administered statutes and
regulations to protect the public from infected or diseased meat products, eradicate animal
diseases, and improve livestock quality.” (National Archives and Records Administration,
2016, section 17.1). Following the success of the BAI and the Federal Horticulture Board,
after several iterations of restructuring, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS) was formed in 1971 to consolidate efforts to protect the U.S. food system (USDA–
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APHIS, 2019).
Today, there has been a resurgence of interest in livestock disease policy. The 2018
Farm Bill provided funding for a three-part program to help support foreign animal disease
(FAD) prevention and management efforts by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA)
APHIS (USDA–APHIS, 2020b). A key part of the animal disease provisions in the 2018 Farm
Bill is $150 million in funding for USDA to spend on developing and expanding the National
Animal Vaccine and Veterinary Countermeasures Bank (Spike, 2018). USDA APHIS recently
announced that they were awarding $10.2 million in funds through the National Animal
Disease Preparedness and Response Program (NADPRP) and the National Animal Health
Laboratory Network (NAHLN) to support disease prevention, emergency response training,
and projects to improve laboratory diagnostic capability (USDA–APHIS, 2020c).1
Global disease surveillance strategies for emerging infectious diseases depends on early
detection of disease outbreaks in animal populations (Halliday et al., 2012). In the United
States, efforts by USDA APHIS to prevent and control FAD incursions depend crucially on
disease surveillance, traceability, biosecurity, and timely self-reporting of disease suspicions.
Disease reporting plays an important role in determining the success of disease surveillance
programs (Halliday et al., 2012), and is as important as disease detection (Brugere et al.,
2017; Lupo et al., 2014). Indemnity payments are the key policy variable that provide
incentives for self-reporting of disease suspicions.
When herd depopulation is necessary to control and eradicate the disease, indemnity
payments are made available to compensate producers. Indemnity payments to impacted
livestock producers equal the fair market value of the euthanized animals, and in most cases,
100 percent of the indemnity amount is paid (USDA–APHIS–VS, 2015a). A key economic
question is: To what extent do indemnity payments affect a producer’s decision to self-report
the disease.
An important aspect of livestock disease reporting is the potential for the problem of
adverse selection. Adverse selection occurs because producers have private information about
1The National Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Program (NADPRP) and the National Animal
Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) are the two programs that were established under the 2018 Farm Bill.
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the disease status of their livestock herd and policymakers would like to incentivize producers
to reveal this private information.2 Indemnity payments are the monetary incentive for
producers to reveal the health status of their herd. Determining how to set the level of
indemnity payments is challenging for policymakers (Wolf, 2006). If indemnity payments
are set too low, producers with higher quality animals may be reluctant to report (Enticott
and Lee, 2015; Hennessy and Wolf, 2018). If payments are too high, we might expect to find
over-reporting of disease suspicions.
This chapter determines the effects of livestock disease policies on producer self-reporting
rates. To do this, we start by developing a conceptual framework that culls several features
from the literature on the economics of disease (e.g., Fraser, 2018; Gramig and Horan, 2011;
Gramig et al., 2009; Hennessy, 2007; Reeling and Horan, 2015, among others). The concep-
tual framework provides a link between producer decision making and the reported supply of
diseased animals. Stated choice methods are used to determine the effects of indemnity pay-
ments on cow-calf producer self-reporting of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) suspicions. We
use stated preference methods because data on livestock disease outbreaks would only allow
us to observe those cases that were reported or detected. Stated choice experiments allow us
to observe those that report disease and those that do not. We empirically study FMD as
a specific example because it is a thoroughly researched, high risk, highly contagious, FAD
that has received considerable attention from industry groups following the passing of the
2018 Farm Bill.
This chapter makes two contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the
growing body of research that conceptually studies the role of economic incentives on disease
reporting. Building on Hennessy (2007), Gramig et al. (2009) provide a novel assessment of
the effects of indemnity payments on producer disease reporting. In their analysis, Gramig
et al. (2009) consider the case where government testing always returns a positive result
for a disease. Thus, producers know if their animals are sick with a disease that should
be reported and know the government’s emergency response strategy. We build on Gramig
2Adverse selection is a classic problem in economics that arises when an agent possesses private or hidden
information.
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et al. (2009), giving more attention to the role of disease testing and prevalence.3 FADs
and diseases with existing eradication programs share several symptoms with less harmful
diseases. In our model, producers report disease suspicions, and the government test result
determines whether animals are culled or treated for a less harmful disease.
The empirical literature on livestock disease reporting economics and policy is limited.
To our knowledge, the only other paper to estimate the effects of indemnity payments on
disease reporting is Kuchler and Hamm (2000). Using the 1952-1992 U.S. scrapie eradica-
tion program as a natural experiment, Kuchler and Hamm (2000) find that the supply of
diseased animals is price elastic, where prices are indemnity payment levels. We contribute
to the literature by directly estimating producer preferences for indemnity payments and
determine the effects of the size of indemnity payments on the share of producers reporting
FMD suspicions. A novel test of adverse selection arises because we empirically consider
the interactions between the size of indemnity payments and the disease prevalence rate.
Elasticity estimates range from 0.064% to 0.216% for the effects of a 1% increase in the
share of production losses covered by indemnity payments on the probability of reporting
FMD suspicions. We find that the within-herd prevalence of the disease has a small effect
on the disease reporting rate for a given indemnity payment. Thus, those that report FMD
suspicions do so early before the disease spreads within their herd.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we develop a conceptual framework that links disease reporting rates to
producer-level decision making. After making this connection, we study the effects of in-
demnity policy and government intervention strategies on reported diseased animal supply.
The goal is to develop a framework that yields testable hypotheses. Importantly, we choose
to ignore the dynamics of disease reporting as we have no way of testing the predictions that
a dynamic model would yield.
3Sheriff and Osgood (2010) consider the role of auditing on seller disclosure of food safety. Again, Sheriff
and Osgood (2010) do not allow sellers to report quality defects that would test safe.
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We begin with i = 1, 2, ..., N livestock producers who observe symptoms that their respec-
tive livestock herds are infected with an unknown disease. Denote the within-herd disease
prevalence rate by di ∈ [0, 1]. A source of uncertainty arises because producers do not know
the type of disease that is infecting their herds. Indexing disease type by j, we consider
two disease types j ∈ {R,NR} where type R diseases are reportable and type NR are non-
reportable.4 In the United States, reportable livestock disease is diseases that are foreign to
the U.S. or have an eradication program in place by APHIS (USDA–APHIS, 2017). Produc-
ers do not know the disease type because several livestock diseases share similar symptoms.
Thus, each producer must decide whether to report symptoms of sick animals to animal
health officials. By not knowning disease type, our framework allows for the possibility that
choosing not to report is inadvertent. Denote the reporting decision by ri ∈ {0, 1}.
3.2.1 Reporting
First, consider the case where a producer chooses to report, r = 1.
Diagnostic testing. After producers report disease suspicions to animal health officials,
diagnostic testing is performed at no cost to the producer to determine the disease type.
Denote the probability of testing positive for a type R disease by PR ∈ [0, 1], which is
determined exogenously. Following a positive test result, the government takes action to
control the reportable disease. There are no testing errors from diagnostic tests.
Government disease control. Researchers model the effects of a single government
strategy (Gramig et al., 2009) or ignore the government’s role in controlling disease (Fraser,
2018). In practice, the government has a collection of disease response strategies to control
disease. In the United States, USDA APHIS has six response strategies for FADs, which
include: stamping-out, stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to kill, stamping-
out with emergency vaccination to slaughter, stamping-out with emergency vaccination to
live, emergency vaccination to live without stamping-out, and manage without widespread
stamping-out or vaccination (USDA–APHIS–VS, 2015b).
4Disease has no human health implications.
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We consider two government response plans. Index government response plans by G ∈
{F, V }. The first government intervention is full depopulation, denoted by F ∈ {0, 1}, where
all infected and susceptible animals are depopulated. The second government response is
vaccinate, denoted V ∈ {0, 1}, where animals are vaccinated without depopulation. The
strategies that we consider represent the two extremes. Producers take the government’s
disease response plan as given and is conditional on the producer testing positive for a type
R disease.
Producer losses. Disease and government intervention are costly to producers (Gramig
et al., 2009). Production losses are conditional on reporting, testing positive for type R
disease, and the government disease control strategy. Production losses from government
strategies are denoted `G(di), for G ∈ {F, V }. Assume `F (di) ≥ `V (di) and ∂`G(di)/∂di > 0.
Losses from each strategy capture loss in asset value, reductions in animal performance, and
business disruption. An example of a business disruption are movement controls put in place
by the government to control disease spread.
No government action is taken if the producer does not test positive for a type R disease.
Instead, the producer privately treats a type NR disease and treatment costs are denoted
by c(di). Assume c(di)/∂di > 0. We assume `F (di) ≥ c(di) ≥ `V (di) because producers bear
the cost of disease control.
Prices. Absent herd depopulation, producers market diseased livestock and receive
salvage value sj(di). The salvage value depends on the disease type. Assume ∂sj(di)/∂di < 0
and sNR(di) > sR(di). Buyers will pay a higher price for sick animals relative to animals
sold following a type R disease outbreak.
Indemnity Policy. Indemnity payments are made available to type R disease impacted
producers who report. We assume that indemnity payments cover a share of production
loss, and are only paid when the government depopulates infected herds. Denote the share
of losses covered by indemnity payments by τ ∈ [0, 1] and the total payment by τ`F (di).
While we assume that `F (di) ≥ c(di) ≥ `V (di), it is clear that τ will play an important
role for producers evaluating loss at the margin under different scenarios. That is, τ will
determine whether `F (di)(1− τ) is >, <, or = to `V (di) and c(di).
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3.2.2 No Reporting
Next, consider the case where a producer chooses not to report, r = 0.
Detection. There is risk that producers who fail to report a type R disease are detected
through government disease surveillance. Denote the probability of detection by PD|R ∈ [0, 1].
The probability of detection is conditional on animals testing positive for a type R disease.
Government disease control and producer losses. Following detection, the govern-
ment chooses whether to depopulate the herd (F ) or vaccinate (V ). Production losses are
denoted `G(di). Losses are conditional on a positive test for a type R disease and detection.
Producers that go undetected, privately treat the disease where costs are c(di).
Prices. Producers that go undetected sell sick livestock and receive salvage value sNR(di).
Undetected producers do not disclose disease status to buyers. We assume animals that go
undetected sell for the same amount as animals diagnosed with a type NR disease. Producers
that are detected through government surveillance can sell sick animals and receive salvage
value sR(di) when a vaccination strategy is taken by the government.
Indemnity Policy. Producers that do not report and are detected through surveillance
for a type R disease receive indemnity payments τ`F (di) and pay a fine f . The fine is paid
regardless of whether the decision not to report was inadvertent and does not depend on the
availability of indemnity payments.
3.2.3 Producer Utility and Diseased Animal Supply
The conceptual framework allows for three producer outcomes that result from reporting:
1. Test positive for type R disease, government depopulates the herd and realize produc-
tion losses, and receive indemnity payments,
2. test positive for type R disease, government vaccinates the herd and realize production
losses, and sell type R infected animals, and
3. test negative for type R disease, privately treat the disease and realize production
losses, and sell type NR infected animals.
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Three producer outcomes arise from not reporting disease suspicions:
1. Government detection through type R disease surveillance, government depopulates
the herd and realize production losses, pay a fine, and receive indemnity payments,
2. government detection through type R disease surveillance, government depopulates the
herd and realize production losses, pay a fine, and sell type R infected animals, and
3. no detection through type R disease surveillance, privately treat the disease and realize
production losses, and sell animals with unknown disease type.
We use a random utility model approach to characterize producer decisions about re-
porting disease suspicions. Producers have preferences for reporting strategy attributes and
choose the strategy that yields the highest expected utility. Utility from reporting strategy r
is Ui,r = U(PR,r, PD|R,r, Gr, `G,r, cr, sj,r, fr, τr, di,r;Bi, εi,r). Producers are heterogeneous. Bi
is the set of parameters characterizing the utility function with density function f(Bi). εi,r
is random unobserved variation with density function f(εi,r).
A producer will choose reporting strategy r = 1 if Ui,r=1 > Ui,r=0. Denote the set
of producers for which Ui,r=1 > Ui,r=0 by Ar=1 = {Bi, εi,r|Ui,r=1 > Ui,r=0}. The share of





Likewise, denote the set of producers for which Ui,r=0 ≥ Ui,r=1 by Ar=0 = {Bi, εi,r|Ui,r=0 ≥





Beyond functional form and distributional assumptions made by the researcher, the number




Equations 3.1 and 3.2 have important policy implications. First, realize that equations 3.1
and 3.2 give the share of diseased animals that are and are not reported to animal health
officials. Equations 3.1 and 3.2 do not give shares for animals that test positive for type
R disease. That is, miss-reporting and over-reporting are just as problematic as under-
reporting (Brugere et al., 2017). The policy variables are G ∈ {F, V }, τ , and f . Setting
G ∈ {F, V }, τ , and f will depend on policymaker tolerance for PR, the probability of a
positive test for type R disease, and PD|R, the probability the disease surveillance detects
producers with type R diseased animals.For P̄R and P̄D|R, a policymaker would like to set
G ∈ {F, V }, τ , and f such that S1(S0) is maximized(minimized).
Effects of indemnity payments. Kuchler and Hamm (2000) find an elastic supply
function for the supply of diseased animals, and Hennessy and Wolf (2018) provide further
argument for an upward sloping supply curve. Our framework allows us to provide further






would confirm that indemnity payments induce sufficiently higher reporting rates. However,
















would provide evidence that indemnity payments induce higher early reporting thereby re-
ducing adverse selection. Equation 3.4 shows that indemnity payments and disease preva-
lence rates complement each other in inducing reporting. The example in equation 3.5 shows
that indemnity payments induce higher rates of change in reporting at lower prevalence rates.
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3.3 Data
The full incidence of livestock disease is categorized by individuals who report, are detected
by surveillance, and are not detected by surveillance. A problem with studying the economics
of livestock disease reporting is that we only observe livestock disease cases reported or
detected by disease surveillance. Assuming that disease surveillance does not catch 100% of
unreported cases, observational data does not record producers who do not report disease
and go undetected. Using observational data would result in us having to change the research
question and relevant policy counterfactual. As an example, observational data would not
allow us to answer the question, “if a livestock producer who did not report disease suspicions
had instead received a policy treatment, would they have changed their reporting strategy?”
In this chapter, we rely on primary data collection to study the effects of government dis-
ease intervention and indemnity payments on producer willingness report disease suspicions.
A mail survey was developed for U.S. cow-calf producers to collect information on opera-
tion and producer characteristics, biosecurity and animal health practices, FMD knowledge
and risk perceptions, and disease reporting practices and perceptions. Sampling procedures,
survey packet development, and data collection were done in collaboration with BEEF Mag-
azine.5 The final survey instrument was granted exemption by the Kansas State University
Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects and Institutional Review Board.
BEEF Magazine developed an eligible mail distribution list of 2,000 United States cattle
producers based on the requirement that the operation has at least 20 head of any cattle in
inventory.6 In an effort to increase survey response, a $1 bill, cover letter, and postage-paid
return envelopes were included in each invitation packet (Dillman et al., 2009; Schulz and
Tonsor, 2010a,b; Tonsor, 2018). Printed survey invitation packets were mailed on October
22, 2018, with no follow-up solicitation. Survey responses were accepted until January 15,
2019. The final survey response rate was 22%, and data included 442 partially complete or
5Schulz and Tonsor (2010a), Schulz and Tonsor (2010b), and Tonsor (2018) also used magazine subscrip-
tion lists to survey livestock producers. McKendree (2017) used state association membership and Feedlot
Magazine mailing lists to survey feedlot operations.




3.3.1 Stated Choice Experiments
We use stated choice methods to determine producer preferences for reporting strategy at-
tributes and the effects of alternative disease policies. The stated choice experiments present
producers with scenarios were they observe suspicions of an FMD outbreak in their cow
herd. The decision for each respondent is to decide whether to report FMD suspicions to an
accredited veterinarian, a binary choice.
FMD is a highly contagious viral disease that infects cows, pigs, sheep, goats, deer, and
other animals with divided hooves (USDA–APHIS–VS, 2013). FMD is on the National
List of Reportable Animal Diseases in the United States and is an OIE-World Organisation
for Animal Health reportable disease. 9 C.F.R. §161.4 (2012) states the disease reporting
requirements and standards for accredited veterinarians in the United States. However, the
United States lacks a standardized national system for animal disease reporting (USDA-
APHIS, 2020). While there are legal implications of failing to disclose a known case of
FMD, our stated choice experiments frame the scenario for cattle producers as observing
symptoms and suspicions of an outbreak. Thus, in our scenarios there are no direct legal
consequences from not reporting.
Several factors contribute to an individual’s decision to report disease suspicions that go
beyond economics.7 However, as the number of variables increases in stated choice methods,
so does the task complexity and survey respondent burden (Louviere et al., 2000). A survey
of the literature, our conceptual framework, and research objectives are used to determine
attribute and attribute levels.
The attributes and attribute levels are a subset of the variables considered in Section 3.2.
The FMD suspicion reporting scenarios varied by prevalence rate (di in Section 3.2), positive
test (PR in section 3.2), government response policy (G in Section 3.2), indemnity policy
(τ in Section 3.2), and livestock buyer discount (sj in Section 3.2) (Delabouglise and Boni,
7For example, Palmer et al. (2009) finds that trust for Western Australia sheep and cattle farmers re-
porting disease.
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2019; Fraser, 2018; Gramig et al., 2009; Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; Kuchler and Hamm, 2000;
Tonsor and Schulz, 2020). An example stated choice scenario is in 3.1. Complete directions
and descriptions from the survey instrument are in appendix B.
Figure 3.1: FMD reporting stated choice experiment example.
In the choice experiments, prevalence rate is the percent of the cow herd that is showing
signs of infection. Prevalence rate has three levels (10%, 50%, 100%). Positive test is the
probability of animals testing positive for FMD and has three levels (10%, 50%, 100%).
Government response policy is the government’s action to control the disease and has three
levels (vaccinate, conditional herd depopulation, and full herd depopulation. Indemnity
policy is the share of production losses covered by indemnity payments and has three levels
(0%, 50%, and 100%). Livestock buyer discount is the discount applied to animals coming
from FMD impacted regions and has three levels ($0/cwt, $5/cwt, and $10/cwt).
With five attributes, each with three levels, a full factorial design would involve 35 choice
tasks. For a binary choice situation, we use a main effects and two-interaction effects design
drawn from the full factorial design and maximize D-efficiency to identify a smaller number
of choice sets (Kuhfeld et al., 1994; Lusk and Norwood, 2005).8 The resulting design includes
11 choice tasks, randomly blocked into a set of five and a set of six.
3.3.2 Sources of Response Bias
Given the nature of the choice experiments, there are two sources of response bias that
warrant discussion. The first is social desirability bias where respondents behave in ways
8Louviere et al. (2000) advise that in binary choice situations, randomly drawing choice sets from the full
factorial will perform poorly in approximating the statistical properties of the full design.
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that are perceived to be viewed favorably by the researcher. In our context, respondents
might always choose to report FMD suspicions because they believe that researchers view this
as the “right thing to do”. Several methods exist to address social desirability bias. However,
Norwood and Lusk (2011) show that these methods might not work well in settings where
respondents are anonymous.
The second source of bias is linked to realism and a respondent’s subjective beliefs about
the scenarios in the choice experiment. The role of subjective beliefs in decision making is well
documented, and most credit Savage (1954) with developing a theory of subjective expected
utility. A natural extension, research argues that subjective beliefs can lead to scenario
adjustment or scenario rejection in stated choice experiments (Bradley, 1988; Burghart et al.,
2007; Cameron et al., 2011; Kataria et al., 2012). Scenario rejection refers to the case where
respondents view the choice scenarios as unrealistic, and scenario adjustment refers to the
situation where respondents adjust some aspect of choice scenarios based on their subjective
beliefs (Cameron et al., 2011). In our context, respondents might have priors about whether
an FMD outbreak will occur or on given FMD policy.
The two sources of response bias might result in preferences that are biased downwards,
where the economic variables in the choice experiments have a small effect on a respondent’s
decision to report FMD suspicions. We estimate discrete choice models for the full sample
and a sample that omits respondents that answered with the same choice for each choice
task as a crude attempt to correct social desirability bias. While this is a crude attempt to
correct for social desirability bias, it could also result in an overcorrection. There might be
some respondents whose preferences were such that they always choose to report FMD or
never choose to report.
The survey included questions to elicit subjective beliefs about several aspects of FMD
reporting. The first question asked, “How many times in the next 100 years do you think
an FMD outbreak will occur in a U.S. livestock population (cattle, sheep, goats, swine)?”
The second question asked, “If an FMD outbreak occurred on your operation, would you
expect indemnity payments to be provided by the government?” These two questions capture
producer expectations about FMD and policy. To control for scenario rejection, we estimate
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discrete choice models for the full model and a sample that omits those that do not expect
an FMD outbreak in the next 100 years. We also attempt to incorporate FMD and policy
expectations as respondent-specific variables in the model.
3.3.3 Summary
Table 3.1 provides a summary of select variables for respondents in the panel of U.S. cattle
producers. The first two columns provide a summary of the full sample of 3,426 observations
across 306 individual producers (N =3426). The next two columns omit respondents that do
not expect a U.S. FMD outbreak in the next 100 years and include 2,790 observations across
248 producers (N =2790). Data for (N =2790) reflects one attempt to control for realism.
The last two columns omit respondents who provided the same answer to each stated choice
question and includes 1,318 observations across 120 producers (N =1318). Data (N =1318)
reflects our attempt to control for social desirability bias. However, this might be viewed as
an overcorrection and restricts cross-sectional variation in the data.
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Table 3.1: Summary of select respondent characteristics
N=3426 N=2790 N=1318
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 63.04 13.18 62.83 13.13 60.67 13.76
Cows (head) 225.69 434.35 219.63 370.86 232.78 461.51
Region (0,1):
CB 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.28 0.45
NC 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23
NP 0.27 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.32 0.47
NW 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40
SE 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.25
SP 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.34 0.07 0.25
Operation (0,1):
Commercial 0.78 0.42 0.77 0.42 0.75 0.43
Seedstock 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.25
Both 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37
Other 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.15
FMD Expectation (0,1):
0 times 0.19 0.39 0.23 0.42
1 time 0.17 0.37 0.21 0.40 0.16 0.37
2 times 0.24 0.43 0.29 0.45 0.22 0.42
3 times 0.12 0.32 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.31
4 times 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30
5 times 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30
6 or more times 0.13 0.33 0.16 0.36 0.07 0.26
Policy Expectation (0,1): 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.56 0.50
Note: Age is the age of the respondent in years. Cows is beef cow inventory as of January
1, 2018. Region is coded following Schulz and Tonsor (2010a,b). CB is corn belt states,
NC is northern crescent states, NP is northern plains states, NW is northwest states, SE is
southeast states, and SP is southern plains stats. Operation is the operation type that best
describes the respondent’s cattle operation. FMD Expectation is the number of times the
respondent expects there to be an FMD outbreak in the United States. Policy Expectation is
a dummy variable that equals 1 (0 otherwise) if the producer expects their to be indemnity
payments following a FMD outbreak in the United States.
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3.4 Empirical Framework
The objective is to determine the effects of indemnity payments on producer reporting of
FMD suspicions. To do this, we use stated choice experiments and a random utility approach
to estimate producer preferences. Specifically, producer i in choice situation t will choose
FMD reporting strategy r = 1 if Ui,r=1,t > Ui,r=0,t where Uirt is utility from reporting
strategy r. Utility is decomposed into observable and unobservable components, Uirt =
Virt + εirt where Virt is the observable component of utility and εirt is unosbserved random
taste variation. Using the notation from Section 3.2, we argue that utility from reporting
FMD suspicions can be expressed as:
Uirt = V (sirt, dirt, PR,irt, Firt, Virt, τirt) + εirt (3.6)
where sirt is the $/cwt livestock buyer discount, dirt is the within-herd prevalence rate for
FMD symptoms, PR,irt is the probability of a positive FMD test result, Virt is an emergency
vaccination strategy taken by the government relative to conditional herd depopulation,
Firt is an emergency full herd depopulation taken by the government relative to conditional
depopulation, τirt is the share of production losses covered by indemnity payments.
Given the specification in equation 3.6, assuming that εirt is distributed type 1 extreme
value, we approximate producer utility with a mixed logit model of the form:
Uirt = β0 + β1sirt + βi2dirt + βi3PR,irt + βi4Virt + βi5Firt + βi6τirt
+ θjEir + εirt, ∀ r = Reporting
(3.7)
Uirt = θjEir + εirt, ∀ j = No Reporting (3.8)
where β′i = (βi2, βi3, βi4, βi5, βi6) are normally distributed random parameters (Train, 2009).
In equations 3.7 and 3.8, the random parameters are specified as βi = β̄ + Ωυi (Greene
and Hensher, 2005) where β̄ is a vector of fixed means, Ω = diag(σ2, σ3, σ4, σ5, σ6) is
a diagonal matrix of standard deviations, and υi is a vector of individual random unob-
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served taste variation with mean vector zero and identity covariance matrix. Finally, Eij are
individual-specific random effects that capture unobserved choice situation invariant hetero-
geneity (time-invariant heterogeneity in conventional panel data settings), and θj are random
effect standard deviations (Greene and Hensher, 2005). While we do not directly model the
consequences of not reporting using choice attributes in 3.8, the random effects specification
allows us to capture individual unobserved effects from not reporting FMD suspicions.
Mixed logit choice probabilities for the model in equations 3.7 and 3.8 are estimated
using simulated maximum likelihood. We use 500 Halton draws for simulation estimation
(Train, 2009). Using the estimated models for N =3426, N =2790, and N =1318, we estimate
equations 3.1 and 3.2 with




where P̂ij are predicted mixed logit probabilities (Hensher et al., 2005).
3.5 Results
We use likelihood ratio tests for model specification. First, likelihood ratio tests reject a
conditional logit model in favor of a more general mixed logit specification. Next, we test for
random effects and reject the null. The final model specification is a mixed logit model with
normal distributed random parameters and alternative specific random effects (equations 3.7
and 3.8).
Social desirability bias and realism are potential sources of bias. We estimate the model
in equations 3.7 and 3.8 three separate times. The first estimation includes the full sample of
respondents (N =3426). The second estimation attempts to account for realism and scenario
rejection by omitting respondents that do not expect an FMD outbreak in the next 100 years
(N =2790). In the data, 19% of respondents do not expect an FMD outbreak (Table 3.1).
The third estimation attempts to account for social desirability bias by omitting respondents
who always to choose to report or never report (N =1318). Simulated maximum likelihood
estimation results are reported in Table 3.2. Importantly, results show that there are no sign
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changes in preferences among the three samples.
Table 3.2: Simulated maximum likelihood estimates for FMD reporting mixed logit models
N=3426 N=2790 N=1318
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Nonrandom Parameter:
Constant 0.904* 0.464 0.984* 0.568 -1.678*** 0.358
sirt -0.043 0.037 -0.038 0.048 0.020 0.035
Random parameter means:
dirt 1.988*** 0.631 1.840** 0.788 1.206*** 0.443
PR,irt 1.842*** 0.654 2.380*** 0.793 1.017** 0.472
τR,irt 3.566*** 0.749 3.890*** 1.040 2.255*** 0.407
Firt -1.298*** 0.226 -1.259*** 0.329 -0.973*** 0.200
Virt 1.104*** 0.216 1.074*** 0.275 1.052*** 0.232
Random parameter std. devs.:
dirt 1.809** 0.807 1.908** 0.928 0.970 0.620
PR,irt 2.385*** 0.750 3.020*** 0.917 2.023*** 0.457
τirt 2.233** 0.941 2.061* 1.076 1.183** 0.485
Firt 0.051 1.469 0.011 1.501 0.013 0.319
Virt 0.464 0.388 0.782 0.601 0.508 0.321
Error components:
θr=1 2.455** 1.144 2.966*** 0.931 0.040 0.110
θr=0 2.371** 1.161 2.099 1.434 0.017 0.094
N 3426.00 2790.00 1318.00
Log-likelihood -601.27 -462.55 -394.70
AIC 1230.50 953.10 817.40
Pseudo R-squared 0.49 0.52 0.14
Note: (N =3426) refers to the full sample of respondents, (N =2790) omits respondents that
do not expect an FMD outbreak in the next 100 years, and (N =1318) omits respondents
who always answer “yes” or “no” to stated choice questions. Number of observations is the
product of 2 choices per task, number of choice tasks, and number of respondents. Standard
errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
A potential problem with the results in Table 3.2 is that there may be other sources of
mean and variance heterogeneity based on subjective beliefs. Ignoring significant sources
of heterogeneity would bias preference estimates. For each of the models in Table 3.2, we
estimate a pooled model and models that stratify the data by Policy Expectation and FMD
Expectation. In each case, we fail to reject the pooled model using likelihood ratio tests. We
also estimate models that interact Policy Expectation and FMD Expectation with specific
78
variables in the mean and variance terms of βi and find similar results.
Using results in Table 3.2, we determine the effects of indemnity policy (τirt in Table 3.2)
and prevalence rate (dirt in Table 3.2) by estimating elasticities and counterfactual simula-
tions. Point elasticities are estimated for each respondent and averaged using probability-
weighted sample enumeration (Hensher et al., 2005). Elasticities for discrete choice models
measure the percentage change in the choice probability for a percentage change in an inde-
pendent variable. Elasticity estimates are in Table 3.3. A benefit of the mixed logit is that it
does not impose symmetry on elasticity estimates. A percentage increase in the choice prob-
ability for reporting does not impose the same percentage reduction in the choice probability
for not reporting.
Table 3.3: Elasticity estimates
N=3426 N=2790 N=1318
Variable r=1 r=0 r=1 r=0 r=1 r=0
dirt 0.052*** -0.230*** 0.405*** -0.194*** 0.155*** -0.195***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
PR,irt 0.033*** -0.148*** 0.327*** -0.157*** 0.105*** -0.132***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
τirt 0.064*** -0.284*** 0.068*** -0.327*** 0.216*** -0.272***
(0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014)
sirt -0.014*** 0.065*** -0.011*** 0.053*** 0.028*** -0.035***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Note: Elasticities are calculated using the point elasticity method and calculated for each
individual in the sample and aggregated using probability-weighted sample enumeration.
Delta method standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
For a fixed set of attributes, the share of respondents that report FMD suspicions is
calculated using equation 3.9 and results in Table 3.2. Iterating over a set of values for an
attribute gives FMD reporting curves. As a baseline, Figure 3.2 predicts reporting shares at
mean attribute levels. Figure 3.2 shows that 81.7%, 82.7%, and 55.7% of respondents report
FMD suspicions for N =3426, N =2790, and N =1318, respectively. The data the generate
the figures in this section are in Appendix C and referenced throughout.
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Figure 3.2: Mean FMD suspicion reporting rates.
3.5.1 Effects of Indemnity Payments
First, we study the effects of indemnity payments on the rate of FMD reporting. A 1%
increase in τirt increases the probability of reporting FMD suspicions by 0.064%, 0.068%,
and 0.216% for N =3426, N =2790, and N =1318, respectively (Table 3.3). Kuchler and
Hamm (2000) predicts that the supply of susceptible animals is increasing in indemnity
payments and argue that there are two ways to realize higher supply. First, a farmer could
increase their efforts to identify sick animals for a fixed number of susceptible animals.
Alternatively, a moral hazard problem could arise where farmers increase the number of
susceptible animals when such activities yield positive returns (Kuchler and Hamm, 2000).
(Kuchler and Hamm, 2000) estimate an elastic supply response where indemnity payments
are set relative to market prices. Our estimates suggest a smaller reporting response from
increases indemnity payments. Thus, we reject the prediction in equation 3.3 at mean values.
Elasticity estimates in Table 3.3 do capture the effects for the full range of indemnity
payments. In Figure 3.3, we predict the rate of FMD reporting for the full set of indemnity
payments while holding all other attributes at their mean values. This reveals a relatively
more elastic response over the range τirt ∈ [0, 100]. For indemnity payments set at 0%, 72.5%,
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73.0%, and 40.2% of producers report FMD suspicions for N =3426, N =2790, and N =1318,
respectively (Figure 3.3 and Table C.1). When indemnity payments are set at 50%, results
from Figure 3.3 reveal that 83.6%, 84.3%, and 59.1% of producers report FMD for N =3426,
N =2790, and N =1318, respectively (Figure 3.3 and Table C.1). The large difference for
N =1318 in Figure 3.3 magnifies the potential for social desirability and realism bias.
Figure 3.3: Effects of indemnity payments on FMD suspicion reporting rates.
3.5.2 Effects of Indemnity Payments and Disease Prevalence
Research has found that there are important interactions between disease prevalence and in-
demnity payments (Fraser, 2018; Gramig et al., 2009; Kuchler and Hamm, 2000). Elasticity
results in Table 3.3 show that disease prevalence has the largest effect on FMD reporting.
A 1% increase in disease prevalence increases the disease reporting response probability by
0.052%, 0.405%, and 0.155% for N =3426, N =2790, and N =1318, respectively. However,
elasticity estimates in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.3 say nothing about which types of produc-
ers reveal FMD suspicions. Policymakers would like to set indemnity payments such that
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producers reveal disease status before the disease spreads within and across livestock herds.
Figure 3.4 shows the effects of indemnity payments at different disease prevalence rates.
Figure 3.4 provides empirical context to equations 3.4 and 3.5. Specifically, Figure 3.4
confirms equation 3.4. Increasing indemnity payments results in an upward shift in the
reporting-prevalence curve. Moreover, increasing indemnity payments is more effective at
increasing reporting at lower disease prevalence rates. As an empirical counterpart to equa-
tion 3.5, at dirt = 25% the results that populate the left panel in Figure 3.4 show that
increasing τirt from 50% to 100% increases reporting from 54.4% to 71.1% (Table C.2).
However, the left panel in Figure 3.4 shows that when dirt = 100%, increasing τirt from 50%
to 100% increases reporting from 68.2% to 80.5% (Table C.2). Thus, indemnity payments
are more effective at inducing reporting when disease prevalence is low. Figure 3.4 also shows
that indemnity payments and disease prevalence have a smaller impact on FMD reporting
for N =3426 and N =2790.




This chapter provides a bold and novel attempt to study the role of indemnity policy on
livestock producer disease reporting. As an empirical example, we consider reporting FMD
suspicions. There are limitations to our approach that are worth describing.
First, there are limitations to framing the scenarios around FMD. This chapter describes
the limitations of social desirability bias and subjective beliefs. Perhaps, a more obvious flaw
is that in practice, many may choose not to report FMD because they are not familiar with
the disease and symptoms. Conversely, producers may always choose to report because they
always consult a veterinarian when animals are sick. For these two alternative scenarios,
the economic variables would likely play no role in determining whether a producer reports
FMD suspicions, which may result in us overstating the importance of our examined economic
conditions. Future research might consider an alternative livestock disease for which that is
an existing reporting and eradication program in place.
Second, the choice experiments include a variable for the government disease response.
The disease response attribute consists of three levels: full herd depopulation, conditional
herd depopulation, and vaccinate. The descriptions for full herd depopulation and con-
ditional herd depopulation follow from (USDA–APHIS, 2015). However, the vaccination
strategy includes vaccination of infected animals. While all three plans might be economi-
cally feasible and appeal to political pressures, they all may not be deemed viable or likely
from an epidemiology perspective. It is difficult to predict which strategy of those described
in this chapter, if any of them, would be implemented during an FMD outbreak because the
U.S. has not faced an FMD outbreak since 1929. Thus, this attribute is potentially limited
in usefulness and practicality. That said, consistent with other stated-preference work this
research intentionally spans a set of scenarios that vary in how likely they are to play out
given our focus on producer behavior over a range of situations.
Despite these two limitations, this chapter contributes new insights into the role of public
policy in livestock disease control. Potentially the effects of indemnity payments are more
generalizable to other livestock disease scenarios relative to other attributes in the choice
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experiment. A promising result is that producers report early before the disease spreads
within the herd. However, FMD has such a high transmission rate that it is unlikely that
a producer would be able to delay reporting before the disease impacts the entire herd
effectively – the broader desire is that early reporting results in quicker public response and
hence lower overall spread within the regional or national herd.
3.7 Conclusion
There has been an increase of interest in livestock disease policy following the passing of the
2018 Farm Bill. The 2018 Farm Bill authorizes USDA APHIS to use $150 million in funding
to develop an FMD vaccine bank. Despite the importance of livestock disease policy, little
work exists to explain the incentives for producers to protect against and report livestock
disease. In this chapter, we study the effects of indemnity payments on cow-calf producer
willingness to report FMD suspicions. Indemnity payments induce higher reporting at low
disease prevalence rates and diminish as the prevalence rate increases. Thus, producers are
willing to reveal private information about disease status when disease prevalence is low.
Results also have important policy implications. The stated choice experiments cover a
broader mix of policy approaches relative to what is currently being implemented by USDA
APHIS. Importantly, our results show that policy plays an essential role in a producer’s
decision to report FMD suspicions. Equally important, though not directly considered, are
the consequences of choosing not to report. Results from this paper highlight the benefits of
alternative policy approaches to control FADs. A natural extension would be to determine
the costs from policy approaches that we consider to determine the optimal policy response.
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A.1 Seller Choice Experiment Directions
Instructions and description provided to choice experiment seller respondents.
The following 6 scenarios each containing three different options for you to select re-
garding participation in information sharing, individual animal traceability programs. Two
options are voluntary traceability programs you could choose to participate in and the third
option (No Traceability) is an alternative where you could choose not to participate in ei-
ther of the two presented traceability programs. For your information in interpreting the
alternative traceability program options, please carefully read the following descriptions:
Participation in a Visual Traceability program would involve applying ‘traditional ear
tags’ that are read manually upon human inspection. Participation in an Electronic Trace-
ability program would involve applying ‘button-like’ RFID (radio frequency identification)
tags that can be read by electronic readers.
Source of origin and/or health certification/vaccination records of your ranch may also
be provided to buyers of your cattle by participating in either a Visual Traceability (written
documentation) or Electronic Traceability (electronic documentation) voluntary program.
These options vary in the cost for you to implement on your operation. Choosing No
Traceability results in no increase in costs while choosing to participate in either the Visual
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Traceability or Electronic Traceability program will increase costs by $1, $5, or $9 (per head).
The entity managing each voluntary traceability program may take one of three forms:
• Government : entity such as the USDA (United States Department of Agriculture);
• Private-Industry : entity specializes in traceability specifically for the beef cattle indus-
try;
• Government, Private-Industry Partnership: joint effort between the public and private
sector. Government data use would be limited to only disease monitoring, tracking,
and surveillance consistent with public-good aspects of this information.
In addition, these options differ in terms of the premium or discount (per head sold) you
would receive. These price adjustments to the market price range from discounts of up to
$15 per head for selecting No Traceability and premiums of up to $15 per head for selecting
Electronic Traceability. Negative numbers indicate discounts and positive numbers indicate
premiums.
A.2 Buyer Choice Experiment Directions
Instructions and description provided to choice experiment buyer respondents.
The following 6 scenarios each containing three different options for you to select regard-
ing the procurement of feeder cattle that are already participating in information sharing,
individual animal traceability programs. Two options are feeder cattle participating in vol-
untary traceability programs and the third option (No Traceability) is an alternative where
you could choose to procure cattle that are not participating in either of the two presented
traceability programs. For your information in interpreting the alternative traceability pro-
gram options, please carefully read the following descriptions:
Participation in a Visual Traceability program would involve you procuring cattle with
‘traditional ear tags’ that are read manually upon human inspection. Participation in an
Electronic Traceability program would involve you procuring cattle with ‘button-like’ RFID
(radio frequency identification) tags that can be read by electronic readers.
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Source of origin and/or health certification/vaccination records may also be provided
to you by feeder cattle sellers who are already participating in either a Visual Traceabil-
ity (written documentation) or Electronic Traceability (electronic documentation) voluntary
program.
These options vary in the feeder cattle premium or discount (per head sold) that you
would have to offer to procure cattle that are participating in individual animal traceability
programs. These price adjustments to the market price range from discounts of up to $15
per head for procuring cattle with No Traceability and premiums of up to $15 per head
for procuring cattle with Electronic Traceability. Negative numbers indicate discounts and
positive numbers indicate premiums.
The entity managing each voluntary traceability program may take one of three forms:
• Government : entity such as the USDA (United States Department of Agriculture);
• Private-Industry : entity specializes in traceability specifically for the beef cattle indus-
try;
• Government, Private-Industry Partnership: joint effort between the public and private
sector. Government data use would be limited to only disease monitoring, tracking,
and surveillance consistent with public-good aspects of this information.
In addition, these options differ in terms of the fed cattle premium or discount (per head
sold) you would receive. These price adjustments to the market price range from discounts of
up to $15 per head for marketing cattle with No Traceability and premiums of up to $15 per
head for marketing cattle with Electronic Traceability. Negative numbers indicate discounts




Stated choice experiment instructions and descriptions provided to survey re-
spondents.
Suppose you privately observe that your cow herd is showing signs of being infected with
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). Having observed signs of FMD being present, you need to
decide if you will report suspicions to an accredited veterinarian. On the following pages
are hypothetical scenarios which vary with respect to prevalence rate, positive test results,
government response policy, indemnity policy, and livestock buyer discount. For your in-
formation in interpreting the disease reporting options, please carefully read the following
descriptions.
Prevalence rate (%): The percent of your cow herd that is showing signs of being infected
with FMD.
• For example, if your cow herd consists of 100 animals and 10% of the herd is showing
signs of being infected with FMD, then 10 animals are suspected of having FMD.
Positive test (%): The probability that animals in your cow herd that are suspected of
having FMD actually test positive for the disease.
• For example, FMD is often confused with other diseases involving fever and blisters
that are less harmful. Diseases that might be confused with FMD include bovine viral
diarrhea, footrot, bluetongue, and vesicular stomatitis.
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Government response policy: The response strategy taken by the government to eradi-
cate FMD from cow herds that test positive for the disease. Alternative response strategies
include:
• Full herd depopulation-depopulation of animals clinically infected with FMD and
susceptible animals.
• Conditional herd depopulation-depopulation of animals clinically infected with
FMD and susceptible animals and also vaccination all remaining at-risk animals.
• Vaccinate-vaccination of all animals clinically infected with FMD and susceptible
animals.
Indemnity policy (%): The share of production losses covered by indemnity payments
provided by the government following FMD detection. Indemnity payments are provided
when animals must be quarantined and euthanized. They are based on fair market value of
the animal, reflect budget conditions and USDA APHIS policies at the time.
• For example, if the indemnity payment covers 100% of losses then you would receive
the fair market value, based on USDA APHIS calculations, for each animal that is
euthanized to eradicate FMD. During large scale disease outbreaks, the government
might choose to provide indemnity payments that cover 50% or 0% (no payments) of
production losses.
Livestock buyer discount ($/cwt): FMD is not a public health or food safety concern.
Therefore, cattle which pass ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection by USDA Food Safety
Inspection Service (FSIS) are safe and wholesome for human consumption. Cattle from
impacted regions with no evidence of FMD infection may be available at a discount relative
to livestock from not impacted regions.
• For example, buyers might choose to procure animals from an FMD impacted region
only at a $5.00/cwt discount compared to animals from FMD-free regions, if animals
are disease free or vaccinated for FMD.
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Place an “X” in either the “Yes” or “No” box, for the option that you would choose from
each of the following 5 scenarios. Even though this a hypothetical exercise, please answer
the questions as if you were actually facing these situations on your operation. Although
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Table C.2: Data for Figure 3.4
Sample Indemnity Rate Report
N=3426 0 25 69.24
N=3426 25 25 76.04
N=3426 50 25 81.45
N=3426 75 25 85.46
N=3426 100 25 88.31
N=3426 0 50 72.91
N=3426 25 50 79.13
N=3426 50 50 83.95
N=3426 75 50 87.46
N=3426 100 50 89.93
N=3426 0 75 76.01
N=3426 25 75 81.63
N=3426 50 75 85.92
N=3426 75 75 89.00
N=3426 100 75 91.16
N=3426 0 100 78.54
N=3426 25 100 83.60
N=3426 50 100 87.42
N=3426 75 100 90.16
N=3426 100 100 92.08
N=2790 0 25 70.32
N=2790 25 25 77.13
N=2790 50 25 82.60
N=2790 75 25 86.73
N=2790 100 25 89.73
N=2790 0 50 73.40
N=2790 25 50 79.69
N=2790 50 50 84.65
N=2790 75 50 88.34
N=2790 100 50 90.99
N=2790 0 75 75.99
N=2790 25 75 81.75
N=2790 50 75 86.24
N=2790 75 75 89.56
N=2790 100 75 91.93
N=2790 0 100 78.12
N=2790 25 100 83.38
N=2790 50 100 87.45
N=2790 75 100 90.45
N=2790 100 100 92.60
N=1318 0 25 34.60
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N=1318 25 25 44.35
N=1318 50 25 54.42
N=1318 75 25 63.59
N=1318 100 25 71.11
N=1318 0 50 39.90
N=1318 25 50 49.80
N=1318 50 50 59.53
N=1318 75 50 68.02
N=1318 100 50 74.79
N=1318 0 75 45.33
N=1318 25 75 55.05
N=1318 50 75 64.18
N=1318 75 75 71.88
N=1318 100 75 77.90
N=1318 0 100 50.59
N=1318 25 100 59.84
N=1318 50 100 68.22
N=1318 75 100 75.13
N=1318 100 100 80.46
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Q1.1 Survey Number _______   (1) 
 
Q1.2 Survey Version: 
m R1  (1) FMD Survey 
m R2  (2) FMD Survey 
m C1  (3) Feeder Cattle Seller Traceability Survey 
m C2  (4) Feeder Cattle Seller Traceability Survey 
m C3  (5) Feeder Cattle Seller Traceability Survey 
m F1  (6) Feeder Cattle Buyer Traceability Survey 
m F2  (7) Feeder Cattle Buyer Traceability Survey 
m F3  (8) Feeder Cattle Buyer Traceability Survey 
 
Start of Block: R1 Version 
Q2.1 Which operation type best describes your cattle operation? 
m Commercial  (1)  
m Both commercial and seedstock  (2)  
m Seedstock  (3)  
m Other (specify)  (4) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q2.2 Which marketing method do you most frequently use in marketing your operation’s cattle? 
m Sale barn/auction  (1)  
m Direct-Video/Internet auction  (2)  
m Direct-private treaty  (3)  
m Consignment  (4)  
m Forward contract  (5)  
m Carcass basis  (6)  
m Other (specify)  (7) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q2.3 Do the same buyers purchase cattle from your operation each year? 
m No  (1)  
m Yes  (2)  
 
Q2.4 Do you usually provide buyers with information about your operation’s health programs? 
m No  (1)  
m Yes  (2)  
 
Q2.5 How is this information most frequently shared? 
m Written documentation  (1)  
m Electronic documentation  (2)  
m Tell buyer orally   (3)  
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Q2.6 Has your operation had any of the following disease outbreaks in the last 5 years? If yes, 
how many months ago was the most recent case? 
 Yes (1) Months ago (1) 
No Disease 
Problems (1) 
Bovine Viral Diarrhea (BVD) (1)  m _________ m 
Trichomoniasis (Trich) (2)  m _________ m 
Bovine tuberculosis (TB) (3)  m _________ m 
Vesicular stomatitis (VS) (4)  m _________ m 
Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis (IBRV) (5)  m _________ m 
Other (specify) (6)  m _________ m 
 
Q2.7 During the last 12 months, did your operation consult a veterinarian for: 
 Yes (1) No (2) 
Disease diagnosis or treatment? (1)  m m 
Disease prevention? (2)  m m 
Livestock deaths? (3)  m m 
Information on biosecurity practices? (4)  m m 
Information on foreign animal diseases? (5)  m m 
 
Q2.8 In which state is your cattle operation?  
m Alabama  (1)  
m Alaska  (2)  
m Arizona  (3)  
m Arkansas  (4)  
m California  (5)  
m Colorado  (6)  
m Connecticut  (7)  
m Delaware  (8)  
m District of Columbia  (9)  
m Florida  (10)  
m Georgia  (11)  
m Hawaii  (12)  
m Idaho  (13)  
m Illinois  (14)  
m Indiana  (15)  
m Iowa  (16)  
m Kansas  (17)  
m Kentucky  (18)  
m Louisiana  (19)  
m Maine  (20)  
m Maryland  (21)  
m Massachusetts  (22)  
m Michigan  (23)  
m Minnesota  (24)  
m Mississippi  (25)  
m Missouri  (26)  
m Montana  (27)  
m Nebraska  (28)  
m Nevada  (29)  
m New Hampshire  (30)  
m New Jersey  (31)  
m New Mexico  (32)  
m New York  (33)  
m North Carolina  (34)  
m North Dakota  (35)  
m Ohio  (36)  
m Oklahoma  (37)  
m Oregon  (38)  
m Pennsylvania  (39)  
m Puerto Rico  (40)  
m Rhode Island  (41)  
m South Carolina  (42)  
m South Dakota  (43)  
m Tennessee  (44)  
m Texas  (45)  
m Utah  (46)  
m Vermont  (47)  
m Virginia  (48)  
m Washington  (49)  
m West Virginia  (50)  
m Wisconsin  (51)  
m Wyoming  (52)  
m I do not reside in the 
United States  (53)  
 
Q2.9 Biosecurity for beef cattle operations is often defined as the implementation of protocols 
designed to reduce the likelihood of unwanted pests and disease threats from entering the 
cattle herd. Which practice best describes the level of biosecurity implemented on your 
operation? 
m Maintain a closed herd   (1)  
m No entry of new cattle but reentry of existing cattle allowed  (2)  
m Entry of new cattle with known medical records and initial quarantine   (3)  
m Entry of new cattle with known medical records but no initial quarantine  (4)  
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Q2.10 How would you rate the biosecurity of your operation compared to other operations in your 
area? 
m Very Low -1  (1)  
m 2  (2)  
m 3  (3)  
m 4  (4)  
m 5  (5)  
m 6  (6)  
m 7  (7)  
m 8  (8)  
m 9  (9)  
m Very High - 10  (10)  
 
Q2.11 Approximately, what portion of your total annual cow costs are   allocated to biosecurity 
efforts? 
 _______ percent (1) 
 
Q2.12 How many times in the next 100 years do you think an FMD outbreak will occur in a U.S. 
livestock population (cattle, sheep, goats, swine)? 
m 0 times  (1)  
m 1 time  (2)  
m 2 times  (3)  
m 3 times  (4)  
m 4 times  (5)  
m 5 times  (6)  
m 6 or more times  (7)  
 
Q2.13 If an FMD outbreak occurred on your operation, how long (number of months) do you think 
losses would persist? 
m Under 1 month  (1)  
m 1 to 3 months  (2)  
m 4 to 6 months  (3)  
m 7 to 9 months  (4)  
m 10 to 12 months  (5)  
m 13 to 15 months  (6)  
m 16 to 18 months  (7)  
m 19 months or longer  (8)  
 
Q2.14 If an FMD outbreak occurred on your operation, what do you think production losses would 
be in dollars per cow? 
m $0 per cow  (1)  
m $0.01-$100 per cow  (2)  
m $100.01-$200 per cow  (3)  
m $200.01-$300 per cow  (4)  
m $300.01-$400 per cow  (5)  
m $400.01-$500 per cow  (6)  
m $500.01-$600 per cow  (7)  
m $600.01-$700 per cow  (8)  
m $700.01-$800 per cow  (9)  
m Over $800 per cow  (10)  
 
Q2.15 If an FMD outbreak occurred on your operation, would you expect indemnity payments to 
be provided by the government? 
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m No  (1)  
m Yes  (2)  
 
Q2.16 If yes, would you expect indemnity payments provided by the government to be made 
available to cattle producers only if they could document biosecurity efforts? 
m No  (1)  
m Yes  (2)  
 
Q2.17 Would you expect indemnity payments provided by the government to cover all of the 
production losses in cattle value? 
m No  (1)  
m Yes  (2)  
 
Q2.18 If an FMD outbreak occurred on your operation, in your opinion how would buyers of your 
cattle likely respond? Buyers would continue to purchase cattle known to be FMD free or 
vaccinated against FMD at a discount of: 
m No discount, buyers would continue to purchase cattle as usual  (1)  
m $0.01-$5.00 per hundredweight discount  (2)  
m $5.01-$10.00 per hundredweight discount  (3)  
m $10.01-$15.00 per hundredweight discount  (4)  
m $ 15.01 per hundredweight or higher discount  (5)  
 
Q2.19 If an FMD outbreak occurred on your operation, in your opinion how would buyers of your 
cattle likely respond? Buyers would entirely cease taking cattle for: 
m Not applicable, buyers would continue to purchase cattle as usual  (1)  
m Under 1 month   (2)  
m 1 to 3 months  (3)  
m 4 to 6 months  (4)  
m 6 months or longer  (5)  
 
Q2.20 If you suspect FMD might be present on your operation, who would you contact? (please 
check all that apply)  
q U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)  (1)  
q Neighboring and/or local beef producers  (2)  
q Livestock buyers  (3)  
q Private veterinarian    (4)  
q State Veterinarian’s office  (5)  
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Q2.21 For the biosecurity practices listed below, please check the left column for those used on 
your operation. Also please indicate by circling a number, how feasible you believe 
















There is a designated biosecurity 
manager for the operation (1)  m m m m m m 
An operation-specific, written, 
enhanced biosecurity plan has been 
developed (2)  
m m m m m m 
Animals come only from sources with 
documented enhanced biosecurity 
practices (3)  
m m m m m m 
A plan exists to manage animals in a 
biosecure manner on-site in the event 
animal movement is stopped for several 
weeks (4)  
m m m m m m 
Feedstuffs are delivered, stored, mixed, 
and fed in a manner that minimizes 
contamination, and feed spills are 
cleaned up promptly (5)  
m m m m m m 
 
Q2.22 A Line of Separation (LOS) is an outer control boundary around, or within, the premises to 
limit movement of virus into areas where animals can be exposed. Please check the left 
column for those used on your operation. Also please indicate by circling a number, how 

















A line of separation is clearly defined 
and marked on the operation (1)  m m m m m m 
Entry to the operation is restricted to a 
limited number of access points (2)  m m m m m m 
Nose-to-nose contact with livestock on 
adjacent premises is prevented (3)  m m m m m m 
Access is limited to individuals who are 
essential to the operation (4)  m m m m m m 
Vehicles, trailers, and equipment that 
cross the LOS are properly cleaned & 
disinfected (5)  
m m m m m m 
Animals leaving the operation only 
move in one direction across the LOS 
at an Access Point (6)  
m m m m m m 
The area designated for 
loading/unloading animals is not a 
people entry point (7)  
m m m m m m 
Areas contaminated by personnel or 
animals after loading/unloading are 
properly cleaned and disinfected (8)  
m m m m m m 
 
Q2.23 Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. (please circle the 
most appropriate answer for each row) 
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I am willing to take animal health risks in order 
to make more money (1)  m m m m m 
With respect to the conduct of my business, I 
prefer certainty to uncertainty  (2)  m m m m m 
I am willing to take financial risks in order to 
realize higher average returns (3)  m m m m m 
My cattle operation is protected from financial 
risks (4)  m m m m m 
My cattle operation is protected from animal 
disease risks (5)  m m m m m 
With respect to animal health, I prefer certainty 
to uncertainty (6)  m m m m m 
 
Q2.24 Which animal identification methods to you currently use? 
m Plastic ear tag  (1)  
m Metal (“Bright”) tag  (2)  
m Brand  (3)  
m Tattoo  (4)  
m Brucellosis tag  (5)  
m Electronic ear tag (RFID)  (6)  
m None  (7)  
m Other (specify)  (8) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q2.25 What is your age?  _______ years (1) 
 
Q2.26 What is your gender? 
m Male  (1)  
m Female  (2)  
 
Q2.27 What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
m High school graduate/GED  (1)  
m Some college or 2-year college/technical degree  (2)  
m 4-year college degree  (3)  
m Graduate degree (MS, MBA, PhD, DVM, etc.)  (4)  
m Other (specify)  (5) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q2.28 Approximately, what portion of your household income is from on-farm sources?  
 _______ percent (1) 
 
Q2.29 What was your inventory on January 1, 2018 of cows, replacement heifers (bred or open), 
and bulls? 
 _______ Cows (1) 
 _______ Replacement heifers (2) 
 _______ Bulls (3) 
 
Q2.30 What was your total annual cow cost for 2018?   _______ per head (1) 
 
Q2.31 How many years of experience in cattle production do you have?   _______ years (1) 
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Q2.32 How many more years do you expect to be in cattle production?  _______ years (1) 
 
Q2.33 Prevalence rate (%) - 90% 
 Positive test (%) - 50% 
 Government response policy- Conditional herd depopulation 
 Indemnity policy (%) - 0% 
 Livestock buyer discount ($/cwt) - $10 
m Yes  (1)  
m No  (2)  
 
Q2.34 Prevalence rate (%) - 90% 
 Positive test (%) - 50% 
 Government response policy- Conditional herd depopulation 
 Indemnity policy (%) - 0% 
 Livestock buyer discount ($/cwt) - $10 
m Yes  (1)  
m No  (2)  
 
Q2.35 Prevalence rate (%) - 50% 
 Positive test (%) - 10% 
 Government response policy- Full herd depopulation 
 Indemnity policy (%) - 0% 
 Livestock buyer discount ($/cwt) - $10 
m Yes  (1)  
m No  (2)  
 
Q2.36 Prevalence rate (%) - 10% 
 Positive test (%) - 50% 
 Government response policy- Vaccinate 
 Indemnity policy (%) - 0% 
 Livestock buyer discount ($/cwt) - $5 
m Yes  (1)  
m No  (2)  
 
Q2.37 Prevalence rate (%) - 10% 
 Positive test (%) - 50% 
 Government response policy- Full herd depopulation 
 Indemnity policy (%) - 100% 
 Livestock buyer discount ($/cwt) - $0 
m Yes  (1)  
m No  (2)  
 
Q2.38 Your input will strengthen our research and help us obtain more accurate conclusions. If 
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Start of Block: R2 Version 
Q3.1 Which operation type best describes your cattle operation? 
m Commercial  (1)  
m Both commercial and seedstock  (2)  
m Seedstock  (3)  
m Other (specify)  (4) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q3.2 Which marketing method do you most frequently use in marketing your operation’s cattle? 
m Sale barn/auction  (1)  
m Direct-Video/Internet auction  (2)  
m Direct-private treaty  (3)  
m Consignment  (4)  
m Forward contract  (5)  
m Carcass basis  (6)  
m Other (specify)  (7) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q3.3 Do the same buyers purchase cattle from your operation each year? 
m No  (1)  
m Yes  (2)  
 
Q3.4 Do you usually provide buyers with information about your operation’s health programs? 
m No  (1)  
m Yes  (2)  
 
Q3.5 How is this information most frequently shared? 
m Written documentation  (1)  
m Electronic documentation  (2)  
m Tell buyer orally   (3)  
m Other (specify)  (4) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q3.6 Has your operation had any of the following disease outbreaks in the last 5 years? If yes, 
how many months ago was the most recent case? 
 
Yes (1) Months ago (1) 
No Disease 
Problems (1) 
Bovine Viral Diarrhea (BVD) (1)  m _________ m 
Trichomoniasis (Trich) (2)  m _________ m 
Bovine tuberculosis (TB) (3)  m _________ m 
Vesicular stomatitis (VS) (4)  m _________ m 
Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis (IBRV) (5)  m _________ m 
Other (specify) (6)  m _________ m 
 
Q3.7 During the last 12 months, did your operation consult a veterinarian for: 
 Yes (1) No (2) 
Disease diagnosis or treatment? (1)  m m 
Disease prevention? (2)  m m 
Livestock deaths? (3)  m m 
Information on biosecurity practices? (4)  m m 
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Q3.8 In which state is your cattle operation?  
m Alabama  (1)  
m Alaska  (2)  
m Arizona  (3)  
m Arkansas  (4)  
m California  (5)  
m Colorado  (6)  
m Connecticut  (7)  
m Delaware  (8)  
m District of Columbia  (9)  
m Florida  (10)  
m Georgia  (11)  
m Hawaii  (12)  
m Idaho  (13)  
m Illinois  (14)  
m Indiana  (15)  
m Iowa  (16)  
m Kansas  (17)  
m Kentucky  (18)  
m Louisiana  (19)  
m Maine  (20)  
m Maryland  (21)  
m Massachusetts  (22)  
m Michigan  (23)  
m Minnesota  (24)  
m Mississippi  (25)  
m Missouri  (26)  
m Montana  (27)  
m Nebraska  (28)  
m Nevada  (29)  
m New Hampshire  (30)  
m New Jersey  (31)  
m New Mexico  (32)  
m New York  (33)  
m North Carolina  (34)  
m North Dakota  (35)  
m Ohio  (36)  
m Oklahoma  (37)  
m Oregon  (38)  
m Pennsylvania  (39)  
m Puerto Rico  (40)  
m Rhode Island  (41)  
m South Carolina  (42)  
m South Dakota  (43)  
m Tennessee  (44)  
m Texas  (45)  
m Utah  (46)  
m Vermont  (47)  
m Virginia  (48)  
m Washington  (49)  
m West Virginia  (50)  
m Wisconsin  (51)  
m Wyoming  (52)  
m I do not reside in the 
United States  (53)  
 
Q3.9 Biosecurity for beef cattle operations is often defined as the implementation of protocols 
designed to reduce the likelihood of unwanted pests and disease threats from entering the 
cattle herd. Which practice best describes the level of biosecurity implemented on your 
operation? 
m Maintain a closed herd   (1)  
m No entry of new cattle but reentry of existing cattle allowed  (2)  
m Entry of new cattle with known medical records and initial quarantine   (3)  
m Entry of new cattle with known medical records but no initial quarantine  (4)  
m Entry of new cattle with no known medical records and no initial quarantine  (5)  
 
Q3.10 How would you rate the biosecurity of your operation compared to other operations in your 
area? 
m Very Low -1  (1)  
m 2  (2)  
m 3  (3)  
m 4  (4)  
m 5  (5)  
m 6  (6)  
m 7  (7)  
m 8  (8)  
m 9  (9)  
m Very High - 10  (10)  
 
Q3.11 Approximately, what portion of your total annual cow costs are   allocated to biosecurity 
efforts? 




2018 Beef Biosecurity 
 
Page 10 of 53 
Q3.12 How many times in the next 100 years do you think an FMD outbreak will occur in a U.S. 
livestock population (cattle, sheep, goats, swine)? 
m 0 times  (1)  
m 1 time  (2)  
m 2 times  (3)  
m 3 times  (4)  
m 4 times  (5)  
m 5 times  (6)  
m 6 or more times  (7)  
 
Q3.13 If an FMD outbreak occurred on your operation, how long (number of months) do you think 
losses would persist? 
m Under 1 month  (1)  
m 1 to 3 months  (2)  
m 4 to 6 months  (3)  
m 7 to 9 months  (4)  
m 10 to 12 months  (5)  
m 13 to 15 months  (6)  
m 16 to 18 months  (7)  
m 19 months or longer  (8)  
 
Q3.14 If an FMD outbreak occurred on your operation, what do you think production losses would 
be in dollars per cow? 
m $0 per cow  (1)  
m $0.01-$100 per cow  (2)  
m $100.01-$200 per cow  (3)  
m $200.01-$300 per cow  (4)  
m $300.01-$400 per cow  (5)  
m $400.01-$500 per cow  (6)  
m $500.01-$600 per cow  (7)  
m $600.01-$700 per cow  (8)  
m $700.01-$800 per cow  (9)  
m Over $800 per cow  (10)  
 
Q3.15 If an FMD outbreak occurred on your operation, would you expect indemnity payments to 
be provided by the government? 
m No  (1)  
m Yes  (2)  
 
Q3.16 If yes, would you expect indemnity payments provided by the government to be made 
available to cattle producers only if they could document biosecurity efforts? 
m No  (1)  
m Yes  (2)  
 
Q3.17 Would you expect indemnity payments provided by the government to cover all of the 
production losses in cattle value? 
m No  (1)  
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Q3.18 If an FMD outbreak occurred on your operation, in your opinion how would buyers of your 
cattle likely respond? Buyers would continue to purchase cattle known to be FMD free or 
vaccinated against FMD at a discount of: 
m No discount, buyers would continue to purchase cattle as usual  (1)  
m $0.01-$5.00 per hundredweight discount  (2)  
m $5.01-$10.00 per hundredweight discount  (3)  
m $10.01-$15.00 per hundredweight discount  (4)  
m $ 15.01 per hundredweight or higher discount  (5)  
 
Q3.19 If an FMD outbreak occurred on your operation, in your opinion how would buyers of your 
cattle likely respond? Buyers would entirely cease taking cattle for: 
m Not applicable, buyers would continue to purchase cattle as usual  (1)  
m Under 1 month   (2)  
m 1 to 3 months  (3)  
m 4 to 6 months  (4)  
m 6 months or longer  (5)  
 
Q3.20 If you suspect FMD might be present on your operation, who would you contact? (please 
check all that apply)  
q U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)  (1)  
q Neighboring and/or local beef producers  (2)  
q Livestock buyers  (3)  
q Private veterinarian    (4)  
q State Veterinarian’s office  (5)  
q Other (specify)  (6) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q3.21 For the biosecurity practices listed below, please check the left column for those used on 
your operation. Also please indicate by circling a number, how feasible you believe 
















There is a designated biosecurity 
manager for the operation (1)  m m m m m m 
An operation-specific, written, 
enhanced biosecurity plan has been 
developed (2)  
m m m m m m 
Animals come only from sources with 
documented enhanced biosecurity 
practices (3)  
m m m m m m 
A plan exists to manage animals in a 
biosecure manner on-site in the event 
animal movement is stopped for 
several weeks (4)  
m m m m m m 
Feedstuffs are delivered, stored, mixed, 
and fed in a manner that minimizes 
contamination, and feed spills are 
cleaned up promptly (5)  
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Q3.22 A Line of Separation (LOS) is an outer control boundary around, or within, the premises to 
limit movement of virus into areas where animals can be exposed. Please check the left 
column for those used on your operation. Also please indicate by circling a number, how 

















A line of separation is clearly defined 
and marked on the operation (1)  m m m m m m 
Entry to the operation is restricted to a 
limited number of access points (2)  m m m m m m 
Nose-to-nose contact with livestock on 
adjacent premises is prevented (3)  m m m m m m 
Access is limited to individuals who are 
essential to the operation (4)  m m m m m m 
Vehicles, trailers, and equipment that 
cross the LOS are properly cleaned & 
disinfected (5)  
m m m m m m 
Animals leaving the operation only 
move in one direction across the LOS 
at an Access Point (6)  
m m m m m m 
The area designated for 
loading/unloading animals is not a 
people entry point (7)  
m m m m m m 
Areas contaminated by personnel or 
animals after loading/unloading are 
properly cleaned and disinfected (8)  
m m m m m m 
 
Q3.23 Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. (please circle the 











I am willing to take animal health risks in order 
to make more money (1)  m m m m m 
With respect to the conduct of my business, I 
prefer certainty to uncertainty  (2)  m m m m m 
I am willing to take financial risks in order to 
realize higher average returns (3)  m m m m m 
My cattle operation is protected from financial 
risks (4)  m m m m m 
My cattle operation is protected from animal 
disease risks (5)  m m m m m 
With respect to animal health, I prefer certainty 




2018 Beef Biosecurity 
 
Page 13 of 53 
Q3.24 Which animal identification methods to you currently use? 
q Plastic ear tag  (1)  
q Metal (“Bright”) tag  (2)  
q Brand  (3)  
q Tattoo  (4)  
q Brucellosis tag  (5)  
q Electronic ear tag (RFID)  (6)  
q None  (7)  
q Other (specify)  (8) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q3.25 What is your age?  _______ years (1) 
 
Q3.26 What is your gender? 
m Male  (1)  
m Female  (2)  
 
Q3.27 What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
m High school graduate/GED  (1)  
m Some college or 2-year college/technical degree  (2)  
m 4-year college degree  (3)  
m Graduate degree (MS, MBA, PhD, DVM, etc.)  (4)  
m Other (specify)  (5) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q3.28 Approximately, what portion of your household income is from on-farm sources? 
 _______ percent (1) 
 
Q3.29 What was your inventory on January 1, 2018 of cows, replacement heifers (bred or open), 
and bulls? 
 _______ Cows (1) 
 _______ Replacement heifers (2) 
 _______ Bulls (3) 
 
Q3.30 What was your total annual cow cost for 2018?  _______ per head (1) 
 
Q3.31 How many years of experience in cattle production do you have?  _______ years (1) 
 
Q3.32 How many more years do you expect to be in cattle production?  _______ years (1) 
 
Q3.33 Prevalence rate (%) - 90% 
 Positive test (%) - 90% 
 Government response policy- Full herd depopulation 
 Indemnity policy (%) - 50% 
 Livestock buyer discount ($/cwt) - $5 
m Yes  (1)  
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Q3.34 Prevalence rate (%) - 90% 
 Positive test (%) - 10% 
 Government response policy- Vaccinate 
 Indemnity policy (%) - 100% 
 Livestock buyer discount ($/cwt) - $0 
m Yes  (1)  
m No  (2)  
 
Q3.35 Prevalence rate (%) - 50% 
 Positive test (%) - 90% 
 Government response policy- Conditional herd depopulation 
 Indemnity policy (%) - 0% 
 Livestock buyer discount ($/cwt) - $0 
m Yes  (1)  
m No  (2)  
 
Q3.36 Prevalence rate (%) - 50% 
 Positive test (%) - 10% 
 Government response policy- Conditional herd depopulation 
 Indemnity policy (%) - 100% 
 Livestock buyer discount ($/cwt) - $5 
m Yes  (1)  
m No  (2)  
 
Q3.37 Prevalence rate (%) - 10% 
 Positive test (%) - 90% 
 Government response policy- Vaccinate 
 Indemnity policy (%) - 100% 
 Livestock buyer discount ($/cwt) - $10 
m Yes  (1)  
m No  (2)  
 
Q3.38 Prevalence rate (%) - 10% 
 Positive test (%) - 10% 
 Government response policy- Conditional herd depopulation 
 Indemnity policy (%) - 50% 
 Livestock buyer discount ($/cwt) - $0 
m Yes  (1)  
m No  (2)  
 
Q3.39 Your input will strengthen our research and help us obtain more accurate conclusions. If 
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Start of Block: C1 Version  
 
Q4.1 Which operation type best describes your cattle operation? 
m Commercial  (1)  
m Both commercial and seedstock  (2)  
m Seedstock  (3)  
m Other (specify)  (4) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q4.2 Which marketing method do you most frequently use in marketing your operation’s cattle? 
m Sale barn/auction  (1)  
m Direct-Video/Internet auction  (2)  
m Direct-private treaty  (3)  
m Consignment  (4)  
m Forward contract  (5)  
m Carcass basis  (6)  
m Other (specify)  (7) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q4.3 Do the same buyers purchase cattle from your operation each year? 
m No  (1)  
m Yes  (2)  
 
Q4.4 Do you usually provide buyers with information about your operation’s health programs? 
m No  (1)  
m Yes  (2)  
 
Q4.5 How is this information most frequently shared? 
m Written documentation  (1)  
m Electronic documentation  (2)  
m Tell buyer orally   (3)  
m Other (specify)  (4) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q4.6 Has your operation had any of the following disease outbreaks in the last 5 years? If yes, 
how many months ago was the most recent case? 
 Yes (1) Months ago (1) 
No Disease 
Problems (1) 
Bovine Viral Diarrhea (BVD) (1)  m _________ m 
Trichomoniasis (Trich) (2)  m _________ m 
Bovine tuberculosis (TB) (3)  m _________ m 
Vesicular stomatitis (VS) (4)  m _________ m 
Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis (IBRV) (5)  m _________ m 
Other (specify) (6)  m _________ m 
 
Q4.7 During the last 12 months, did your operation consult a veterinarian for: 
 Yes (1) No (2) 
Disease diagnosis or treatment? (1)  m m 
Disease prevention? (2)  m m 
Livestock deaths? (3)  m m 
Information on biosecurity practices? (4)  m m 
Information on foreign animal diseases? (5)  m m 
 
Q4.8 In which state is your cattle operation?  
122
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m Alabama  (1)  
m Alaska  (2)  
m Arizona  (3)  
m Arkansas  (4)  
m California  (5)  
m Colorado  (6)  
m Connecticut  (7)  
m Delaware  (8)  
m District of Columbia  (9)  
m Florida  (10)  
m Georgia  (11)  
m Hawaii  (12)  
m Idaho  (13)  
m Illinois  (14)  
m Indiana  (15)  
m Iowa  (16)  
m Kansas  (17)  
m Kentucky  (18)  
m Louisiana  (19)  
m Maine  (20)  
m Maryland  (21)  
m Massachusetts  (22)  
m Michigan  (23)  
m Minnesota  (24)  
m Mississippi  (25)  
m Missouri  (26)  
m Montana  (27)  
m Nebraska  (28)  
m Nevada  (29)  
m New Hampshire  (30)  
m New Jersey  (31)  
m New Mexico  (32)  
m New York  (33)  
m North Carolina  (34)  
m North Dakota  (35)  
m Ohio  (36)  
m Oklahoma  (37)  
m Oregon  (38)  
m Pennsylvania  (39)  
m Puerto Rico  (40)  
m Rhode Island  (41)  
m South Carolina  (42)  
m South Dakota  (43)  
m Tennessee  (44)  
m Texas  (45)  
m Utah  (46)  
m Vermont  (47)  
m Virginia  (48)  
m Washington  (49)  
m West Virginia  (50)  
m Wisconsin  (51)  
m Wyoming  (52)  
m I do not reside in the 
United States  (53)  
 
Q4.9 Biosecurity for beef cattle operations is often defined as the implementation of protocols 
designed to reduce the likelihood of unwanted pests and disease threats from entering the 
cattle herd. Which practice best describes the level of biosecurity implemented on your 
operation? 
m Maintain a closed herd   (1)  
m No entry of new cattle but reentry of existing cattle allowed  (2)  
m Entry of new cattle with known medical records and initial quarantine   (3)  
m Entry of new cattle with known medical records but no initial quarantine  (4)  
m Entry of new cattle with no known medical records and no initial quarantine  (5)  
 
Q4.10 How would you rate the biosecurity of your operation compared to other operations in your 
area? 
m Very Low -1  (1)  
m 2  (2)  
m 3  (3)  
m 4  (4)  
m 5  (5)  
m 6  (6)  
m 7  (7)  
m 8  (8)  
m 9  (9)  
m Very High - 10  (10)  
 
Q4.11 Approximately, what portion of your total annual cow costs are   allocated to biosecurity 
efforts? 
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Q4.12 For the biosecurity practices listed below, please check the left column for those used on 
your operation. Also please indicate by circling a number, how feasible you believe 
















There is a designated biosecurity 
manager for the operation (1)  m m m m m m 
An operation-specific, written, 
enhanced biosecurity plan has been 
developed (2)  
m m m m m m 
Animals come only from sources with 
documented enhanced biosecurity 
practices (3)  
m m m m m m 
A plan exists to manage animals in a 
biosecure manner on-site in the event 
animal movement is stopped for 
several weeks (4)  
m m m m m m 
Feedstuffs are delivered, stored, mixed, 
and fed in a manner that minimizes 
contamination, and feed spills are 
cleaned up promptly (5)  
m m m m m m 
 
Q4.13 A Line of Separation (LOS) is an outer control boundary around, or within, the premises to 
limit movement of virus into areas where animals can be exposed. Please check the left 
column for those used on your operation. Also please indicate by circling a number, how 

















A line of separation is clearly defined 
and marked on the operation (1)  m m m m m m 
Entry to the operation is restricted to a 
limited number of access points (2)  m m m m m m 
Nose-to-nose contact with livestock on 
adjacent premises is prevented (3)  m m m m m m 
Access is limited to individuals who are 
essential to the operation (4)  m m m m m m 
Vehicles, trailers, and equipment that 
cross the LOS are properly cleaned & 
disinfected (5)  
m m m m m m 
Animals leaving the operation only 
move in one direction across the LOS 
at an Access Point (6)  
m m m m m m 
The area designated for 
loading/unloading animals is not a 
people entry point (7)  
m m m m m m 
Areas contaminated by personnel or 
animals after loading/unloading are 
properly cleaned and disinfected (8)  
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Q4.14 Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. (please circle the 











I am willing to take animal health risks in order 
to make more money (1)  m m m m m 
With respect to the conduct of my business, I 
prefer certainty to uncertainty  (2)  m m m m m 
I am willing to take financial risks in order to 
realize higher average returns (3)  m m m m m 
My cattle operation is protected from financial 
risks (4)  m m m m m 
My cattle operation is protected from animal 
disease risks (5)  m m m m m 
With respect to animal health, I prefer certainty 
to uncertainty (6)  m m m m m 
 
Q4.15 Which animal identification methods do you currently use? 
q Plastic ear tag  (1)  
q Ear notches  (2)  
q Brand  (3)  
q Tattoo  (4)  
q Brucellosis or any other metal tag  (5)  
q Electronic ear tag (RFID)  (6)  
q None  (7)  
q Other (specify)  (8) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q4.16 What would it cost you to participate in a Visual Traceability program that involved 
applying “traditional ear tags” that are read manually upon human inspection? 
m Less than $1/head  (1)  
m $1 to $4/head  (2)  
m $5 to $8/head  (3)  
m $9 to $12/head  (4)  
m $13 to $16/head  (5)  
m More than $16/head  (6)  
 
Q4.17 What would it cost you to participate in an Electronic Traceability program would involve 
applying “button-like” radio frequency identification tags readable by electronic readers? 
m Less than $1/head  (1)  
m $1 to $4/head  (2)  
m $5 to $8/head  (3)  
m $9 to $12/head  (4)  
m $13 to $16/head  (5)  
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Q4.18 In designing a national, individual animal traceability system how important are the 














Monitoring/managing disease (1)  m m m m m 
Increasing consumer confidence (2)  m m m m m 
Enhancing marketability (3)  m m m m m 
Maintaining current foreign markets (4)  m m m m m 
Accessing foreign markets (5)  m m m m m 
Improving on-farm management (6)  m m m m m 
Managing the supply chain (7)  m m m m m 
Enhancing food safety (8)  m m m m m 
 
Q4.19 In designing a national, individual animal traceability system how concerned are you 














Cost to participating producer (1)  m m m m m 
Confidentiality of information (2)  m m m m m 
Reliability of technology (3)  m m m m m 
Liability to participating producer  
(4)  m m m m m 
Non-participating firms benefiting 
(5)  m m m m m 
Failure of system to meet stated 
goals (6)  m m m m m 
 
Q4.20 Please circle your level of agreement with each of the following statements. (please circle 












“is more cost effective for larger cow-calf 
operations.” (1)  m m m m m 
“results in more liability for cow-calf producers 
than cattle owners at other stages of 
production.” (2)  
m m m m m 
“is unnecessary if COOL (country-of-Origin 
Labeling) was implemented nationally.” (3)  m m m m m 
“as a mandated system is exaggerated in 
need.” (4)  m m m m m 
 
Q4.21 What is your age? _______ years (1) 
 
Q4.22 What is your gender? 
m Male  (1)  
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Q4.23 What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
m High school graduate/GED  (1)  
m Some college or 2-year college/technical degree  (2)  
m 4-year college degree  (3)  
m Graduate degree (MS, MBA, PhD, DVM, etc.)  (4)  
m Other (specify)  (5) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q4.24 Approximately, what portion of your household income is from on-farm sources? 
 _______ percent (1) 
 
Q4.25 What was your inventory on January 1, 2018 of cows, replacement heifers (bred or open), 
and bulls? 
 _______ Cows (1) 
 _______ Replacement heifers (2) 
 _______ Bulls (3) 
 
Q4.26 What was your total annual cow cost for 2018? _______ per head (1) 
 
Q4.27 How many years of experience in cattle production do you have?  _______ years (1) 
 
Q4.28 How many more years do you expect to be in cattle production? _______ years (1) 
 
Q4.29 Scenario #1 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q4.30 Scenario #2 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q4.31 Scenario #3 
m Visual Traceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Traceability  (3)  
 
Q4.32 Scenario #4 
m Visual Traceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Traceability  (3)  
 
Q4.33 Scenario #5 
m Visual Traceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Traceability  (3)  
 
Q4.34 Scenario #6 
m Visual Traceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Traceability  (3)  
 
Q4.35 Your input will strengthen our research and help us obtain more accurate conclusions. If 
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Start of Block: C2 Version 
 
Q5.1 Which operation type best describes your cattle operation? 
m Commercial  (1)  
m Both commercial and seedstock  (2)  
m Seedstock  (3)  
m Other (specify)  (4) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q5.2 Which marketing method do you most frequently use in marketing your operation’s cattle? 
m Sale barn/auction  (1)  
m Direct-Video/Internet auction  (2)  
m Direct-private treaty  (3)  
m Consignment  (4)  
m Forward contract  (5)  
m Carcass basis  (6)  
m Other (specify)  (7) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q5.3 Do the same buyers purchase cattle from your operation each year? 
m No  (1)  
m Yes  (2)  
 
Q5.4 Do you usually provide buyers with information about your operation’s health programs? 
m No  (1)  
m Yes  (2)  
 
Q5.5 How is this information most frequently shared? 
m Written documentation  (1)  
m Electronic documentation  (2)  
m Tell buyer orally   (3)  
m Other (specify)  (4) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q5.6 Has your operation had any of the following disease outbreaks in the last 5 years? If yes, 
how many months ago was the most recent case? 
 
Yes (1) Months ago (1) 
No Disease 
Problems (1) 
Bovine Viral Diarrhea (BVD) (1)  m _________ m 
Trichomoniasis (Trich) (2)  m _________ m 
Bovine tuberculosis (TB) (3)  m _________ m 
Vesicular stomatitis (VS) (4)  m _________ m 
Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis (IBRV) (5)  m _________ m 
Other (specify) (6)  m _________ m 
 
Q5.7 During the last 12 months, did your operation consult a veterinarian for: 
 Yes (1) No (2) 
Disease diagnosis or treatment? (1)  m m 
Disease prevention? (2)  m m 
Livestock deaths? (3)  m m 
Information on biosecurity practices? (4)  m m 
Information on foreign animal diseases? (5)  m m 
 
Q5.8 In which state is your cattle operation?  
128
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m Alabama  (1)  
m Alaska  (2)  
m Arizona  (3)  
m Arkansas  (4)  
m California  (5)  
m Colorado  (6)  
m Connecticut  (7)  
m Delaware  (8)  
m District of Columbia  (9)  
m Florida  (10)  
m Georgia  (11)  
m Hawaii  (12)  
m Idaho  (13)  
m Illinois  (14)  
m Indiana  (15)  
m Iowa  (16)  
m Kansas  (17)  
m Kentucky  (18)  
m Louisiana  (19)  
m Maine  (20)  
m Maryland  (21)  
m Massachusetts  (22)  
m Michigan  (23)  
m Minnesota  (24)  
m Mississippi  (25)  
m Missouri  (26)  
m Montana  (27)  
m Nebraska  (28)  
m Nevada  (29)  
m New Hampshire  (30)  
m New Jersey  (31)  
m New Mexico  (32)  
m New York  (33)  
m North Carolina  (34)  
m North Dakota  (35)  
m Ohio  (36)  
m Oklahoma  (37)  
m Oregon  (38)  
m Pennsylvania  (39)  
m Puerto Rico  (40)  
m Rhode Island  (41)  
m South Carolina  (42)  
m South Dakota  (43)  
m Tennessee  (44)  
m Texas  (45)  
m Utah  (46)  
m Vermont  (47)  
m Virginia  (48)  
m Washington  (49)  
m West Virginia  (50)  
m Wisconsin  (51)  
m Wyoming  (52)  
m I do not reside in the 
United States  (53)  
 
Q5.9 Biosecurity for beef cattle operations is often defined as the implementation of protocols 
designed to reduce the likelihood of unwanted pests and disease threats from entering the 
cattle herd. Which practice best describes the level of biosecurity implemented on your 
operation? 
m Maintain a closed herd   (1)  
m No entry of new cattle but reentry of existing cattle allowed  (2)  
m Entry of new cattle with known medical records and initial quarantine   (3)  
m Entry of new cattle with known medical records but no initial quarantine  (4)  
m Entry of new cattle with no known medical records and no initial quarantine  (5)  
 
Q5.10 How would you rate the biosecurity of your operation compared to other operations in your 
area? 
m Very Low -1  (1)  
m 2  (2)  
m 3  (3)  
m 4  (4)  
m 5  (5)  
m 6  (6)  
m 7  (7)  
m 8  (8)  
m 9  (9)  
m Very High - 10  (10)  
 
Q5.11 Approximately, what portion of your total annual cow costs are   allocated to biosecurity 
efforts? 
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Q5.12 For the biosecurity practices listed below, please check the left column for those used on 
your operation. Also please indicate by circling a number, how feasible you believe 
















There is a designated biosecurity 
manager for the operation (1)  m m m m m m 
An operation-specific, written, 
enhanced biosecurity plan has been 
developed (2)  
m m m m m m 
Animals come only from sources with 
documented enhanced biosecurity 
practices (3)  
m m m m m m 
A plan exists to manage animals in a 
biosecure manner on-site in the event 
animal movement is stopped for 
several weeks (4)  
m m m m m m 
Feedstuffs are delivered, stored, mixed, 
and fed in a manner that minimizes 
contamination, and feed spills are 
cleaned up promptly (5)  
m m m m m m 
 
Q5.13 A Line of Separation (LOS) is an outer control boundary around, or within, the premises to 
limit movement of virus into areas where animals can be exposed. Please check the left 
column for those used on your operation. Also please indicate by circling a number, how 

















A line of separation is clearly defined 
and marked on the operation (1)  m m m m m m 
Entry to the operation is restricted to a 
limited number of access points (2)  m m m m m m 
Nose-to-nose contact with livestock on 
adjacent premises is prevented (3)  m m m m m m 
Access is limited to individuals who are 
essential to the operation (4)  m m m m m m 
Vehicles, trailers, and equipment that 
cross the LOS are properly cleaned & 
disinfected (5)  
m m m m m m 
Animals leaving the operation only 
move in one direction across the LOS 
at an Access Point (6)  
m m m m m m 
The area designated for 
loading/unloading animals is not a 
people entry point (7)  
m m m m m m 
Areas contaminated by personnel or 
animals after loading/unloading are 
properly cleaned and disinfected (8)  
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Q5.14 Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. (please circle the 











I am willing to take animal health risks in order 
to make more money (1)  m m m m m 
With respect to the conduct of my business, I 
prefer certainty to uncertainty  (2)  m m m m m 
I am willing to take financial risks in order to 
realize higher average returns (3)  m m m m m 
My cattle operation is protected from financial 
risks (4)  m m m m m 
My cattle operation is protected from animal 
disease risks (5)  m m m m m 
With respect to animal health, I prefer certainty 
to uncertainty (6)  m m m m m 
 
Q5.15 Which animal identification methods do you currently use? 
q Plastic ear tag  (1)  
q Ear notches  (2)  
q Brand  (3)  
q Tattoo  (4)  
q Brucellosis or any other metal tag  (5)  
q Electronic ear tag (RFID)  (6)  
q None  (7)  
q Other (specify)  (8) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q5.16 What would it cost you to participate in a Visual Traceability program that involved 
applying “traditional ear tags” that are read manually upon human inspection? 
m Less than $1/head  (1)  
m $1 to $4/head  (2)  
m $5 to $8/head  (3)  
m $9 to $12/head  (4)  
m $13 to $16/head  (5)  
m More than $16/head  (6)  
 
Q5.17 What would it cost you to participate in an Electronic Traceability program would involve 
applying “button-like” radio frequency identification tags readable by electronic readers? 
m Less than $1/head  (1)  
m $1 to $4/head  (2)  
m $5 to $8/head  (3)  
m $9 to $12/head  (4)  
m $13 to $16/head  (5)  
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Q5.18 In designing a national, individual animal traceability system how important are the 














Monitoring/managing disease (1)  m m m m m 
Increasing consumer confidence (2)  m m m m m 
Enhancing marketability (3)  m m m m m 
Maintaining current foreign markets (4)  m m m m m 
Accessing foreign markets (5)  m m m m m 
Improving on-farm management (6)  m m m m m 
Managing the supply chain (7)  m m m m m 
Enhancing food safety (8)  m m m m m 
 
Q5.19 In designing a national, individual animal traceability system how concerned are you 














Cost to participating producer (1)  m m m m m 
Confidentiality of information (2)  m m m m m 
Reliability of technology (3)  m m m m m 
Liability to participating producer  
(4)  m m m m m 
Non-participating firms benefiting 
(5)  m m m m m 
Failure of system to meet stated 
goals (6)  m m m m m 
 
Q5.20 Please circle your level of agreement with each of the following statements. (please circle 












“is more cost effective for larger cow-calf 
operations.” (1)  m m m m m 
“results in more liability for cow-calf producers 
than cattle owners at other stages of 
production.” (2)  
m m m m m 
“is unnecessary if COOL (country-of-Origin 
Labeling) was implemented nationally.” (3)  m m m m m 
“as a mandated system is exaggerated in 
need.” (4)  m m m m m 
 
Q5.21 What is your age? _______ years (1) 
 
Q5.22 What is your gender? 
m Male  (1)  
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Q5.23 What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
m High school graduate/GED  (1)  
m Some college or 2-year college/technical degree  (2)  
m 4-year college degree  (3)  
m Graduate degree (MS, MBA, PhD, DVM, etc.)  (4)  
m Other (specify)  (5) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q5.24 Approximately, what portion of your household income is from on-farm sources? 
 _______ percent (1) 
 
Q5.25 What was your inventory on January 1, 2018 of cows, replacement heifers (bred or open), 
and bulls? 
 _______ Cows (1) 
 _______ Replacement heifers (2) 
 _______ Bulls (3) 
 
Q5.26 What was your total annual cow cost for 2018?  _______ per head (1) 
 
Q5.27 How many years of experience in cattle production do you have? _______ years (1) 
 
Q5.28 How many more years do you expect to be in cattle production? _______ years (1) 
 
Q5.29 Scenario #1 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q5.30 Scenario #2 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q5.31 Scenario #3 
m Visual Traceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q5.32 Scenario #4 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q5.33 Scenario #5 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q5.34 Scenario #6 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q5.35 Your input will strengthen our research and help us obtain more accurate conclusions. If 
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Start of Block: C3 Version 
 
Q6.1 Which operation type best describes your cattle operation? 
m Commercial  (1)  
m Both commercial and seedstock  (2)  
m Seedstock  (3)  
m Other (specify)  (4) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q6.2 Which marketing method do you most frequently use in marketing your operation’s cattle? 
m Sale barn/auction  (1)  
m Direct-Video/Internet auction  (2)  
m Direct-private treaty  (3)  
m Consignment  (4)  
m Forward contract  (5)  
m Carcass basis  (6)  
m Other (specify)  (7) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q6.3 Do the same buyers purchase cattle from your operation each year? 
m No  (1)  
m Yes  (2)  
 
Q6.4 Do you usually provide buyers with information about your operation’s health programs? 
m No  (1)  
m Yes  (2)  
 
Q6.5 How is this information most frequently shared? 
m Written documentation  (1)  
m Electronic documentation  (2)  
m Tell buyer orally   (3)  
m Other (specify)  (4) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q6.6 Has your operation had any of the following disease outbreaks in the last 5 years? If yes, 
how many months ago was the most recent case? 
 
Yes (1) Months ago (1) 
No Disease 
Problems (1) 
Bovine Viral Diarrhea (BVD) (1)  m _________ m 
Trichomoniasis (Trich) (2)  m _________ m 
Bovine tuberculosis (TB) (3)  m _________ m 
Vesicular stomatitis (VS) (4)  m _________ m 
Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis (IBRV) (5)  m _________ m 
Other (specify) (6)  m _________ m 
 
Q6.7 During the last 12 months, did your operation consult a veterinarian for: 
 Yes (1) No (2) 
Disease diagnosis or treatment? (1)  m m 
Disease prevention? (2)  m m 
Livestock deaths? (3)  m m 
Information on biosecurity practices? (4)  m m 
Information on foreign animal diseases? (5)  m m 
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Q6.8 In which state is your cattle operation?  
m Alabama  (1)  
m Alaska  (2)  
m Arizona  (3)  
m Arkansas  (4)  
m California  (5)  
m Colorado  (6)  
m Connecticut  (7)  
m Delaware  (8)  
m District of Columbia  (9)  
m Florida  (10)  
m Georgia  (11)  
m Hawaii  (12)  
m Idaho  (13)  
m Illinois  (14)  
m Indiana  (15)  
m Iowa  (16)  
m Kansas  (17)  
m Kentucky  (18)  
m Louisiana  (19)  
m Maine  (20)  
m Maryland  (21)  
m Massachusetts  (22)  
m Michigan  (23)  
m Minnesota  (24)  
m Mississippi  (25)  
m Missouri  (26)  
m Montana  (27)  
m Nebraska  (28)  
m Nevada  (29)  
m New Hampshire  (30)  
m New Jersey  (31)  
m New Mexico  (32)  
m New York  (33)  
m North Carolina  (34)  
m North Dakota  (35)  
m Ohio  (36)  
m Oklahoma  (37)  
m Oregon  (38)  
m Pennsylvania  (39)  
m Puerto Rico  (40)  
m Rhode Island  (41)  
m South Carolina  (42)  
m South Dakota  (43)  
m Tennessee  (44)  
m Texas  (45)  
m Utah  (46)  
m Vermont  (47)  
m Virginia  (48)  
m Washington  (49)  
m West Virginia  (50)  
m Wisconsin  (51)  
m Wyoming  (52)  
m I do not reside in the 
United States  (53)  
 
Q6.9 Biosecurity for beef cattle operations is often defined as the implementation of protocols 
designed to reduce the likelihood of unwanted pests and disease threats from entering the 
cattle herd. Which practice best describes the level of biosecurity implemented on your 
operation? 
m Maintain a closed herd   (1)  
m No entry of new cattle but reentry of existing cattle allowed  (2)  
m Entry of new cattle with known medical records and initial quarantine   (3)  
m Entry of new cattle with known medical records but no initial quarantine  (4)  
m Entry of new cattle with no known medical records and no initial quarantine  (5)  
 
Q6.10 How would you rate the biosecurity of your operation compared to other operations in your 
area? 
m Very Low -1  (1)  
m 2  (2)  
m 3  (3)  
m 4  (4)  
m 5  (5)  
m 6  (6)  
m 7  (7)  
m 8  (8)  
m 9  (9)  
m Very High - 10  (10)  
 
Q6.11 Approximately, what portion of your total annual cow costs are   allocated to biosecurity 
efforts? 
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Q6.12 For the biosecurity practices listed below, please check the left column for those used on 
your operation. Also please indicate by circling a number, how feasible you believe 
















There is a designated biosecurity 
manager for the operation (1)  m m m m m m 
An operation-specific, written, 
enhanced biosecurity plan has been 
developed (2)  
m m m m m m 
Animals come only from sources with 
documented enhanced biosecurity 
practices (3)  
m m m m m m 
A plan exists to manage animals in a 
biosecure manner on-site in the event 
animal movement is stopped for 
several weeks (4)  
m m m m m m 
Feedstuffs are delivered, stored, mixed, 
and fed in a manner that minimizes 
contamination, and feed spills are 
cleaned up promptly (5)  
m m m m m m 
 
Q6.13 A Line of Separation (LOS) is an outer control boundary around, or within, the premises to 
limit movement of virus into areas where animals can be exposed. Please check the left 
column for those used on your operation. Also please indicate by circling a number, how 

















A line of separation is clearly defined 
and marked on the operation (1)  m m m m m m 
Entry to the operation is restricted to a 
limited number of access points (2)  m m m m m m 
Nose-to-nose contact with livestock on 
adjacent premises is prevented (3)  m m m m m m 
Access is limited to individuals who are 
essential to the operation (4)  m m m m m m 
Vehicles, trailers, and equipment that 
cross the LOS are properly cleaned & 
disinfected (5)  
m m m m m m 
Animals leaving the operation only 
move in one direction across the LOS 
at an Access Point (6)  
m m m m m m 
The area designated for 
loading/unloading animals is not a 
people entry point (7)  
m m m m m m 
Areas contaminated by personnel or 
animals after loading/unloading are 
properly cleaned and disinfected (8)  
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Q6.14 Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. (please circle the 











I am willing to take animal health risks in order 
to make more money (1)  m m m m m 
With respect to the conduct of my business, I 
prefer certainty to uncertainty  (2)  m m m m m 
I am willing to take financial risks in order to 
realize higher average returns (3)  m m m m m 
My cattle operation is protected from financial 
risks (4)  m m m m m 
My cattle operation is protected from animal 
disease risks (5)  m m m m m 
With respect to animal health, I prefer certainty 
to uncertainty (6)  m m m m m 
 
Q6.15 Which animal identification methods do you currently use? 
q Plastic ear tag  (1)  
q Ear notches  (2)  
q Brand  (3)  
q Tattoo  (4)  
q Brucellosis or any other metal tag  (5)  
q Electronic ear tag (RFID)  (6)  
q None  (7)  
q Other (specify)  (8) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q6.16 What would it cost you to participate in a Visual Traceability program that involved 
applying “traditional ear tags” that are read manually upon human inspection? 
m Less than $1/head  (1)  
m $1 to $4/head  (2)  
m $5 to $8/head  (3)  
m $9 to $12/head  (4)  
m $13 to $16/head  (5)  
m More than $16/head  (6)  
 
Q6.17 What would it cost you to participate in an Electronic Traceability program would involve 
applying “button-like” radio frequency identification tags readable by electronic readers? 
m Less than $1/head  (1)  
m $1 to $4/head  (2)  
m $5 to $8/head  (3)  
m $9 to $12/head  (4)  
m $13 to $16/head  (5)  
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Q6.18 In designing a national, individual animal traceability system how important are the 














Monitoring/managing disease (1)  m m m m m 
Increasing consumer confidence (2)  m m m m m 
Enhancing marketability (3)  m m m m m 
Maintaining current foreign markets (4)  m m m m m 
Accessing foreign markets (5)  m m m m m 
Improving on-farm management (6)  m m m m m 
Managing the supply chain (7)  m m m m m 
Enhancing food safety (8)  m m m m m 
 
Q6.19 In designing a national, individual animal traceability system how concerned are you 














Cost to participating producer (1)  m m m m m 
Confidentiality of information (2)  m m m m m 
Reliability of technology (3)  m m m m m 
Liability to participating producer  
(4)  m m m m m 
Non-participating firms benefiting 
(5)  m m m m m 
Failure of system to meet stated 
goals (6)  m m m m m 
 
 
Q6.20 Please circle your level of agreement with each of the following statements. (please circle 












“is more cost effective for larger cow-calf 
operations.” (1)  m m m m m 
“results in more liability for cow-calf producers 
than cattle owners at other stages of 
production.” (2)  
m m m m m 
“is unnecessary if COOL (country-of-Origin 
Labeling) was implemented nationally.” (3)  m m m m m 
“as a mandated system is exaggerated in 
need.” (4)  m m m m m 
 
Q6.21 What is your age?  _______ years (1) 
 
Q6.22 What is your gender? 
m Male  (1)  
m Female  (2)  
 
Q6.23 What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
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m High school graduate/GED  (1)  
m Some college or 2-year college/technical degree  (2)  
m 4-year college degree  (3)  
m Graduate degree (MS, MBA, PhD, DVM, etc.)  (4)  
m Other (specify)  (5) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q6.24 Approximately, what portion of your household income is from on-farm sources? 
 _______ percent (1) 
 
Q6.25 What was your inventory on January 1, 2018 of cows, replacement heifers (bred or open), 
and bulls? 
 _______ Cows (1) 
 _______ Replacement heifers (2) 
 _______ Bulls (3) 
 
Q6.26 What was your total annual cow cost for 2018? _______ per head (1) 
 
Q6.27 How many years of experience in cattle production do you have? _______ years (1) 
 
Q6.28 How many more years do you expect to be in cattle production? _______ years (1) 
 
Q6.29 Scenario #1 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q6.30 Scenario #2 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q6.31 Scenario #3 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q6.32 Scenario #4 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q6.33 Scenario #5 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
Q6.34 Your input will strengthen our research and help us obtain more accurate conclusions. If 
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Start of Block: F1 Version 
 
Q7.1 Which operation type best describes your cattle operation? 
m Feedlot  (1)  
m Feedlot and stocker/backgrounder  (2)  
m Stocker/backgrounder  (3)  
m Other (specify)  (4) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q7.2 Which method do you most frequently use to procure feeder cattle? 
m Sale barn/auction  (1)  
m Direct-Video/Internet auction  (2)  
m Direct-private treaty  (3)  
m Consignment  (4)  
m Forward contract  (5)  
m Carcass basis  (6)  
m Other (specify)  (7) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q7.3 When procuring feeder cattle, do sourcing producers usually provide you with information 
about their operation’s health programs? 
m No  (1)  
m Yes  (2)  
 
Q7.4 how is this information most frequently shared with you? 
m Written documentation  (1)  
m Electronic documentation  (2)  
m Tell buyer orally   (3)  
m Other (specify)  (4) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q7.5 For cattle placed on feed over the past 12 months, what percent were given these vaccines: 
BVD (bovine viral diarrhea)  : _______  (1) 
BRSV (bovine respiratory syncytial virus)  : _______  (2) 
Pasteurella  : _______  (3) 
Leptospira spp. (lepto) : _______  (4) 
PI3 (parainfluenza 3) : _______  (5) 
Injectable IBR (infectious bovine rhinotracheitis) : _______  (6) 
Intranasal IBR : _______  (7) 
 
Q7.6 For cattle placed on feed over the past 12 months, what percentage were mass treated with 
an antibiotic to prevent or reduce an outbreak of shipping fever? 
Cattle less than 700 lbs when placed : _______  (1) 
Cattle between 700-899 lbs when placed : _______  (2) 
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Q7.7 How would you rate the biosecurity of your operation compared to other operations in your 
area? 
m Very Low -1  (1)  
m 2  (2)  
m 3  (3)  
m 4  (4)  
m 5  (5)  
m 6  (6)  
m 7  (7)  
m 8  (8)  
m 9  (9)  
m Very High - 10  (10)  
 
Q7.8 Approximately, what percent of your total financial expenditure for cattle production is 
annually spent on biosecurity? 
 _______ percent (1) 
 
Q7.9 During the last 12 months, did your operation consult a veterinarian for: 
 Yes (1) No (2) 
Disease diagnosis or treatment? (1)  m m 
Disease prevention? (2)  m m 
Livestock deaths? (3)  m m 
Information on biosecurity practices? (4)  m m 
Information on foreign animal diseases? (5)  m m 
 
Q7.10 For the biosecurity practices listed below, please check the left column for those used on 
your operation. Also please indicate by circling a number, how feasible you believe 
















There is a designated biosecurity 
manager for the operation (1)  m m m m m m 
An operation-specific, written, 
enhanced biosecurity plan has been 
developed (2)  
m m m m m m 
Animals come only from sources with 
documented enhanced biosecurity 
practices (3)  
m m m m m m 
A plan exists to manage animals in a 
biosecure manner on-site in the event 
animal movement is stopped for 
several weeks (4)  
m m m m m m 
Feedstuffs are delivered, stored, mixed, 
and fed in a manner that minimizes 
contamination, and feed spills are 
cleaned up promptly (5)  
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Q7.11 A Line of Separation (LOS) is an outer control boundary around, or within, the premises to 
limit movement of virus into areas where animals can be exposed. Please check the left 
column for those used on your operation. Also please indicate by circling a number, how 

















A line of separation is clearly defined 
and marked on the operation (1)  m m m m m m 
Entry to the operation is restricted to a 
limited number of access points (2)  m m m m m m 
Access is limited to individuals who are 
essential to the operation (3)  m m m m m m 
Vehicles, trailers, and equipment that 
cross the LOS are properly cleaned & 
disinfected (4)  
m m m m m m 
Animals leaving the operation only 
move in one direction across the LOS 
at an Access Point (5)  
m m m m m m 
The area designated for 
loading/unloading animals is not a 
people entry point (6)  
m m m m m m 
Areas contaminated by personnel or 
animals after loading/unloading are 
properly cleaned and disinfected (7)  
m m m m m m 
 
Q7.12 Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. (please circle the 











I am willing to take animal health risks in order 
to make more money (1)  m m m m m 
With respect to the conduct of my business, I 
prefer certainty to uncertainty  (2)  m m m m m 
I am willing to take financial risks in order to 
realize higher average returns (3)  m m m m m 
My cattle operation is protected from financial 
risks (4)  m m m m m 
My cattle operation is protected from animal 
disease risks (5)  m m m m m 
With respect to animal health, I prefer certainty 
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Q7.13 For cattle placed on feed over the past 12 months, what percent of cattle arrived with the 
following methods of animal identification: 
Plastic ear tag : _______  (1) 
Ear notches : _______  (2) 
Brand : _______  (3) 
Tattoo : _______  (4) 
Brucellosis or any other metal tag : _______  (5) 
Electronic ear tag (RFID)  : _______  (6) 
None : _______  (7) 
Other (specify) : _______  (8) 
Total : ________  
 
Q7.14 What would you be willing to pay to receive cattle that are already participating in a Visual 
Traceability program that includes “traditional ear tags” that are read manually upon human 
inspection? 
m Less than $1/head  (1)  
m $1 to $4/head  (2)  
m $5 to $8/head  (3)  
m $9 to $12/head  (4)  
m $13 to $16/head  (5)  
m More than $16/head  (6)  
 
Q7.15 What would you be willing to pay to receive cattle that are already participating in an 
Electronic Traceability program that includes “button-like” radio frequency identification 
(RFID) tags readable by electronic readers? 
m Less than $1/head  (1)  
m $1 to $4/head  (2)  
m $5 to $8/head  (3)  
m $9 to $12/head  (4)  
m $13 to $16/head  (5)  
m More than $16/head  (6)  
 
Q7.16 In designing a national, individual animal traceability system how important are the 














Monitoring/managing disease (1)  m m m m m 
Increasing consumer confidence (2)  m m m m m 
Enhancing marketability (3)  m m m m m 
Maintaining current foreign markets (4)  m m m m m 
Accessing foreign markets (5)  m m m m m 
Improving on-farm management (6)  m m m m m 
Managing the supply chain (7)  m m m m m 
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Q7.17 In designing a national, individual animal traceability system how concerned are you 














Cost to participating producer (1)  m m m m m 
Confidentiality of information (2)  m m m m m 
Reliability of technology (3)  m m m m m 
Liability to participating producer  
(4)  m m m m m 
Non-participating firms benefiting 
(5)  m m m m m 
Failure of system to meet stated 
goals (6)  m m m m m 
 
Q7.18 Please circle your level of agreement with each of the following statements. (please circle 












“is more cost effective for larger feedlot 
operations.” (1)  m m m m m 
“results in more liability for feedlot producers 
than cattle owners at other stages of 
production.” (2)  
m m m m m 
“is unnecessary if COOL (country-of-Origin 
Labeling) was implemented nationally.” (3)  m m m m m 
“as a mandated system is exaggerated in 
need.” (4)  m m m m m 
 
Q7.19 In which state is your cattle operation?  
m Alabama  (1)  
m Alaska  (2)  
m Arizona  (3)  
m Arkansas  (4)  
m California  (5)  
m Colorado  (6)  
m Connecticut  (7)  
m Delaware  (8)  
m District of Columbia  (9)  
m Florida  (10)  
m Georgia  (11)  
m Hawaii  (12)  
m Idaho  (13)  
m Illinois  (14)  
m Indiana  (15)  
m Iowa  (16)  
m Kansas  (17)  
m Kentucky  (18)  
m Louisiana  (19)  
m Maine  (20)  
m Maryland  (21)  
m Massachusetts  (22)  
m Michigan  (23)  
m Minnesota  (24)  
m Mississippi  (25)  
m Missouri  (26)  
m Montana  (27)  
m Nebraska  (28)  
m Nevada  (29)  
m New Hampshire  (30)  
m New Jersey  (31)  
m New Mexico  (32)  
m New York  (33)  
m North Carolina  (34)  
m North Dakota  (35)  
m Ohio  (36)  
m Oklahoma  (37)  
m Oregon  (38)  
m Pennsylvania  (39)  
m Puerto Rico  (40)  
m Rhode Island  (41)  
m South Carolina  (42)  
m South Dakota  (43)  
m Tennessee  (44)  
m Texas  (45)  
m Utah  (46)  
m Vermont  (47)  
m Virginia  (48)  
m Washington  (49)  
m West Virginia  (50)  
m Wisconsin  (51)  
m Wyoming  (52)  
m I do not reside in the 
United States  (53)  
 
Q7.20 What is your age?  _______ years (1) 
 
Q7.21 What is your gender? 
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m Male  (1)  
m Female  (2)  
 
Q7.22 What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
m High school graduate/GED  (1)  
m Some college or 2-year college/technical degree  (2)  
m 4-year college degree  (3)  
m Graduate degree (MS, MBA, PhD, DVM, etc.)  (4)  
m Other (specify)  (5) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q7.23 What was your average cost of gain for fed cattle sold over the past 12 months on your 
operation? 
m Less than $60/cwt  (1)  
m $60 to $64.99/cwt  (2)  
m $65 to $69.99/cwt  (3)  
m $70 to $74.99/cwt  (4)  
m $75 to $79.99/cwt  (5)  
m $80 to $84.99/cwt  (6)  
m $85 to $89.99/cwt  (7)  
m Over $90/cwt  (8)  
 
Q7.24 What is the one-time capacity of your feedlot? 
m Less than 1,000 head  (1)  
m 1,000 to 1,999 head  (2)  
m 2,000 to 3,999 head  (3)  
m 4,000 to 7,999 head  (4)  
m 8,000 to 15,999 head  (5)  
m 16,000 to 23,999 head  (6)  
m 24,000 to 31,999 head  (7)  
m 32,000 to 49,999 head  (8)  
m More than 50,000 head  (9)  
 
Q7.25 How many fed cattle were sold on your operation in the last 12 months? 
m Less than 1,000 head  (1)  
m 1,000 to 1,999 head  (2)  
m 2,000 to 3,999 head  (3)  
m 4,000 to 7,999 head  (4)  
m 8,000 to 15,999 head  (5)  
m 16,000 to 23,999 head  (6)  
m 24,000 to 31,999 head  (7)  
m 32,000 to 49,999 head  (8)  
m More than 50,000 head  (9)  
 
Q7.26 How many years of experience in cattle production do you have?  _______ years (1) 
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Q7.28 Scenario #1 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q7.29 Scenario #2 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q7.30 Scenario #3 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q7.31 Scenario #4 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q7.32 Scenario #5 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q7.33 Scenario #6 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q7.34 Your input will strengthen our research and help us obtain more accurate conclusions. If 
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Start of Block: F2 Version 
 
Q8.1 Which operation type best describes your cattle operation? 
m Feedlot  (1)  
m Feedlot and stocker/backgrounder  (2)  
m Stocker/backgrounder  (3)  
m Other (specify)  (4) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q8.2 Which method do you most frequently use to procure feeder cattle? 
m Sale barn/auction  (1)  
m Direct-Video/Internet auction  (2)  
m Direct-private treaty  (3)  
m Consignment  (4)  
m Forward contract  (5)  
m Carcass basis  (6)  
m Other (specify)  (7) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q8.3 When procuring feeder cattle, do sourcing producers usually provide you with information 
about their operation’s health programs? 
m No  (1)  
m Yes  (2)  
 
Q8.4 how is this information most frequently shared with you? 
m Written documentation  (1)  
m Electronic documentation  (2)  
m Tell buyer orally   (3)  
m Other (specify)  (4) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q8.5 For cattle placed on feed over the past 12 months, what percent were given these vaccines: 
BVD (bovine viral diarrhea)  : _______  (1) 
BRSV (bovine respiratory syncytial virus)  : _______  (2) 
Pasteurella  : _______  (3) 
Leptospira spp. (lepto) : _______  (4) 
PI3 (parainfluenza 3) : _______  (5) 
Injectable IBR (infectious bovine rhinotracheitis) : _______  (6) 
Intranasal IBR : _______  (7) 
Total : ________  
 
Q8.6 For cattle placed on feed over the past 12 months, what percentage were mass treated with 
an antibiotic to prevent or reduce an outbreak of shipping fever? 
Cattle less than 700 lbs when placed : _______  (1) 
Cattle between 700-899 lbs when placed : _______  (2) 
Cattle greater than 900 lbs when placed : _______  (3) 
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Q8.7 How would you rate the biosecurity of your operation compared to other operations in your 
area? 
m Very Low -1  (1)  
m 2  (2)  
m 3  (3)  
m 4  (4)  
m 5  (5)  
m 6  (6)  
m 7  (7)  
m 8  (8)  
m 9  (9)  
m Very High - 10  (10)  
 
Q8.8 Approximately, what percent of your total financial expenditure for cattle production is 
annually spent on biosecurity? 
 _______ percent (1) 
 
Q8.9 During the last 12 months, did your operation consult a veterinarian for: 
 Yes (1) No (2) 
Disease diagnosis or treatment? (1)  m m 
Disease prevention? (2)  m m 
Livestock deaths? (3)  m m 
Information on biosecurity practices? (4)  m m 
Information on foreign animal diseases? (5)  m m 
 
 
Q8.10 For the biosecurity practices listed below, please check the left column for those used on 
your operation. Also please indicate by circling a number, how feasible you believe 
















There is a designated biosecurity 
manager for the operation (1)  m m m m m m 
An operation-specific, written, 
enhanced biosecurity plan has been 
developed (2)  
m m m m m m 
Animals come only from sources with 
documented enhanced biosecurity 
practices (3)  
m m m m m m 
A plan exists to manage animals in a 
biosecure manner on-site in the event 
animal movement is stopped for 
several weeks (4)  
m m m m m m 
Feedstuffs are delivered, stored, mixed, 
and fed in a manner that minimizes 
contamination, and feed spills are 
cleaned up promptly (5)  
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Q8.11 A Line of Separation (LOS) is an outer control boundary around, or within, the premises to 
limit movement of virus into areas where animals can be exposed. Please check the left 
column for those used on your operation. Also please indicate by circling a number, how 

















A line of separation is clearly defined 
and marked on the operation (1)  m m m m m m 
Entry to the operation is restricted to a 
limited number of access points (2)  m m m m m m 
Access is limited to individuals who are 
essential to the operation (3)  m m m m m m 
Vehicles, trailers, and equipment that 
cross the LOS are properly cleaned & 
disinfected (4)  
m m m m m m 
Animals leaving the operation only 
move in one direction across the LOS 
at an Access Point (5)  
m m m m m m 
The area designated for 
loading/unloading animals is not a 
people entry point (6)  
m m m m m m 
Areas contaminated by personnel or 
animals after loading/unloading are 
properly cleaned and disinfected (7)  
m m m m m m 
 
Q8.12 Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. (please circle the 











I am willing to take animal health risks in order 
to make more money (1)  m m m m m 
With respect to the conduct of my business, I 
prefer certainty to uncertainty  (2)  m m m m m 
I am willing to take financial risks in order to 
realize higher average returns (3)  m m m m m 
My cattle operation is protected from financial 
risks (4)  m m m m m 
My cattle operation is protected from animal 
disease risks (5)  m m m m m 
With respect to animal health, I prefer certainty 
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Q8.13 For cattle placed on feed over the past 12 months, what percent of cattle arrived with the 
following methods of animal identification: 
Plastic ear tag : _______  (1) 
Ear notches : _______  (2) 
Brand : _______  (3) 
Tattoo : _______  (4) 
Brucellosis or any other metal tag : _______  (5) 
Electronic ear tag (RFID)  : _______  (6) 
None : _______  (7) 
Other (specify) : _______  (8) 
Total : ________  
 
Q8.14 What would you be willing to pay to receive cattle that are already participating in a Visual 
Traceability program that includes “traditional ear tags” that are read manually upon human 
inspection? 
m Less than $1/head  (1)  
m $1 to $4/head  (2)  
m $5 to $8/head  (3)  
m $9 to $12/head  (4)  
m $13 to $16/head  (5)  
m More than $16/head  (6)  
 
Q8.15 What would you be willing to pay to receive cattle that are already participating in an 
Electronic Traceability program that includes “button-like” radio frequency identification 
(RFID) tags readable by electronic readers? 
m Less than $1/head  (1)  
m $1 to $4/head  (2)  
m $5 to $8/head  (3)  
m $9 to $12/head  (4)  
m $13 to $16/head  (5)  
m More than $16/head  (6)  
 
Q8.16 In designing a national, individual animal traceability system how important are the 











Monitoring/managing disease (1)  m m m m m 
Increasing consumer confidence (2)  m m m m m 
Enhancing marketability (3)  m m m m m 
Maintaining current foreign markets (4)  m m m m m 
Accessing foreign markets (5)  m m m m m 
Improving on-farm management (6)  m m m m m 
Managing the supply chain (7)  m m m m m 
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Q8.17 In designing a national, individual animal traceability system how concerned are you 











Cost to participating producer (1)  m m m m m 
Confidentiality of information (2)  m m m m m 
Reliability of technology (3)  m m m m m 
Liability to participating producer  
(4)  m m m m m 
Non-participating firms benefiting 
(5)  m m m m m 
Failure of system to meet stated 
goals (6)  m m m m m 
 
Q8.18 Please circle your level of agreement with each of the following statements. (please circle 












“is more cost effective for larger feedlot 
operations.” (1)  m m m m m 
“results in more liability for feedlot producers 
than cattle owners at other stages of 
production.” (2)  
m m m m m 
“is unnecessary if COOL (country-of-Origin 
Labeling) was implemented nationally.” (3)  m m m m m 
“as a mandated system is exaggerated in 
need.” (4)  m m m m m 
 
Q8.19 In which state is your cattle operation?  
m Alabama  (1)  
m Alaska  (2)  
m Arizona  (3)  
m Arkansas  (4)  
m California  (5)  
m Colorado  (6)  
m Connecticut  (7)  
m Delaware  (8)  
m District of Columbia  (9)  
m Florida  (10)  
m Georgia  (11)  
m Hawaii  (12)  
m Idaho  (13)  
m Illinois  (14)  
m Indiana  (15)  
m Iowa  (16)  
m Kansas  (17)  
m Kentucky  (18)  
m Louisiana  (19)  
m Maine  (20)  
m Maryland  (21)  
m Massachusetts  (22)  
m Michigan  (23)  
m Minnesota  (24)  
m Mississippi  (25)  
m Missouri  (26)  
m Montana  (27)  
m Nebraska  (28)  
m Nevada  (29)  
m New Hampshire  (30)  
m New Jersey  (31)  
m New Mexico  (32)  
m New York  (33)  
m North Carolina  (34)  
m North Dakota  (35)  
m Ohio  (36)  
m Oklahoma  (37)  
m Oregon  (38)  
m Pennsylvania  (39)  
m Puerto Rico  (40)  
m Rhode Island  (41)  
m South Carolina  (42)  
m South Dakota  (43)  
m Tennessee  (44)  
m Texas  (45)  
m Utah  (46)  
m Vermont  (47)  
m Virginia  (48)  
m Washington  (49)  
m West Virginia  (50)  
m Wisconsin  (51)  
m Wyoming  (52)  
m I do not reside in the 
United States  (53)  
 
Q8.20 What is your age? _______ years (1) 
 
Q8.21 What is your gender? 
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m Male  (1)  
m Female  (2)  
 
Q8.22 What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
m High school graduate/GED  (1)  
m Some college or 2-year college/technical degree  (2)  
m 4-year college degree  (3)  
m Graduate degree (MS, MBA, PhD, DVM, etc.)  (4)  
m Other (specify)  (5) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q8.23 What was your average cost of gain for fed cattle sold over the past 12 months on your 
operation? 
m Less than $60/cwt  (1)  
m $60 to $64.99/cwt  (2)  
m $65 to $69.99/cwt  (3)  
m $70 to $74.99/cwt  (4)  
m $75 to $79.99/cwt  (5)  
m $80 to $84.99/cwt  (6)  
m $85 to $89.99/cwt  (7)  
m Over $90/cwt  (8)  
 
Q8.24 What is the one-time capacity of your feedlot? 
m Less than 1,000 head  (1)  
m 1,000 to 1,999 head  (2)  
m 2,000 to 3,999 head  (3)  
m 4,000 to 7,999 head  (4)  
m 8,000 to 15,999 head  (5)  
m 16,000 to 23,999 head  (6)  
m 24,000 to 31,999 head  (7)  
m 32,000 to 49,999 head  (8)  
m More than 50,000 head  (9)  
 
Q8.25 How many fed cattle were sold on your operation in the last 12 months? 
m Less than 1,000 head  (1)  
m 1,000 to 1,999 head  (2)  
m 2,000 to 3,999 head  (3)  
m 4,000 to 7,999 head  (4)  
m 8,000 to 15,999 head  (5)  
m 16,000 to 23,999 head  (6)  
m 24,000 to 31,999 head  (7)  
m 32,000 to 49,999 head  (8)  
m More than 50,000 head  (9)  
 
Q8.26 How many years of experience in cattle production do you have? _______ years (1) 
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Q8.28 Scenario #1 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q8.29 Scenario #2 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q8.30 Scenario #3 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q8.31 Scenario #4 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q8.32 Scenario #5 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q8.33 Scenario #6 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q8.34 Your input will strengthen our research and help us obtain more accurate conclusions. If 
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Start of Block: F3 Version 
 
Q9.1 Which operation type best describes your cattle operation? 
m Feedlot  (1)  
m Feedlot and stocker/backgrounder  (2)  
m Stocker/backgrounder  (3)  
m Other (specify)  (4) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q9.2 Which method do you most frequently use to procure feeder cattle? 
m Sale barn/auction  (1)  
m Direct-Video/Internet auction  (2)  
m Direct-private treaty  (3)  
m Consignment  (4)  
m Forward contract  (5)  
m Carcass basis  (6)  
m Other (specify)  (7) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q9.3 When procuring feeder cattle, do sourcing producers usually provide you with information 
about their operation’s health programs? 
m No  (1)  
m Yes  (2)  
 
Q9.4 how is this information most frequently shared with you? 
m Written documentation  (1)  
m Electronic documentation  (2)  
m Tell buyer orally   (3)  
m Other (specify)  (4) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q9.5 For cattle placed on feed over the past 12 months, what percent were given these vaccines: 
BVD (bovine viral diarrhea)  : _______  (1) 
BRSV (bovine respiratory syncytial virus)  : _______  (2) 
Pasteurella  : _______  (3) 
Leptospira spp. (lepto) : _______  (4) 
PI3 (parainfluenza 3) : _______  (5) 
Injectable IBR (infectious bovine rhinotracheitis) : _______  (6) 
Intranasal IBR : _______  (7) 
 
Q9.6 For cattle placed on feed over the past 12 months, what percentage were mass treated with 
an antibiotic to prevent or reduce an outbreak of shipping fever? 
Cattle less than 700 lbs when placed : _______  (1) 
Cattle between 700-899 lbs when placed : _______  (2) 
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Q9.7 How would you rate the biosecurity of your operation compared to other operations in your 
area? 
m Very Low -1  (1)  
m 2  (2)  
m 3  (3)  
m 4  (4)  
m 5  (5)  
m 6  (6)  
m 7  (7)  
m 8  (8)  
m 9  (9)  
m Very High - 10  (10)  
 
Q9.8 Approximately, what percent of your total financial expenditure for cattle production is 
annually spent on biosecurity? 
 _______ percent (1) 
 
Q9.9 During the last 12 months, did your operation consult a veterinarian for: 
 Yes (1) No (2) 
Disease diagnosis or treatment? (1)  m m 
Disease prevention? (2)  m m 
Livestock deaths? (3)  m m 
Information on biosecurity practices? (4)  m m 
Information on foreign animal diseases? (5)  m m 
 
Q9.10 For the biosecurity practices listed below, please check the left column for those used on 
your operation. Also please indicate by circling a number, how feasible you believe 
















There is a designated biosecurity 
manager for the operation (1)  m m m m m m 
An operation-specific, written, 
enhanced biosecurity plan has been 
developed (2)  
m m m m m m 
Animals come only from sources with 
documented enhanced biosecurity 
practices (3)  
m m m m m m 
A plan exists to manage animals in a 
biosecure manner on-site in the event 
animal movement is stopped for 
several weeks (4)  
m m m m m m 
Feedstuffs are delivered, stored, mixed, 
and fed in a manner that minimizes 
contamination, and feed spills are 
cleaned up promptly (5)  
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Q9.11 A Line of Separation (LOS) is an outer control boundary around, or within, the premises to 
limit movement of virus into areas where animals can be exposed. Please check the left 
column for those used on your operation. Also please indicate by circling a number, how 

















A line of separation is clearly defined 
and marked on the operation (1)  m m m m m m 
Entry to the operation is restricted to a 
limited number of access points (2)  m m m m m m 
Access is limited to individuals who are 
essential to the operation (3)  m m m m m m 
Vehicles, trailers, and equipment that 
cross the LOS are properly cleaned & 
disinfected (4)  
m m m m m m 
Animals leaving the operation only 
move in one direction across the LOS 
at an Access Point (5)  
m m m m m m 
The area designated for 
loading/unloading animals is not a 
people entry point (6)  
m m m m m m 
Areas contaminated by personnel or 
animals after loading/unloading are 
properly cleaned and disinfected (7)  
m m m m m m 
 
Q9.12 Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. (please circle the 











I am willing to take animal health risks in order 
to make more money (1)  m m m m m 
With respect to the conduct of my business, I 
prefer certainty to uncertainty  (2)  m m m m m 
I am willing to take financial risks in order to 
realize higher average returns (3)  m m m m m 
My cattle operation is protected from financial 
risks (4)  m m m m m 
My cattle operation is protected from animal 
disease risks (5)  m m m m m 
With respect to animal health, I prefer certainty 
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Q9.13 For cattle placed on feed over the past 12 months, what percent of cattle arrived with the 
following methods of animal identification: 
Plastic ear tag : _______  (1) 
Ear notches : _______  (2) 
Brand : _______  (3) 
Tattoo : _______  (4) 
Brucellosis or any other metal tag : _______  (5) 
Electronic ear tag (RFID)  : _______  (6) 
None : _______  (7) 
Other (specify) : _______  (8) 
Total : ________  
 
Q9.14 What would you be willing to pay to receive cattle that are already participating in a Visual 
Traceability program that includes “traditional ear tags” that are read manually upon human 
inspection? 
m Less than $1/head  (1)  
m $1 to $4/head  (2)  
m $5 to $8/head  (3)  
m $9 to $12/head  (4)  
m $13 to $16/head  (5)  
m More than $16/head  (6)  
 
Q9.15 What would you be willing to pay to receive cattle that are already participating in an 
Electronic Traceability program that includes “button-like” radio frequency identification 
(RFID) tags readable by electronic readers? 
m Less than $1/head  (1)  
m $1 to $4/head  (2)  
m $5 to $8/head  (3)  
m $9 to $12/head  (4)  
m $13 to $16/head  (5)  
m More than $16/head  (6)  
 
Q9.16 In designing a national, individual animal traceability system how important are the 














Monitoring/managing disease (1)  m m m m m 
Increasing consumer confidence (2)  m m m m m 
Enhancing marketability (3)  m m m m m 
Maintaining current foreign markets (4)  m m m m m 
Accessing foreign markets (5)  m m m m m 
Improving on-farm management (6)  m m m m m 
Managing the supply chain (7)  m m m m m 
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Q9.17 In designing a national, individual animal traceability system how concerned are you 














Cost to participating producer (1)  m m m m m 
Confidentiality of information (2)  m m m m m 
Reliability of technology (3)  m m m m m 
Liability to participating producer  
(4)  m m m m m 
Non-participating firms benefiting 
(5)  m m m m m 
Failure of system to meet stated 
goals (6)  m m m m m 
 
 
Q9.18 Please circle your level of agreement with each of the following statements. (please circle 












“is more cost effective for larger feedlot 
operations.” (1)  m m m m m 
“results in more liability for feedlot producers 
than cattle owners at other stages of 
production.” (2)  
m m m m m 
“is unnecessary if COOL (country-of-Origin 
Labeling) was implemented nationally.” (3)  m m m m m 
“as a mandated system is exaggerated in 
need.” (4)  m m m m m 
 
 
Q9.19 In which state is your cattle operation?  
m Alabama  (1)  
m Alaska  (2)  
m Arizona  (3)  
m Arkansas  (4)  
m California  (5)  
m Colorado  (6)  
m Connecticut  (7)  
m Delaware  (8)  
m District of Columbia  (9)  
m Florida  (10)  
m Georgia  (11)  
m Hawaii  (12)  
m Idaho  (13)  
m Illinois  (14)  
m Indiana  (15)  
m Iowa  (16)  
m Kansas  (17)  
m Kentucky  (18)  
m Louisiana  (19)  
m Maine  (20)  
m Maryland  (21)  
m Massachusetts  (22)  
m Michigan  (23)  
m Minnesota  (24)  
m Mississippi  (25)  
m Missouri  (26)  
m Montana  (27)  
m Nebraska  (28)  
m Nevada  (29)  
m New Hampshire  (30)  
m New Jersey  (31)  
m New Mexico  (32)  
m New York  (33)  
m North Carolina  (34)  
m North Dakota  (35)  
m Ohio  (36)  
m Oklahoma  (37)  
m Oregon  (38)  
m Pennsylvania  (39)  
m Puerto Rico  (40)  
m Rhode Island  (41)  
m South Carolina  (42)  
m South Dakota  (43)  
m Tennessee  (44)  
m Texas  (45)  
m Utah  (46)  
m Vermont  (47)  
m Virginia  (48)  
m Washington  (49)  
m West Virginia  (50)  
m Wisconsin  (51)  
m Wyoming  (52)  
m I do not reside in the 
United States  (53)  
 
Q9.20 What is your age?  _______ years (1) 
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Q9.21 What is your gender? 
m Male  (1)  
m Female  (2)  
 
Q9.22 What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
m High school graduate/GED  (1)  
m Some college or 2-year college/technical degree  (2)  
m 4-year college degree  (3)  
m Graduate degree (MS, MBA, PhD, DVM, etc.)  (4)  
m Other (specify)  (5) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q9.23 What was your average cost of gain for fed cattle sold over the past 12 months on your 
operation? 
m Less than $60/cwt  (1)  
m $60 to $64.99/cwt  (2)  
m $65 to $69.99/cwt  (3)  
m $70 to $74.99/cwt  (4)  
m $75 to $79.99/cwt  (5)  
m $80 to $84.99/cwt  (6)  
m $85 to $89.99/cwt  (7)  
m Over $90/cwt  (8)  
 
Q9.24 What is the one-time capacity of your feedlot? 
m Less than 1,000 head  (1)  
m 1,000 to 1,999 head  (2)  
m 2,000 to 3,999 head  (3)  
m 4,000 to 7,999 head  (4)  
m 8,000 to 15,999 head  (5)  
m 16,000 to 23,999 head  (6)  
m 24,000 to 31,999 head  (7)  
m 32,000 to 49,999 head  (8)  
m More than 50,000 head  (9)  
 
Q9.25 How many fed cattle were sold on your operation in the last 12 months? 
m Less than 1,000 head  (1)  
m 1,000 to 1,999 head  (2)  
m 2,000 to 3,999 head  (3)  
m 4,000 to 7,999 head  (4)  
m 8,000 to 15,999 head  (5)  
m 16,000 to 23,999 head  (6)  
m 24,000 to 31,999 head  (7)  
m 32,000 to 49,999 head  (8)  
m More than 50,000 head  (9)  
 
Q9.26 How many years of experience in cattle production do you have?  _______ years (1) 
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Q9.28 Scenario #1 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q9.29 Scenario #2 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q9.30 Scenario #3 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q9.31 Scenario #4 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q9.32 Scenario #5 
m Visual Taceability  (1)  
m Electronic Traceability  (2)  
m No Tracability  (3)  
 
Q9.33 Your input will strengthen our research and help us obtain more accurate conclusions. If 
you wish to add any comments that might be useful in our research, please feel free to do so 
here. 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
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